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Summary 
The thesis is a response to the fact that the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority questions 
the learning ability of the petroleum companies that are operating on the Norwegian 
continental shelf, despite that this is something that has been focused on for decades. The 
issue of learning has recently become increasingly important because of the increasingly 
number of oil & gas companies operating on the Norwegian continental shelf.  
The thesis aims at study factors of importance for the learning ability of companies (the thesis 
is not necessarily just aimed at oil companies) with regards to internal/external experience. 
The terms internal/external experience is explained more in detail in the introduction chapter.  
In order to reveal inhibitors/promoters towards a learning organization it where created 
following research questions: 
 What characterizes a learning organization? 
 What inhibitors to learn from safety experience exist? 
 What promoters to learn from safety experience exist? 
 What general and specific advices can be given to promote learning from 
internal/external experience? 
 
In order to answer these questions, it where chosen a qualitative research approach based on a 
semi-qualitative interview guide which aimed at reveal the experience of nine employees 
within three different oil companies with regards to learn from unwanted incidents/conditions, 
as well as systems to assure learning within their current employer.  
 
The interview results provided the basis for the empirical part of the thesis by using grounded 
theory to code the results in order to find out which issues that were repeatedly mentioned, in 
order to reveal patterns and also to see what issues that were not given so much thought. The 
empirical results where then compared to prewritten theory, which was developed by study 
known literature within organizational learning. It where on the basis of this comparison 
developed recommendations for how to learn from internal/external experience. The 
recommendations are applicable for the oil industry as a whole, and could probably also be 
used by companies in other industries.  
 
The main findings in the thesis can be summarized to the following content: 
 Cooperate across internal/external boundaries in order to learn from each other and 
ensure that everyone/as many as possible are able to participate/express their concerns 
and take signals from different actors seriously  
 Be open for criticism even of established systems  
 Ensure clarity regarding information, expectations, responsibilities, connections with 
following measures, distinguishing of incidents and different types of knowledge 
 Make things easy to follow/summarize  
 Ensure that investigations performed and procedures developed are backed by existing 
ground rules 
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 Map inabilities, long time issues and take into account conflicting interests as well as 
different assumptions 
 Ensure enthusiasm to new solutions and avoid giving blame 
 Important with a proactive management which do not back down from problems but 
instead engages in issues 
 Develop arenas where the aim is to study improvements 
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1 Introduction  
This chapter is dedicated to give a brief introduction to the background for the thesis, and 
what is going to be explored.  
1.1 Background  
To learn from experience is a well-known challenge for many companies. This goes for both 
internal and external experience and applies in many industries. The issue of learning gives 
the basis for this thesis.  
The term internal experience in this context means experience that companies obtain from 
field study of their internal operations, and experiences related to internal incidents. External 
experience covers study of incidents among competitors. It can for example be that employees 
of a company have been on a seminar where they have been studying a certain incident in 
order to learn from it, or it can be participation in forums that aims at exchange experience 
within a specific business field, for example a HSE forum.   
The thesis aims at develop general recommendations for how to establish and facilitate a 
learning organization related to safety. The recommendations are based on a combination 
between general theory for how to ensure organizational learning and empirical results based 
on nine semi-qualitative interviews of personnel within three different oil companies in order 
to reveal their views for how to learn from internal/external experience, as well as systems 
that exist at their current employers that have the aim of promote learning.  
In practise it appears that lack of shearing of knowledge and experience is a common factor 
that inhibits learning in many companies. Analyses at Statoil revealed that underlying causes 
to incidents are not necessary the same as direct causes (Hansen & Leknes, Læring av 
hendelser i Statoil, 2011). Underlying causes might not be dangerous apart and an 
organization can live with them for a long time without something happens. The challenge is 
to reveal these underlying incidents before an accident occur. In Hansen & Lekenes report it 
were revelled that Statoil had problems with different tools like IT- systems which did not 
work as it were intended to and that information of relevance for the employees where seen as 
unavailable. Organization and coordination were also seen as a challenging.  
In the Norwegian continental shelf it has been made analysis of incidents with regards to 
learning, one of them are in relation to well C-06 A on the Gullfaks A platform. One common 
way of separating challenges are to divide them into two parts, one are related to deviation, 
while the other are related to possibilities for improvements. The incident on Gullfaks proved 
that there was inadequate follow-up of documentation that regulates the policy of the 
company. Thus requirements to methods, exchange of experience, quality assurance of plans 
and processes, requirements to training and involvement of relevant personnel (Gundersen, 
2010). Even though Statoil analysed this incident afterwards, it were revealed that several of 
the key personnel were not involved and did not know about the content in the analysis, which 
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cannot be claimed to promote learning. Several employees of the company thought also that 
the incident should have been investigated.  
The thesis is a response to the challenge with regards to learning with the aim of assuring that 
incidents like Gullfaks do not occur in the future and to ensure proper analyses/investigations 
if incidents are to occur.  
1.2 Objective 
The objective of the thesis is to come up with recommendations with regards to 
internal/external learning. The thesis is divided into six parts. The first part gives an 
introduction into how the work is performed, and what the expected results of the study are. 
The second part aims to describe relevant theory on the field. The third part is dedicated to 
describe methods that are used when working with this thesis. The fourth part consists of an 
empirical study based on nine semi-qualitative interviews of employees at three different oil 
companies, where identification of what inhibit and promote learning where the goal. The 
fifth part consists of a discussion where the theory and the empirical findings are compared; 
the aim is to come up with recommendations in order to learn from internal/external 
experience, the recommendations are meant to be a helping tool for the oil industry as a 
whole, but could possibly also be applicable in other industries. The last part is a brief 
conclusion of the main features for how to ensure a learning organization based on the work 
performed in the thesis.  
1.3 Research questions 
 What characterizes a learning organization? 
 What inhibitors to learn from safety experience exist? 
 What promoters to learn from safety experience exist? 
 What general and specific advices can be given to promote learning from 
internal/external experience? 
 
1.4 Clarification and limitations 
As mentioned this study aims at come up with recommendations in order to learn from 
internal/external experience. Since this is going to be achieved through a combination of 
general theory and empirical studies, the challenges lies in choosing the right theoretical 
material as well as have a good empirical study.  
With regards to the theory, this is a field that can be related to several reports and books, 
therefore the clue is to narrow it down and try to think of how to use the theory in practise. 
In general when doing empirical studies the challenge lie in choosing the right amount of 
cases/interviewee in order to get a broad perspective of the issue. In addition to this the 
quality of the studies/interviewees plays a crucial role in order to get an accurate picture of 
where the challenges lie.  
These are the main factors that bring limitations to the result and the recommendations 
developed.  
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2 Theory on how to create a learning organization 
As a result of more complex organizations and shifty environments, the attention towards 
organizational learning has increased. It is important for an organization that wants to become 
successful and have the ability to achieve innovation are aware of this, so that they do not fall 
behind in the competition with competing actors on the marked.  
This chapter aims at describe factors that ensure organizations to not fall in the trap of getting 
stuck in old patterns and established ways of thinking, but instead undermine the goal of 
being dynamic and successful also in the future.  
2.1 A general introduction to learning 
Learning is about changing either through changed knowledge or behavior. From a 
psychological point of view learning is a result of experiences that changes our behavior 
(Reber, 1995). This means that learning is not something that can be achieved only through 
collect of information, but rather something that have to be tried. This implies that when we 
learn we re-creates ourselves by coping something that we before couldn’t handle (Senge, 
1990).  
Many definitions have been made in order to describe an learning organization, but perhaps 
the best definition is by Senge (1990:3) who defines learning organizations as “organizations 
where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where 
new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, 
and where people are continually learning how to learn together.” 
There is no general consensus regarding what organizational learning really is. It can be 
claimed that organizational learning is a process where an organization and its sub-units 
changes as a result of experience. Learning can be at an internal level where members of an 
organization learns by studying their own experiences or at external level where learning is 
achieved through studying of similar departments. When studying the performance of units it 
can be made a distinction between learning that aims at correcting failure and learning aiming 
at including errors and see them as inevitable (Hollnagel, 2011) which is something that is 
achieved by acquiring of knowledge and adapt behavior as a result of the new knowledge 
(Garvin, 2000).  
Another view is that organizational learning is about change of organizational knowledge. 
This can be achieved for example by convert knowledge into routines that provides guidelines 
for how to behave. The aim here is to understand the processes behind the change of 
organizational knowledge, and the effects it has (Schults, 2002).  
2.1.1 Different values in an organization 
How organizations work can hardly be controlled through written guidelines but rather 
through the members understanding on how the organization works, and which set of values 
that exist. It is a local reality that controls us; this is what is called action theory (Levin & 
Klev, 2002). The action theory is developed through practical training and experience. It is a 
complex interaction between what we consciously reflect and what are controlled by our 
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silence knowledge that has been developed through training and experience (Argyris & 
Schøn, 1996). To be able to change this behavior gives the basis for a learning organization. 
Another value is theory in use, which is a form of everyday theory that reveals the real actions 
of the participants. This makes it possible to study the tension between what employees in a 
company say they do (theory espoused) and what they really do (theory in use). To solve the 
counterpart between theory espoused and theory in use gives the basis to develop strategies 
(Argyris & Schøn, 1996). 
As mentioned theory espoused is a description by the members in the organization of how 
they really want the other members to think, thus the desired value of the organization. 
2.1.2 To be able to learn  
Before an organization can learn there are some important assumptions that have to be 
considered.  
2.1.2.1 Purpose 
Before evaluating the learning ability of organizations it is important to understand what 
purpose the learning has. One purpose can be related to the aim of achieve improvement by 
increase the favorable results. Another purpose can be to see learning as recordings, where 
conclusions are maid on the background of experiences and that these conclusions are 
formalized into routines, procedures, conventions, technologies and strategies. The third 
purpose emphasizes learning as an evolution of knowledge over time and how this is to be 
distributed to sub – units (Schults, 2002).  
2.1.2.2 See the context 
Since every organization is a part of a social and historical continuity it is important to see the 
context the organization is in, organizations tends to avoid/reduce uncertainty by negotiating 
their own environment by follow tried and tested approaches/methods within the industry. In 
this environment members of the organization are forced to act upon more or less complete 
information, which might lead to that the members will reduce uncertainty by reducing 
complexity, based on the criteria they feel they are evaluated on (Baumard, 1999). As a result 
of that organization often develops filters against incoming signals, in order to make sense of 
their environment and constraints (Cyert & March, 2006). This can result in that the 
organization develops a misinterpreting system. It can for example be that an organization 
uses a worldview based on past behavior as an equipment to understand the current situation 
(Daft & Weick, 1984). In this environment knowledge are a changeable and delicate thing, 
and will if drawn from its application be lost if it is moved from its context (Baumard, 1999). 
The environment of the organization are especially enlightened when facing a major accident 
which results in that expectations arise from many different actors that demands results. It can 
after a major incident be appropriate to study the period right in front of the accident in order 
to study why an organization does not correct its view even though the organization probably 
have seen signs on that the world view might not be correct (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).  
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2.1.2.3 Pressure 
A certain pressure is healthy for an organization, since it highlight important issues that an 
organization has to improve, however it is important to be aware that this pressure may only 
affect external features of the organization, and have a little impact on the core concept or in 
the sharp end. This can be as a result of that measures are taken fast with little pre assessment, 
the actions taken are purely in a symbolic nature, or it could be the media which often uses 
exaggerating and catastrophe techniques (Hovden, 2011) may affect the agenda.  
2.1.2.4 Conditions and tools to ensure learning 
In the past learning has been seen as something restricted to individuals, but has in later years 
also been seen as a key concept for organizational development. There have been written 
papers that explore learning related to human, technological and organizational issues 
(Størseth & Tinmannsvik, 2011). To be able to learn it is important to realize that the biggest 
barriers against learning often are that members don’t want to learn. This can be as a result of 
that members don’t want to admit they are wrong because of the fear of being punished, or 
because of other defense mechanisms we have been grooving up with and that hierarchical 
organizations have thought us (Argyris & Schøn, 1996).  
To be able to learn Størseth & Tinmannsvik (2011) describes different conditions in an 
organization that have to be in place.  
 Cooperation: It is necessary that different actors cooperate across different sectors.  
 Motivation: It is important that the members of the organization are willingly to 
confront the problem with an open mind in an honest effort to learn.  
 Trust: It is of importance that the different segments have a trust in each other. So that 
they can shear with others what they do wrong.  
 Participation: Try to incorporate all key personnel and segments, so they can 
contribute at develop measures 
(Størseth & Tinmannsvik, 2011).  
The main difference between organizational and individual learning is that organizational 
learning means a change in the shared understanding between members of the organization. 
An important model developed to describe learning in organizations is the learning by 
experience model (Kolb, 1984). This model identifies the processes that are important in order 
to be able to learn in a good and effective manner.  
 
Page 11 of 119 
 
  
Figure 1: David Kolbes cycle on experimental learning (Amstron & Fukami, 2009).  
The figure shows a learning cycle where concrete experiences are being reflected to build up 
an understanding of what really happens, and afterwards use these new understandings as a 
basis for new actions, experiences and so on.  
2.1.3 Different goals with the learning 
When discussing learning it is important that the organization reflects what they are trying to 
achieve. For example distinguish between single loop and double loop learning.  
 
Figure 2 Argrys & Schøn single vs. double loop learning model (nwlink.com, 2010).  
As the figure shows single loop learning is a form of instrumental learning that changes the 
action strategies, but leaves the values of a theory unchanged. For example an inspector 
which identifies a defective product and conveys that information to a product engineer who 
may change the product specifications and methods to correct the defect. It is an adjustment 
of the action strategies, while the basic values and goals are still the same.  
Double loop learning also changes the values of theory in use (action theory) as well as the 
strategy of action. This double loop connects the observed effect of action with strategies and 
values served by strategies. This form of learning may be carried out by individuals, when 
their inquire leads to a change in the values of their theory in use or by organizations, when 
individuals inquire on behalf of an organization. This form of learning asks not only if the 
issues are done the right way but also if the right things are done (Klev & Levin, 2009).  
2.1.4 Problems with learning 
We have to be aware of that not all kind of learning is positive. It can be that locally based 
learning have provided good results in a local area and therefore becomes repeated several 
times. This is something that tends to happen when there is a lack of compliance with 
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procedures and rules to ensure the system as a whole, and units develops ways to act based on 
practical trying and failing. How centralized a system should be organized has to be based on 
how tight the connections in the system are (Perrow, 1999). With tight connections failure 
will spread rapidly and there is a little room for slack in the system. The contraction to this is 
a system with loose couplings. Here there is room for slack and failure spreads slowly, in this 
kind of system organizations might not need a very coordinated structure. Also when studying 
connections in an organization it is important to be aware that organizations might outsource 
activities in order to learn more about their core concepts. This can cause problems in 
shearing information across organizational boundaries.  
Another problem with learning is that it can be developed a culture within an organization that 
over time adapts dangerous situations and accepts hazards by learning to handle them instead 
of do something about it. This often occurs when the framework is incomplete (Vaughan, 
1996), and it within this develops procedures and an understanding of the system that 
weakens the risk control.   
When an organization tries to develop an identity among members and attach them to 
experiences, a discipline process is important. This process however might have a bi effect in 
form of fear of sanctions among members, and may undermine the flow of information within 
the organization. 
2.2 System thinking 
If a company rely too much fait on the system it can result in that errors become traced back 
to individuals in the system and that the focus becomes directed against the users of the 
system, rather than focus on the system that might have issues to be dealt with (Hansen & 
Lekenes, Læring av hendelser i Statoil, 2011). 
In order to develop a learning organization it is crucial to implement the so called fifth 
discipline, which is system thinking. This discipline aims at integrate different disciplines and 
melt them together as a unit of theory and practice. To be able to develop a good system 
strategy in an organization it is important that following four disciplines operates 
simultaneously, that is; personal mastery, mental models, common visions and group learning 
(Senge, 1990).  
 Personal mastery: with personal mastery it means not just competence and skills, but 
also spiritual expression. The discipline can be divided in two, one is a continual 
mapping of what is right for us, and the other one is related to how we clearer can see 
our present reality. The system perspective will map the structures that characterize 
personal mastery, but also the more subtle sides like integration of reason and 
common sense in order to see more of our relation to the world, compassion and 
commitment to see the whole. 
 Mental models: the reason for that new ideas often fails and organizations are kept 
from learning is that new insight do not become considered because that it contradict 
with old and ingrown performances about how the world works. Therefore it is 
important that organizations explore this discipline in order to achieve change. This 
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can be done by use of institutional new ways of thinking so that new skills can become 
regular.  
 Common visions: common visions enable an organization to focus on a subject, and it 
provides the group with energy to continue the work. It is impossible to create 
generative learning without the members feel that something really matters for them. 
Therefore it is important that the members feel a commitment towards the vision, and 
that it is not just something that is forced upon the employees of a company from the 
top management. When developing such visions it is important that the visions are not 
restricted to an outer issue like benchmarking with a competitor in world class 
(Stapenhurst, 2012), because this can restrict the creativity when the goal is 
completed. The key is continually improvement of the processes regardless of how 
good the organization is compared to competitors. After clarifying the vision is it is 
important that people starts to talk about it and create enthusiasm, enthusiasm can also 
be strengthen by early successes, in seeking the goal.  
 Group learning: this is the process of fine – tuning and development of the 
organization`s ability to create desired results. This is a discipline that focuses on 
developing of individuals as well as collectives that contributes to collaboration across 
functions. The discipline consists of three main parts. The first one is to find out how 
they can use all the brains in the organization, in order to release the full potential. The 
second is to coordinate the interaction between the individuals. The third are the 
impact that the group members have on other groups, that is encouraging other groups 
to do the same.   
The purpose of these disciplines is to ensure a synergy effect where the combined result of the 
measures exceeds the sum of its parts (Senge, 1990).  
2.3 A learning culture 
In order to develop a learning organization it is not enough to have the right formal strategies 
and tools in place, it is also important that the organization have the mind set to undermine an 
intelligent and learning organization. This is important because culture reflects the product of 
individual and common values, competence and behavior pattern that determines the degree 
of commitment to the strategy of the company (Kongsvik, 2012). This issue has often not 
become prioritized because the main focus has been on technical solutions. To develop a 
learning culture aims at develop knowledge systems that underlines an effective spreading 
and exploiting of knowledge. It can be several reasons that make this problematic; it can for 
example be that people do not want to shear knowledge because of the fear of their own 
position (Rekdal, Fledsberg, & Hansen, 2002).  
2.3.1 Definition and different levels of culture 
How to define organization culture is not always easy, Bang (1995:97) says “organizational 
culture is a set of sheared norms, values and perception of reality that develops in an 
organization when the members interacts with each other and the environment”.  When 
studying the culture of an organization as a whole it can be a beneficial to divide the culture 
into three different levels (Schein E. H., 1987): 
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 Artifacts and products: This is the most visible level in a culture. It can be products 
that the group delivers, spatial design, the language that are used and the observable 
behavior among the members. To observe these artifacts are easy, the challenge is to 
understand what they mean, the relation between them and the patterns they represent. 
Therefore it is important to study artifacts over a long time scale in order to understand 
the real culture.  
 Values: When a group faces a problem with no common consensus on how to 
determine if this solution will work or not, the selected solution will reflect the value 
of the group.  If the solution achieves a consensus that it works, it will go through a 
cognitive transformation so that it first will be regarded as a perception, and so as an 
assumption. Therefore cultural learning can to some extent be regarded as a reflection 
of personal values. The value can thus reveal the climate in the organization, which is 
a snapshot of the culture.  
 Basic underlying assumptions: One of the main reasons that organizations do not 
renew themselves is because they take for grounded certain assumptions which leads 
to that they do not see other solutions. This is often because that certain solution 
approves to be appropriate several times, and it gives the basis for how the members 
of a group should think, act and feel. To reveal what kind of assumptions that exists in 
an organization it is not enough to study artifacts and values, but should also interview 
key personnel to reveal the real culture.  
 
2.3.2 How to create a learning culture 
An organization can have the best tools in the world to achieve continually learning. This is 
not good enough without having a culture that emphasizes learning. In order to achieve this it 
is several elements that have to be considered. 
2.3.2.1 Inhibitors towards a learning culture 
How to understand a culture can sometimes be difficult. Culture is not something statically 
that can be completed, but are rather something that are expressed through what we do 
together and are under continually development. The disadvantageous side by having a strong 
culture in an organization is that it might affect the ability to think outside the box (Rosness & 
Nesheim, 2013), which might affect the ability the organization have to acquire knowledge. 
This because that the collective identity is so strong that the members are afraid to come up 
with ideas that violates what’s normal practice. This can be further underlined with a blaming 
culture that aims at find persons to be held responsible, and which do not provide possibilities 
to test causals and other solutions. On the other hand a weak collective identity can result in 
that the members are most concerned with their own interests and do not provide anything 
extra for the group or the organization, and as a result of that have little to contribute with.  
2.3.2.2 Cooperation and participation  
Culture are very seldom a common entity, but are usually divided in different subcultures. It is 
not an individual property but is developed in relation between people and certain frameworks 
(Gherardi & Nicolini, 2006). In order to develop a culture, it is important that people with 
different views work together so that the organization accumulates ideas and becomes more 
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dynamic. It is important that organizations that want creative contributions from their 
members have a tolerance for new ideas and encourage exchange of oral experience, 
creativity and fantasy in order to develop safer work (Petroleumstilsynet, 2002). To ensure 
that the members of the culture do not feel that something are unjustified it is important to 
prevent unjustified blame, that is to develop an predictable and acceptable policy in order to 
separate unjustifiable errors from errors that are caused by systematically deviations 
(Kongsvik, 2012).  
2.3.2.3 Think outside the box 
Myths are something that is embedded into many groups/individual and prevents learning, the 
key is to identify and dispel them in order to change behavior (Short, 2007). Therefore it is 
important to not only train on the same scenarios, but also develop the training programs so it 
enables the training programs to learn and develop. The training programs should also provide 
flexibility to the organization, in order to improvise in difficult situations. This can be 
undermined by training first line leaders in situations that demands improvisation, mix 
members with different background and stimulate to direct communication.  
2.3.2.4 Measure the learning ability  
To ensure that a culture is healthy and learning it is important with a clue on how to measure 
it. This can be answered by asking following questions (Antonsen, 2009):  
 Can a learning culture be observed by studying individuals or interactions, or is the 
culture about basic assumptions?  
 Can it be developed a tool to measure the extent of the learning culture? 
 Can the management of a company specify and implement the learning culture?  
 Are there some signs to look for that characterizes a learning culture?  
 Is the learning culture dependent on the organization culture as a whole?  
 
2.3.3 Create a reporting culture 
To maintain an intelligent organization it is important to develop an information system that 
embrace learning from incidents, accidents and other relevant experiences (Pidgeon, 1998). It 
is therefore important to develop a good reporting system.  
2.3.3.1 Ensure participation  
In a reporting culture the focus is on mapping critical incidents and near accidents. To be able 
to reveal factors like that in an organization it is important to build trust so that members in an 
organization do not fear of the consequences if they choose to report the incident. One way of 
assuring trust can be to ensure confidentiality to they who report, but on the long term the 
goal has to be to ensure a strong confidence in the organization so that confidentiality does 
not become necessary. It is important that the members know that in the reporting system the 
intention is to learn rather than sanction members that do mistakes (Petroleumstilsynet, 2002). 
In addition to this the Norwegian petroleum authority focuses on that the reporting must be 
seen as something meaningful, and not something that stands as a counterpart to more 
profound based analyses. Also to ensure that the reporters feel appreciated it is important with 
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a fast follow-up of the reporting (Reason, 1997) so that the reporters see that changes occur 
rapidly and does not become delayed.  
It is important that the reporting practice have strategies to cope with conflicting interests 
among different actors (authorities, jurisdictions, industry, private companies), therefore it can 
be necessary with several separated reporting systems (Le Coze, 2013). In addition the reports 
should be easy to make, so it do not consume too much time.  
2.3.3.2 Select what to be investigated  
After reporting Le Coze underlines the importance of selecting which incidents to be 
investigated more thoroughly, this can be done by looking for patterns, see connections, look 
after something new, as well as deviations. The results and subsequent recommendations from 
these investigations must be implemented in an appropriate way that takes into account the 
regulatory regime and its ability to adapt and transform public policies. It is important that the 
management is willingly to take the necessary steps to implement changes that are indicated 
by the information system, so that the reporting stands as something useful and is taken 
seriously.  
2.4 Strategies to achieve a learning organization 
Before an organization implement tools to undermine learning it is important that the 
organization have the adequate strategies to achieve this.  
2.4.1 Problems 
To develop strategies for handling the underlying causes is not always easy. This because the 
root causes for accidents are often complex and developed in the interaction between actors at 
different levels in socio-technical systems (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). Also when develop 
strategies it is important to divide between two types of knowledge. One is exploitation which 
is about improving existing routines, working methods and procedures. This kind of 
knowledge is usually related to increased efficiency and improvement of productivity. The 
other type of knowledge are exploration where an entity are learning something new, by 
seeing things differently and find new opportunities and options in doing tasks (Levitt & 
March, 1988). Especially the last form of knowledge can be useful when a company needs to 
innovate processes or products. These two types of knowledge promotes a challenge 
regarding achieving a balance between them (Rosness & Nesheim, 2013).  
2.4.2 Different activity and organizational characteristics  
Another important factor to keep in mind when analyzing organizations, in order to develop 
strategies is to understand what characterizes the activities. Some activities might be 
characterized by that they are often repeated and have no time limit, while other tasks might 
be more special and unique and have a clear date for when to start and when it ends. In 
organizations with repeatable tasks, it would be preferred an organization with parts 
(departments, production or functional entities) that can save and spread knowledge.  
A typical example of an organizational solution to maintain more time limited activities is a 
project organization. This type of organization can be implemented in many ways; it can be 
intended as a supplement, or as a lasting production, or even as a main contributor to the work 
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in the organization. The actors are here more variable and isolated from the organization, and 
include usually internal and external members. In such project based organizations the 
challenge is to learn between projects, it can be documentation of practices in different part of 
the project, experience with suppliers and customers, and identification of experts at the area.  
To maintain an organization as a collective it is important to keep in mind that even though 
the members are in possession of important knowledge this do not ensure an intelligent 
organization. It is therefore important that knowledge held by individuals enters into the 
organizational thoughts and actions (Argyris & Schøn, 1996). We have also the counterpart 
that is when organizations perform better than the skills of the members would imply. This 
can be a result of that structure, procedures and memories are well integrated into the 
organization, like in the army.  In an organization like that the organization becomes the 
behavioral setter. Even though this approach are reached the problem are still to link 
individuals to organizational processes. To solve this problem there are different approaches 
that have to be considered.  
2.4.3 Different strategic approaches 
When developing a learning strategy it is several contradictions that have to be considered. 
2.4.3.1 Who contribute to the learning?  
When developing strategies for learning in an organization one decision could be if the 
organization are going to rely on one key person or to see the organization as clusters/groups 
that learn from each other.  
When seeing the executive as the key person to ensure learning in the organization. The key is 
to have effective communication patterns between the executive and the employees. The 
managers should encourage learning through a transparent communication, where the benefits 
of participate in learning becomes highlighted, in order to ensure motivation (Jones & Cox, 
unspecified). The top management can affect learning in many ways and are important in the 
learning process, since they provide formal authority. The skills of the top management also 
play a role in learning, because it is important that the necessary changes in overall policy and 
strategies are performed with care and not just performed randomly in hoping for the best.  
The approach when organizations are seen as clusters of individual members, the key is that 
members in the clusters/groups learn from one another through interaction with each other. 
The challenge then is to spread the knowledge within the group throughout the organization 
and enter it into the stream of debates and deliberations that affects an organizations policy, 
program or practice.  
2.4.3.2 System logic 
Another contraction has to do with the system logic. The contraction here is to see systems as 
a string of sequence vs. systems as a patch work of parallel systems (Kelly, 1994).         
In the approach of seeing a system as a string of sequences the logic are in a more 
machinelike manner where the measures are performed as a parade of movements of time. 
Here the system is seen as a series of critical individual actions. In the approach where the 
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system works as a parallel of processes the logic are in a more bio-logical way that 
emphasizes a collective pattern, where the system consists of a number of different actions 
that happens simultaneously. The measures in this system are performed as an untidy cascade 
of interdependence. The two systemic approaches must not be taken literally but rather as to 
underline a sharp distinction between the two extremes.  
The most likely approach is a combination of the two extremes. In this lies the assumption 
that to look after a demarcation point with regards to learning are useless. Instead the goal is 
to look for forces and dynamics in learning processes (Størseth & Tinmannsvik, 2011). 
2.4.3.3 Add thinking, knowing and learning to an organization  
In order to add thinking, knowing and learning into an organization there are according to 
Argys & Schøn (1996) two strategies involved.  
1) Adopt the stance of a distant spectator.  
2) Se the entity as an impersonal agent. 
(Argyris & Schøn, 1996) 
The first strategy may be necessary to be able to treat an organization as a monolithic, 
impersonal agent. As an example economics tend to see the business from a great distance 
which enables them to see the organization as a whole. The goal is to see the firm as an agent 
which competing with other firms, adopting or changing strategies in order to gain 
competitive advantage. Even though these distant theories may be helpful in economic and 
policy analysis it is important to realize that this strategy do not describe and explain the 
process within an organization that give rise to patterns of activity.  
The second strategy allows adopting a kind of machine language. These type of language 
increases usually when the influence from computers increases. It is a kind of computer 
language that refers to phenomena that used to be attributed to thoughts, will, deliberation, 
feelings, or habits. The use of computer language like “I am in sales mode” or “I am not 
programmed for this task” underlies the growing tendency to treat organizations and their 
parts as impersonal agents. This strategy aims at reducing the personal side in the organization 
in order to develop a more understandable and marketable language that can be understood 
within the organization as well as by external actors.  
2.4.4 Organizational learning at different stages  
In making it clearer where in an organization learning can be achieved, it can be appropriate 
to describe the organizational learning at different stages (Carroll, 2004). The first stage is 
locally based where knowledge is a result of the members experience and skills within the 
organization. This kind of knowledge is often hard to transfer, since learning is decentralized 
within individuals and/or groups and is most often based on single-loop learning (Argyris & 
Schøn, 1996). The second stage aims at achieving conformity, through exploration of the 
known factors; this can be achieved through a set of routines. The third stage aims at involve 
the members in the process; by for example make them come up with questions to reflect 
over; however with a rapidly changing environment this approach may be too slow. In the 
fourth phase the aim is to create an understanding among members of the deep, systemic 
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causes and provide a wide range of possibilities for action to address these causes. It does that 
by building further on the third phase and adding more capacity for double-loop learning. This 
makes the individual capable to transcend the level of component understanding and develop 
a system thinking skill as well as mental models (Carroll, 2004).  
2.4.5 The presence of power in an organization 
In an organization power are seen as the ability to act and improve. Power in an organization 
is not something that is easy to describe in words, and it exists many different views of what 
power is. However it is beyond now doubt that power is necessary in order to implement 
measures in an organization. It is claimed that power aims at transforming insight of groups 
and individuals into the organization (Lawrence, Mauws, Dyck, & Kleysen, 2005).  
In order to develop strategies for learning it is important to know how changes can be 
achieved, therefore it is of interest to study different power relations. Despite that power are 
attached to formal positions and control systems, it is important to realize that power can lie in 
the capacity to affect premises and understanding of situations and of that reason is it 
important to also study informal network and relations (Hansen & Lekenes, Læring av 
hendelser i Statoil, 2011). When it comes to interpretation this part of learning are affected of 
whether the actors have political skills and the ability to use techniques for its influence.  
The easiest shapes of power in an organization are attached the four learning processes that 
are illustrated in the figure below.  
 
Figure 3: Power relations (Crossan & Lane, 1999) 
2.4.5.1 Influence and force 
Influence will be most effective in the interpreting phase, since influence can affect benefits 
that the members can attach specific interpretations of a new idea. To exercise influence 
different measures like negotiation or persuasion can be used. In the integration phase, the 
most effective power is the use of force, thus to limit alternatives that are in position of the 
members in order to create accept and understandings for the new ideas. This can be done by 
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affecting the agenda of formal and informal agendas and neutralize opponents. Influence and 
force are types of power that relates to concrete, strategic actions performed by the actors that 
wants to secure their interests.  
2.4.5.2 Dominance and discipline  
In the institutionalization phase dominance is the most effective power, since it contributes to 
reduce number of actions. Dominance is usually attached organizational systems that aims at 
assure control of the members in the organization by exerting pressure to assure accept of 
measures. The next form of power is discipline which is most effective in the learning process 
of intuition. Discipline aims at develop individual expertise and experiences within a specific 
field, and also to affect the members identity and attach them to experiences. Discipline 
practices can for example be in the form of socialization or teamwork. When using discipline 
it is important to be aware of the purpose with it, is it to force members into actions or is it to 
assure trust and identification among the members in the organization by encourage informal 
groups to support the policy of the organization (Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006). It can 
be concluded that these two forms of power, thus dominance and discipline are systematical 
and affects learning through routines, and practices in the organization.  
2.4.5.3 Challenges 
If formal power in an organization is misused the result can be that changes stops. This is 
often a result of reluctance against changes among members with positions of power in 
organizations, since they fear to lose ownership of their unique knowledge. However if power 
are to be used proactively, the result could be that an organization enables changes (Borum, 
2005). A well-known scenario is that line managers struggles against changes because of the 
fear that their department are going to lose repute (Hussein, 2013). The reason for that power 
has such big influence on learning is that it affects both participation and collective reflection 
processes. By participation it means the fact that some within the organization have to give up 
some of their influence for the benefit of the new decision takers, this is crucial in order to 
develop organizations. The collective reflection contributes to development of knowledge in 
interaction between members of the organization with the aim at contribute to learning (Levin 
& Klev, 2002).   
In organizations with strong personalities there will almost guaranteed occur conflicts 
between different actors. This can result in different interests, hidden agendas and motives, 
which can undermine the conditions that promote learning. However different views in how 
to perform activities can be healthy, especially in a transparent organization that aims at 
creating discussions. If it is to low accept for discussions and different views this can have a 
negative effect in searching for alternatives.  
2.5 Inhibitors and promoters toward a learning organization 
In the modern world changes occur frequently, therefore it is crucial to create a learning 
organization in order to cope with a changing environment. Any organization that slows down 
on the search for alternative ways of doing things is in the danger zone of falling behind in the 
competition. Therefore it is important that management and employees is proactive in 
contributing to continually improvements by being critical to their own practices 
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(International Atomic Energy Agency , 2002). In order to do so it is important to understand 
what inhibits and what promotes learning so the problem can be attacked from an appropriate 
point of view (Jones & Cox, unspecified).  
2.5.1 Barriers against learning 
Barriers in this chapter are not meant as barriers towards a specific action, but rather as 
something that prevents developing of new ways to think and act.  
2.5.1.1 Get stuck in the past 
A common scenario for many organizations is that they get stuck in old patterns in ways of 
doing things. This is often a result of when a major change in an organization is announced it 
creates an uncertainty that leads to that member of the organization tries to block these 
changes (Edmondson & Moingeon, 1999). This can result in that the organization negotiates 
its own environment by following tried and tested approaches for the industry. This approach 
is common because this seems like an easy way out of the problem they feel they are 
evaluated on (Baumard, 1999). To comply with these issues companies tends to develop 
shields against new ways of thinking which undermines the desire of keeping things as they 
are. Another factor to keep in mind is that the fear of being blamed and punished may also 
block learning (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Therefore organizations have to make tradeoffs 
between organizational learning and responsibility. It is also important to keep in mind the old 
not-intervene here problem, where new interpretations and propositions might meet resistance 
from the other units because of the fear for their positions.  
2.5.1.2 Systemic reasons 
There can be many systemic reasons that prevent learning. It can be a pressure toward 
following the rules, too much focus on responsibility, difficulties because of changes towards 
more automation, and difficulties for the human operator and dysfunctional roles for the 
regulatory organ (Ballesteros, 2007). In growing organizations it will often develop problems 
regarding sharing of knowledge. This is often a result of that members have not built relations 
to each other (Mueller, 2012), and problems regarding who knows what arise. In dynamic 
organizations there will often be a need to perform projects which develop barriers in form of 
restrictions at the budget, and also a lack of discussion among project members after the 
project is finished (Disterer, 2002) because that project members tends to end the project at 
different times and is then off to other assignments.  
2.5.1.3 Wrong focus 
Also when implementing measures to reduce risk of future accidents it is of importance to 
avoid the mistake of focusing too much on a certain problem. This can be regarded as a 
barrier because too much emphasis on one problem may lead to lack of focus on another 
issue. As an example BP were a champion in preventing small accidents because of a high 
focus on issues attached the individual. This led to that they forgot the issues of importance 
for the system as a whole, which lead to a high number of fatalities (Hopkins, 2008).  
Page 22 of 119 
 
2.5.1.4 Relationship between sources to barriers and the learning processes  
When studying barriers that keep an organization from learning it can be beneficial to break it 
up to study how the different sources to organizational learning affects the different learning 
processes, like the figure below shows.  
Learning processes/ 
Sources to barriers 
Intuition Interpretation Integration Institutionalization 
Individual actions Superstition 
Controlling 
The innovator 
have low trust 
Loss of 
ownership and 
knowledge 
No support 
from the 
management 
Lack of 
formal 
authority 
Lack of competence 
Indifferent 
leadership 
Structural actions Monolithically 
culture 
Blaming 
culture 
High level of 
specialization 
Status culture 
Norms to 
prevent failure 
Strong or weak 
collective 
identity 
Resistance 
from other 
departments 
Competence 
traps 
A internal 
and stabile 
based 
culture 
Lack of time and 
resources 
Huge turnover 
Decentralization 
Unclear 
responsibility 
Lack of control 
mechanism 
The environment of the 
organization 
Complex, 
dynamic 
environment 
Ambiguous 
knowledge 
Lack of 
compliance 
with 
dominating 
and 
professional 
knowledge.  
Deviation 
from 
industry 
standards 
To long 
response 
time 
Rapidly 
technological 
change 
What’s typical for 
management 
Figure 4: The context between learning processes and sources to barriers (Rosness & 
Nesheim, 2013).  
2.5.1.5 Conflicting objectives 
A common barrier against learning can be developing of conflicting objectives. Often 
organizations are forced to set different views up against another in order to do the job fast 
and effective. Therefore all organizations have to do a fairly trade between doing a job 
effective vs. being thoroughly. This is referred to as the efficiency - through trade of principle 
(ETTO) (Hollnagel, 2011). If thoroughness dominates there might be too little time to carry 
out the action, this is often preferable in operations with high demands to safety. In such high 
reliable organizations there is a tendency towards unique problems like lack of a major 
learning strategies as well as trial and errors since errors cannot be contained. This can result 
in that the organization will have little knowledge regarding the events that might be 
damaging to them (Weick, 1995). Failure can therefore have a positive effect since it 
contributes to that members of the organization will face difficult situations and learn from it 
(Sitkin, 1990), and therefore cope better to surprisingly incidents. If efficiency dominates, the 
actions may be badly prepared; this is preferable in routine operations with high productivity 
(Hollnagel, 2011).  
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This theory has its limitations in that it can’t foresee any unexpected situations, so called 
Black Swans. This is a term that is used for unexpected situations that have no known 
knowledge attached to it and might lead to a major setback for the business and even a 
complete failure (De - Risk Blog, 2009). In practice some lessons regarding conflicting 
objectives might be worth mentioning (Rosness, 2011): 
 Conflicting objectives are dealt with all the time by individuals, groups and 
organizations. 
 Adaption over a long period might solve conflicting objectives. 
 Pressure from external actors and constraints might routinize explicit decisions. 
 Patterns of distributed decisions where the actors do not know how the actions of other 
actors affect the consequence of their own actions might cause accidents.  
 
2.5.1.6 Information flow and political disagreements  
In any organization there might occur problems regarding flow of information as well as 
political games within the organization. These two factors might develop to be a barrier 
against learning. The information barrier describes the fact that incidents might have problems 
regarding uncertainty. This can be related to wrong assumptions regarding hazards; 
knowledge regarding hazards might be spread among several persons or units, unclear rules 
and how to act if rules are broken, or trivialization of warnings. The political barrier relates to 
the fact that actors might blame each other; it might be done steps to protect themselves, or 
other strategic reasons. These two barriers might cause faulty reporting, secrecy or 
normalization of deviation.  
2.5.1.7 Cultural crash  
In any organization it is important to be aware of that barriers can arise as a result of crash 
between different cultures like; the operation culture, the engineering culture and the 
management culture,  in form of different understandings regarding similar issues (Schein E. 
H., 1996). 
 The operation culture has mainly its roots within experiences they do internally within 
the company, and their skills are locally based in the organizations core technology.  
 The engineering culture has their knowledge mainly in the basic design and in the use 
of technology. They have often high expectations about the operators’ possibilities to 
adapt the systems. The assumptions in this culture are that engineers are mainly 
impersonal and optimistic, prefer quantitative thinking, and want solutions based on a 
minimum of human operators.  
 The management culture relates to different actors with economical interest, and has to 
think profit.  
Under normal conditions these contractions are often hard to see, but arise when organizations 
seek to learn in new ways as a result of that current systems is outdated.  
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2.5.2 Implementing measures 
After identified the obstacles that prevents learning the challenge is to implement the new 
measures in a way that are sustainable for the future. This means that in addition to follow up 
the recommendations it important to anticipate future conditions and situations that might 
occur. This requires a focus on looking ahead, in search for new safety threats, by looking 
outside the box. This makes the organization capable to be prepared on future threats as well 
as seeing new possibilities in ways of handling issues. It is therefore important to have an 
open mind about future threats that goes beyond what the organization to date can handle 
(Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2011). In order to train on different scenarios it is important 
with a close relationship with external parties that are experts on the field of risk training 
(Falck Nutec, 2013). This ensures that the organization in addition to getting drilled in known 
issues also gets drilled in new and possible scenarios.  
2.5.2.1 Hierarchical breakdown  
When implementing measures that undermine the learning ability of an organization, it can be 
beneficial to break the reaction strategy down in a hierarchical structure. This can for example 
be in a first, second and third order reaction strategy. First order reaction can be to improve 
the parts of a machine; second order can also be to improve the parts but in addition change 
organizational plans like maintenance plans. In the third order the measure can be to change 
the goal itself (Hale, Wilpert, & Freitag, 1997). One example of a goal can be to introduce a 
zero goal theory. This is a known theory from the traffic sector. In this theory the goal is zero 
killed and injured in the traffic, in order to do this it is necessary to have first and second 
order measures in place. A first order reaction can be separation fences between meeting cars, 
while a second order measure can be to change the driving patterns on the road by lower the 
speed limit from 80 km/t to 70 km/t (SikkerTrafikk.no, 2012), the third order refers to the zero 
goal theory. To be able to learn, organizations have to see the relations between these 
reactions patterns which can be seen as learning loops in the safety management system. The 
concept of these learning loops describes how to learn in a multilevel learning approach 
(Hovden, Størseth, & Tinmannsvik, 2010). 
2.5.2.2 Formal system 
To undermine the goal of a learning organization it is important to have a formal system 
which contribute to a free float of information among members, and encourage transparency 
(Jones & Cox, unspecified) to ensure that every department is updated on what is being 
done/implemented and the changes that comes with it in form of affects to other parts in the 
system.  In this lays the need for an experienced feedback system (Kjellen, 2002) that collects, 
analyze and interprets the data, and that have a filter that strainers away unnecessary 
information. In addition it is important that the information reaches the right people.  
2.5.2.3 Safety culture 
Even though a company have the best systems to ensure learning, this is not good enough 
without the support from its members. It is important that the members of an organization do 
not become too reluctant on the current situation so that they stop searching for failure in 
order to come up with possible improvements. Therefore it is important that the whole 
organization is aware of the safety issue (Tinmannsvik, 2012). To undermine this it is 
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important to ensure a safety culture in an organization where members are proactive in asking 
questions about the current practice (Petroleumstilsynet, 2002), so that the organization does 
not get stuck in old patterns. This helps in develop correct assumptions about hazards, and 
have realistic interpretation regarding different signals. A proactive measure could be to 
reward safe behavior, by tying safe behavior and career development together (Short, 2007).  
Another important factor is to assure a fair organization, thus to avoid a blaming practice even 
though responsibilities are to be assured. This can be achieved through measures like 
negotiating when conflicts arise, legal protection of whistleblowers, establish a network of 
trust relations, support asking questions regarding issues that generally are avoided. There can 
be raised a lot of questions regarding current practice, the challenge is then to identify which 
issues that are most critical and develop long term strategies related to these issues. This 
demand for a long time commitment from the management related to priorities these issues 
and allocates resources to them (Jones & Cox, unspecified).  
It is important to make sure that different actors/cultures have a mutual understanding of each 
other (Schein E. H., 1996), in order to assure that their different assumptions do not cause 
problems when they are to be coordinated, but rather create mutual trust. This can be done 
thru dialog and training programs that are fitted the different culture.   
2.5.2.4 Learning across boundaries  
As mentioned earlier, learning can be something that goes across company boundaries 
because of an interactional organization system. The key when having a system like that is to 
have control systems which are not restricted to a company boarder, but rather develop tools 
that coordinates and controls the organization across company boarders in order to learn in 
inter organizational relations, which consists of high level of complexity, more hierarchical 
systems, different identities, and different goals. In systems like that it is important with an 
active leadership of knowledge (Meier, 2010). It can be advantageously with alliances that 
contribute to sheared ownership, personal network, and trust among actors. In addition it will 
be important to develop a learning network and common training programs, shearing of 
technology and staff, and to visit each other.  
2.5.2.5 Institutionalization  
After identified the measures it is important that they become institutionalized in the 
organization. This can be done with the use of new or audited procedures. It is important that 
these procedures are followed-up in practice to see if there are gap between procedure and 
practice (Tinmannsvik, 2008). It is a common problem that these procedures becomes to 
detailed, which often results in deviation (Reason, 1997), since in the daily work operators 
have to do activities that deviates from the procedures of practical issues (Nathanel & 
Marmaras, 2008). These tensions between procedures and practice can be regarded as a 
possibility to learn. The clue is to ensure a dialog in the conflict between practice and 
procedures, so that procedures is understood and becomes a habit. The management also has 
to be informed about this issue.  
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2.5.3 Spread knowledge within an organization 
In big organizations where it is a need to shear knowledge across different entities, projects 
and geographical locations, it is crucial to exchange experiences across organizational 
boarders. In practice this has proven to be problematic because that tool like IT – systems do 
not work as supposed and information of relevance for the members is not available. Also in 
the interface with other actors, tools like documentations and follow – up of suppliers is not 
contributing to sheer knowledge and learning across the organization (Hansen & Lekenes, 
Læring av hendelser i Statoil, 2011).  
To spread knowledge is a process where on unit in an organization is affected by experiences 
in another part of the organization. This can be a direct sharing of experience or more indirect 
sharing of knowledge (Dalkir, 2011).  
2.5.3.1 How knowledge can be held  
In practice organizations works as holding environment for knowledge, for example in the 
mind of the members. The problem if knowledge is only health this way is that the 
organization becomes vulnerable, since members are not guaranteed to stay in an 
organization, thus if important key personnel leaves the organization it might have a ruining 
effect. To protect itself from this an organization should hold knowledge in several ways, it 
can be in form of files and maps in order to make the organization understandable for 
themselves and for the environment. Organizational knowledge may also be held in physical 
objects, where employees of a company use physical objects to think (Scribner, 1997).  
Routines and practices may also integrate organizational knowledge, which can be difficult 
for members to describe in words. This enables organizations to carry out complex tasks, 
which gives the basis for the so-called action theory that has been mentioned earlier (Argyris 
& Schøn, 1996). It can be concluded that an organization that wants to become sustainable for 
the future should formalize its knowledge. A challenge however is that formalized knowledge 
and standardization of working processes can give a silent or implicit character, since it can 
be attached specific experiences, working contexts or cultures, which can result in restricted 
opportunities to store knowledge.  
2.5.3.2 Nonaka & Takeuchi knowledge spiral  
To develop and spread knowledge is an important contributor to a learning organization. This 
gives the basis for the theory behind the knowledge creating company (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995).  
Nonaka and Takeuchi`s knowledge spiral gives the basis for four main steps: 
1) Socialization: The purpose with this step is to share secrets and personal skills among 
members in the organization. This is a process where members study each other and 
learn over time. This learning requires physical proximity, and is therefore limited to a 
few numbers of persons. 
2) Externalization: In this step the already known knowledge are transformed to an 
understandable and interpretable form, so that it can be used by others. This to make 
individuals able to know how, why and to care why.  
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3) Combination: The aim in this step is to improve what have been gathered so far by 
developing concepts and broader entities in a way that the content is organized 
logically.  
4) Internalization: Here the goal is to convert or integrate shared and/or individual 
experiences and knowledge into individual mental models.  
 
 
Figure 5: Nonaka and Takeuchi`s knowledge spiral (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). 
To summarize this model the goal is to convert silent knowledge into a socialization process 
where new members learn from it and then transform it back to silent knowledge for the new 
members. For an organization it is especially externalization and internalization that have the 
biggest learning potential. If the organization succeeds in stimulating such learning, it can 
achieve that silent and explicit knowledge will strengthen each other.  
2.5.3.3 Arena  
To undermine the process of exchange experience among members it is important to create an 
arena where members can exchange experiences. Nonaka (2002:105) says “It is a critical 
matter for the organization to decide when and how to establish such a field of interaction in 
which individuals can meet and interact”. The goal is to establish possibilities for dialog 
between cooperative or potential cooperative actors so that development of new 
understandings can be made. This can for example be that a director organizes weekly tours 
where he and leaders of different departments performs inspection of the work place. After 
the tour the director and the leaders discuss what they think about what they were witnessing. 
This following discussion gives the basis on how to behave when facing different situations, 
like if they are to intervene or not. After the meeting the leaders act as they were agreed to, 
and discuss the implemented measures on the following tour (Hussein, 2013). What can be 
concluded from this is that dialog can create new ideas and contribute to sustainable 
decisions, but to reflect whether new collective behavior is achieved there have to be 
possibilities for practical training and reflections over the experiences. Therefore consciously 
design of arenas to exchange experience is important (Levin & Klev, 2002).  
One important type of arena is the communities of practice which is a network of informal 
relations between employees, which contributes to a collective learning within a field of 
subject or a specific competence internal at companies and link its working identity towards 
this competence (Brown & Duguid, 1991). The learning stands in a context and cannot be 
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exchanged through abstract knowledge from one individual to another. The communities of 
practice work as little societies, where information is sheared by common discussions and 
activities. Over a period of time they develop common tools to solve problems. This 
development can find place through many different activities like problem solving, mapping 
of knowledge, and it exists in several forms, for example size, localization and organizational 
placing (Wenger & McDermott, 2002). In order to connect the communities of practice it is 
important with boundary objects that the communities can relate to. An easy example of this 
is a written contract between an operator and a service company, where the different actors 
has to relate to this contract even though there might be different views of what a contract 
really is, how it should be used, and what makes a contract good (Forseth, Rosness, & 
Aamnes, 2011).  
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3 Methods 
This chapter is aimed at giving a description of the research process used in this thesis, 
including general theory on how to make a good qualitative thesis. This provides the reader 
with capability to consider how trustworthy the thesis is. There are different approaches in 
qualitative research, in this thesis it where used an interviewee guide based on a semi-
qualitative approach, and afterwards used grounded theory to look for patterns.  
3.1 Description of the research process 
The process started with a request from Acona, whom were interested in having students from 
the HSE program at NTNU to write a master thesis for them. They provided different topics 
to choose between, with different supervisors for each task. After looking at the propositions 
there were mainly two topics to choose between, one regarding emergency response and one 
regarding how companies can learn from internal/external experience, mainly within the oil 
industry, but the task where later made more general. The election felt on the learning task, 
since this topic seemed to be the most useful topic with regards to the literature studied in the 
HSE program.  
After the task were elected, the job on making a master contract started, as well as starting to 
develop research questions. In parallel with this the rules for how to ensure continuous 
progress started. In order to ensure continuous progress it were decided to have weekly 
meetings with the internal supervisor Eirik Albrechtsen, where feedback where given on the 
work performed to date.  
After the contract was in place the job on develop a project plan started. In this period it was 
especially important with feedback from Albrechtsen, as well as the external supervisor 
Vegard Grimstveit to ensure a good start of the project. 
Afterwards the job on looking for relevant theory started. Since this is a broad topic with 
much paper on the field, the challenge was to choose the most relevant theory and restrict it 
down. The job of choosing relevant theory started with recommendations from Albrechtsen, 
which gave the basis to start with the theory. To ensure the quality of the theoretical material 
it were decided to consult with known names on the field, therefore it were arranged a 
meeting with Ranveig Kviseth Tinmannsvik, who looked over the work so far and provided 
some new theory on the field which were used as a supplement to what have already been 
written.  
After finishing the theory it was important to start with an interview guide whom had to be 
made in a manner understandable for the interview objects. After conferring with the 
supervisors, the interviewee guide where made in a manner that emphasized concrete 
incidents, with follow-up questions in order to ensure that the empirical result were 
comparable with the theory.  
When performing the interview it were focused on revealing the interviewee`s experience, 
therefore it were allowed a free conversation that not always followed the interview guide. On 
the same time it where tried to steer the interview in a desired direction in order to achieve 
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some system in the conversation. It were used a tape recorder during the interview which 
made it easier to go back after the interview to reveal factors that promote/inhibit learning.  
The following analysis where based on grounded theory (Bryman, 2012) where the focus was 
on reveal if there were any patterns that repeated itself by the interview objects. It were used 
the same questions for each interview objects to see how the answers suit each other in order 
to reveal patterns and factors that is not given so much thought.  
After performing the empirical study, the empirical findings where matched up with the 
theory and it was discussed what inhibits and what promotes learning. The discussion gave 
the basis for developing of recommendations for how companies can maintain a learning 
organization. Afterwards it where written a short conclusion that brought up the main 
elements in the discussion as well as discussed possible reasons for the differences in the 
study.  
3.2 Theory on qualitative research 
In this chapter it will be given a theoretical introduction to qualitative research, this includes 
steps, purpose, criteria, tools to conduct a qualitative research process and problems with 
qualitative research.   
3.2.1 The steps in qualitative research 
Qualitative research is a research method that emphasizes description among different actors 
in order to come up with solutions (Andersen & Bendal, 2012). In general, qualitative 
methods consist of following steps (Bryman, 2012): 
1) General research questions: It where developed research questions that emphasized 
in revealing; characteristics, inhibitors, promoters and developing of 
recommendations. These questions gave the basis for the whole assignment, which are 
to be answered through the task. 
2) Selection of relevant sites and subjects: it is important to do a thoroughly pre 
assessment so that right sites are to be studied and right tasks are chosen, this was 
mainly done by considering for which task relevant theory from the master program 
could be used the most. 
3) Collection of relevant data: it is important to consult with people that have a 
background on the field, so that right data can be collected in order to ensure that the 
data are reliable. It where arranged a meeting with Ranveig Kviseth Tinmannsvik, 
which contributed with inputs as well as regularly meetings with the internal 
supervisor Eirik Albrechtsen.  
4) Interpretation of the data: after collecting the data it is important to interpret it. This 
was mainly done by discussions. It was as mentioned discussed with Tinmannsvik 
regarding theoretically terms, as well as discussions with the interviewee objects 
regarding the significance of the questions in the interview guide which was based on 
the theory. This is important to see if the questions in any way can be problematic.  
5) Conceptual and theoretical work: this step combined with the interpretation of the 
data forms the study findings. This includes tightening of the research questions as 
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well as collecting of further data, which where done by separate the discussion into 
inhibitors, promoters and recommendations.  
6) Writing up findings/conclusions: this where done by tighten the empirical results 
together with the theory. The goal is to convince the audience about the credibility and 
significance of the interpretations. 
 
3.2.2 The main purpose of qualitative research 
The main purpose of qualitative research unlike natural science is the purpose of study the 
meaning of events and the environment. This emphasizes the importance of description as 
well as explanation to reveal details of significance for the subject. In that context it is 
important with why questions, in order to find out why things are in the way it is (Skeggs, 
1997). Therefore it is important to study the people in an attempt to see through their eyes 
with regards to events and the social world. In order to do so it is important with face to face 
interaction and to participate in the mind of the research object. It can be revealed that issues 
that seem to be a problem for the outside world might not be seen as a problematic by the 
members of a community (Foster, 1995). This implies that it is impossible to understand the 
behavior of members of a social group other than in the context of the specific environment.   
Even though it is important to understand the insiders view, it is important to pursue the goal 
of what is studied. It is therefore important to evaluate whether the research see through only 
the eyes of some people, and the risk of participating in questionable activities (Armstrong, 
1998).  
Although description is important, it is important to realize that if a research becomes to 
descriptive this may lead to that too much irrelevant information overshadows the essence in 
the thesis (Lofland & Lofland, 1995).  
3.2.3 Criteria in qualitative research 
In the following sub-section it will be given a description of different criteria that is used to 
map the trustworthiness of qualitative research processes.  
3.2.3.1 Reliability and validity 
Reliability and validity are two criteria that can evaluate the qualitative research process. Both 
reliability and validity can be separated in an internal and external meaning (LeCompte & 
Goetz, 1982). 
Internal reliability: refers to whether there is more than one observer on a case where it exist 
a consensus regarding what they observed. It was in the thesis emphasized in have thorough 
discussions with the internal and external supervisor in order to develop reliable interview 
questions.  
External reliability: refers to the degree a study can be replicated, which probably could be 
done if a new researcher are thorough in screening the marked after relevant actors to contact.  
Internal validity: means the degree the researchers’ observations match with the theoretical 
ideas. Internal validity tends to be strong in qualitative research, which also reflect this thesis 
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since the empirical findings where easy to match with the theory as well as it where 
confirmed by the interviewees that the interview questions (based on the theory) where good 
and covered a wide range of important topics.  
External validity: means the degree the findings can be generalized across social settings, 
which must said to be the case in this thesis since the interviewees said that many of the issues 
are applicable for the industry as a whole and also to some extend in other industries.  
3.2.3.2 Trustworthiness and authenticity 
Trustworthiness and authenticity are two criteria that also can evaluate the qualitative study 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994).  
Trustworthiness is built up of four criteria: 
1) Credibility: it where arranged meetings with Tinmannsvik which have been involved 
in several investigations to ensure that the research is performed according to 
standards of good practice and it where discussed with the interviewees to confirm that 
the investigator has correctly understood the social world. 
2) Transferability: even if it was just oil companies in this thesis, the problem frame are 
applicable in many industries, therefore the findings can be transferred to other 
milieux. 
3) Dependability: audit through the process that proper procedures are being followed, 
which was done by continually conferring with the internal and external supervisor 
especially in the starting phase.  
4) Conformability: the researcher is a student with no attachments to the companies 
involved; it is therefore ensured that personal values don’t affect the research and the 
findings.  
The criteria of authenticity can be separated in five parts: Not all of these parts are relevant for 
this thesis.  
1) Fairness: it was interviewed a broad range of people from different companies and at 
different levels in the organizations to ensure that different points of view where 
represented among different social settings. 
2) Ontological authenticity: help members to understand better their social milieu. 
3) Educative authenticity: ensure that members better appreciate perspectives of 
different members. 
4) Catalytic authenticity: try to engage the members to action in order to change 
circumstances.  
5) Tactical authenticity: the interviewees where able to speak freely in the interviews, 
which enabled the members to engage into action. 
 
3.2.4 Tools in qualitative research processes  
There are different tools that can be used to collect and interpret qualitative research data. In 
this thesis it has been used semi-qualitative interview to collect the data combined with 
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grounded theory in order to interpret the results. Therefore it will be given an introduction to 
these tools here.  
3.2.4.1 Semi-qualitative interview 
A qualitative interview is characterized by that it is open for description by the participant(s). 
Unlike quantitative interview which tends to be structured, qualitative interview emphasis 
more general research ideas and the researchers own perspective to maintain reliability and 
validity (Bryman, 2012). Since qualitative interview is about mapping the participants 
concern it is encouraged to talk freely about issues that might go beyond the initial questions, 
in order to ensure rich and detailed answers, which provides flexibility to the interview.  
In the thesis it were used an semi-structured interview, this means that the questions had sub-
questions in order to achieve some sort of systematics, but it were emphasized also that the 
conversation should go outside the questions if the interviewer picked up interesting things 
said by the interviewees.  
In order to perform a successful interview there are some guidelines that are important to 
consider (Kvale, 1996): 
 Knowledgeable: it is important to be familiar with the focus of the interview, which 
was done by developing questions in cooperation with the supervisors that aimed at 
revealing a broad range of topics.  
 Structuring: clarify the purpose with the interview and listen to if the interviewees 
have questions, which were done by allowing the interviewees to freely come up with 
questions under the interview. 
 Clear: it where developed sub-questions as a supplement to the main questions in 
order to keep the questions short and be clear of what it is asked for.   
 Gentle: even though it was tried to steer the interview in a desired direction, it where 
never interrupted and it was a high tolerance for letting the interviewees finish.  
  Sensitive: listen carefully to what is being said and how it is said.  
 Open: it where allowed for the interviewees to speak freely about their concerns in 
order to be flexible for what is important for the interviewee. 
 Steering: it where developed sub-questions to steer the conversation in a desired 
direction in order to reveal useful information. 
 Critical: the researcher used mainly the prewritten theory to challenge the answers 
from the interviewees.  
 Remembering: try to use what has been said to what is currently being said in order 
to reveal patterns, which was mainly done by interject earlier mentioned answers. 
 Interpreting: the theory where used as a basis in the interviews in orders to 
understand the meanings of the statements. 
 
3.2.4.2 Grounded theory 
Grounded theory is the most used framework in studying of qualitative data. The theory 
consists of following tools (Bryman, 2012): 
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 Coding: after the initial data are collected the data are broken down in component 
parts where each is given a unique name (labels), which were done to see what issues 
that are seen as most important by the interviewees. This provided parts of theoretical 
significance, within the social world that is being studied, based on numbers of 
interviewees that saw the different topics as important. 
 Theoretical saturation: this tool relates to two phases.  
1) The coding reaches a point where there is no point in further review the data to see 
how well they fit with the concepts/categories. 
 2) Collection of data reaches a point where new data are no longer illuminating the 
concept/categories.  
 Constant comparison: constantly compare the data being coded under a certain 
category in order to achieve theoretical elaboration of that category; this resulted in 
developing of a broad range of issues related to some of the categories.  
 
3.2.5 Problems with qualitative research 
When conducting qualitative research some issues are important to keep in mind. A common 
criticism is that qualitative research are affected by an unsystematically view about what is 
important. This might lead to that qualitative research becomes too subjective towards the 
view of persons that are involved in the research. This is often an increasingly problem 
because of the problem with replicating the study, which is a result of lack of standard 
procedures, and the fact that the focus in the research is mainly decided by the researcher’s 
view of what is important.  
Other issues to be aware of is the fact that qualitative research is reliant upon few cases which 
might not be representable for other cases, and the fact that it can be difficult to understand 
exactly how the researcher ended up with the conclusions it ended up with because of lack of 
transparency. Lack of transparency can be the result of ambiguities regarding how people 
where chosen for interview/observation, and also regarding the process of the qualitative data 
analysis (Bryman & Burgess, 1994).  
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4 The empirical results 
The empirical result in this thesis is a result of nine semi-qualitative interviews with personnel 
within three different oil companies. Interviewee A, B, C and D from company 1, E and F 
from company 2 and G, H and I from company 3. The interviewees have different background 
and degree of experience. The interview focused on revealing the past experiences of the 
interviewees with regards to learning, and to map the situation in the company they are 
currently working in. The empirical study are separated into different categories where the 
results from the different interviewee are sat together and broken down in key words in order 
to reveal patterns to see what is repeating and eventually what they have not given so much 
thought.  
What is common for the three companies are that they have a relatively small organization 
here in Norway and is therefore dependent of several actors, for example external actors that 
design their wells, and also that none of them are operators at the Norwegian continental 
shelf. Company 2 however is the biggest owner on an oil field which is operated by another 
oil company. A distinguishing factor may be related to the culture, where especially company 
3 emphasized a challenging culture where no final decisions is made until everyone have 
poked on the issue and are satisfied with the result.  
4.1 Deviations that causes incidents  
The first category is related to deviations that cause incidents to happen. Since many of the 
interviewees are new in the current company, the results are mainly from past experience. 
More filling explanations are to be found in appendix C.1.  
Interviewee/Deviations A B C D E F G H I Total 
Information * *  * * * * *  7 
Compliance * *  *    * * 5 
Risk understanding * *     *  * 4 
Management  *  *   *  * 4 
Documentation *       *  2 
Conflict   *    *   2 
Design   *  *     2 
Safety culture *         1 
Misinterpreting  *        1 
Execution   *       1 
Whole picture    *      1 
Measures    *      1 
Interaction        *   1 
Planning        *  1 
Effective       *   1 
 
4.1.1 Lack of information transfer 
The results from this interview show that there are several issues that have led to incidents. 
However one factor that seems to repeat is the lack of information transfer that results in lack 
of knowledge about the tasks that are conducted and the working area as a whole. Interviewee 
A says: “in the shipping industry it is a well-known problem that it lacks knowledge regarding 
what is on board the ships, or clear information regarding what should be done with 
dangerous waste onboard the ships, this as a result of bad information transfer between the 
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rig and the ships”. It is several examples of that ships go back and forth between shore and 
rigs with dangerous waste from the rig on board, even though this is supposed to be removed 
as fast as the boat is reaching shore. It is even shoved that tasks that might ignite the waste 
have been given working permits by the captain, this shows that the lack of knowledge are 
something that goes all the way up to the management of the working area. Another common 
cause that often causes incidents or conflicting work is when information regarding changes is 
not provided to other actors. This might cause actors to perform work that is in conflict with 
each other and might cause incidents. As an example interviewee E says: “it is several 
examples that it is an inadequate transfer of changes when working groups cycles”. 
Especially when small changes are made without verifying the possible consequences changes 
are often not communicated to others. Interviewee G also point out the lack of information 
regarding interpreting signals. He says: “before the Deepwater Horizon incident it was sign to 
a possible blowout; weeks, days, and even hours before the incident”. This shows the 
importance of that competence regarding interpreting signals is spread throughout the 
organization. Interviewee I implies that it is even examples of that results from investigations 
have not been communicated out to the organization adequately and therefore no actions have 
been made to improve the situation.  
4.1.2 Inability to comply/follow procedures/rules properly 
Another issue that seems to be reputable in the interview results is the problem regarding 
comply/follow procedures/rules properly. Interviewee D says: “it is a well-known problem 
that procedures are hard to follow since they often are big and complex which makes it hard 
for the employees to comply with them”. Among the operators it is often limited academically 
knowledge, which might lead to difficulties in interpreting long and complex procedures 
made mainly by engineers without the participation of operators. Another problem mentioned 
by interviewee H is that procedures might not be in compliance with the basic rules; since the 
procedures have been developed without roots in the existing ground rules developed by the 
authorities. This can lead to that people are questioning the procedures and choose not to 
follow them adequately. It is also among the interviewees a perception that new 
procedures/guidelines are not followed because employees consciously choose not follow 
them as a result of resistance to changes. A common scenario are when things have been done 
several times with good results, it can be hard to get the employees to renew themselves and 
doing things differently.  As interviewee A says: “when habits are created and incorporated 
into working groups it is often challenging to change attitudes and enable compliance with 
procedures”.  
4.1.3 Lack of risk understanding 
A third factor that is repeatedly mentioned by the interviewees is the lack of ability to 
understand risks. This issue can in some cases be related to the lack of/poor documentation 
that have in some cases resulted in false safety feeling. Interviewee A says: “it is examples 
that suppliers of equipment’s have provided documentation that the equipment has been used 
in the past, even though this is not true”. The receiver of the equipment has then used the 
equipment in good faith, and as a result a near fatality incident occurred. But in general the 
lack of risk understanding seems to be a result of that employees have not experienced the 
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dangers with what they are working with combined with little brainstorming around 
anticipating what could happen and also train on handle unwanted incidents. This is often a 
scenario that occurs when the time to act exceeds the time to think.  
4.1.4 Poor Management 
The issue of assuring a thoroughly risk understanding is mainly a management issue, which is 
another factor the interviewees repeats. Interviewee D says: “it is often a shortcoming in 
leadership that assures that topical risk issues are brought up at the agenda and trained on in 
community”. Also it is mentioned by interviewee B that management often tends to bring up 
HSE goals at dinner tables etc. without really put force behind the statements. This is 
confirmed by interviewee I who mentions that he several times have experienced lazy 
managements with regards too really do something about dangerous working areas. 
Interviewee G says: “managements tend to put the blame on each other when several 
companies are involved”. This implies that when several actors are involved it increases the 
difficulty to really do something about dangerous working areas.  
4.2 The outcome of the learning 
The second category describes different outcomes as a result of learning processes. The 
outcome can for example be formal tools or it can be new ways the employees act/interact 
with each other. The results are mainly based on the interviewees past experience in other 
companies. More filling explanations are to be found in appendix C.2. 
Interviewee/Outcome A B C D E F G H I Total 
Working methods * * * *  *  * * 7 
Dialog  * *      * 3 
Formal tools   *     *  2 
Risk understanding * *        2 
Rules   * *      2 
Interaction     *  *   2 
Forums *         1 
Brainstorming *         1 
Focus *         1 
Secure operations *         1 
Review *         1 
Risk assessment  *        1 
Practices    *       1 
Investigations     *     1 
Communication         *  1 
Management   *       1 
 
4.2.1 Stopped/changed working methods 
The factor that repeats itself the most is the fact that as a result of the learning working 
methods where changed or stopped performed. There are several ways to achieve this; it can 
be to use more expertise that is especially trained at performing tasks that are demanding or 
dangerous to perform. Interviewee I mentioned that a company he had worked for in the past 
took a drastically step when they got rid of a task by outsource it to another supplier, because 
they felt that the internally expertise where not good enough to handle the working process. 
Although this is positive it is mentioned by interviewee D that it usually have to happen an 
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incident before drastically steps like this are taken. This where exemplified by interviewee A 
who said: “the supplier where forced to take the equipment off the marked after a near fatality 
incident happened”. This implies that it takes a determined and tough management to decide 
something like this without an incident to happen first. Change of working methods can also 
be as mentioned by interviewee H be related to a success by the management in implementing 
guidelines down through the organization, in form of achieving more consciousness 
when/before performing tasks. It can be that the employees as a result of a campaign think 
twice before they conduct a task as well as more carefulness when conducting tasks. 
Interviewee B also mentions that learning have resulted in more us of risk assessment and 
decision trees before conducting tasks as a part of the working method, as well as reviews if 
the assessments have the right/proper content.  
4.2.2 More dialog 
Dialog is repeatedly mentioned to be a result of learning processes. As a result of incidents 
employees have often become more aware of the need to ensure transparency across the 
organization and to constantly exchange experiences. Internally in small organizations this is 
rarely a problem since people see each other all the time and exchange experiences. But in 
major organizations and in the interaction with externally suppliers this can be a challenge. To 
solve this problem interviewee B mention that transfer of informal mail between employees 
across organizations are widely used to communicate with one another and to provide a 
description of incidents that have occurred. As interviewee C says: “after incidents it tends to 
develop many discussions regarding that things are not in the way it should be, however the 
challenge is rather to keep these discussions regularly and continually”. The increased dialog 
between actors is thus a result of the will of apply more awareness all over the organization, 
especially after incidents.  
4.2.3 More use of/improved formal tools 
After incident investigations some of the interview objects points out that learning usually 
results in increased use of/improving of formal tools or developing of tools that can easily 
map the order in which the incident took place. For example interviewee C had experienced 
development of event trees that has a clear and logical structure for how the incident took 
place and what barriers that breached before the incident happened as a direct consequence of 
an incident. It can also be as mentioned by interviewee H that the management conducts an 
audit of the whole control system in order to achieve proper procedures that comply with rules 
and are manageable by the users of the procedure.  
4.2.4 Increased risk understanding 
Increased risk understanding are mentioned by interviewee A and B as an outcome of learning 
processes, which often are released by incidents. The interviewees mentions that meetings 
with emphasize on increasing the risk understanding often are used as a tool, another measure 
are developing of risk assessments that clearly aims at revealing the potential consequences if 
a task fails.  
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4.2.5 Clearer rules 
In order to distinguish between incidents and separate how they should be addressed 
interviewee C and D points out that clearer rules and refinement between incidents are 
developed to make sure a tightening of the system so that the correct people are performing 
the correct tasks and that responsibilities/consequences are shared correctly among the 
internal/external actors.  
4.2.6 Better/increased interaction 
Also it is mentioned better/increased interaction as a result of learning. Interviewee E says: “it 
is a tendency among organizations that want to continually learn to have close relations with 
companies that have developed an expertise within a field”. In addition interviewee G 
mentions that for example oil companies and external suppliers have improved their 
interaction as a result of learning processes.  
4.3 What created the learning? 
The third category is dedicated to reveal how the organizations achieved the results they did 
and improved the situation. More filling explanations are to be found in appendix C.3. 
Interviewee/Created 
learning 
A B C D E F G H I Total 
Dialog * * * * * * *  * 8 
Management *   *  * *  * 5 
Focus * * * *   *   5 
Investigation *   * * *    4 
Brainstorming *     * *   3 
Clarity    *    * * 3 
Forums *       *  2 
Formal tools    *    *  2 
Admission   *       1 
Flexible   *       1 
Campaigns    *      1 
Indicators    *      1 
Ownership         * 1 
Culture        *  1 
Discipline *         1 
Objectivity        *  1 
 
4.3.1 Dialog 
The factor that seems to repeat itself the most among the interviewees as a factor that created 
learning is the need for good dialog between internal/external actors. Interviewee G brought 
up the example of the Deepwater Horizon incident which had enormous consequences in form 
of oil pollution to the sea and led to an enormous interaction between oil companies 
worldwide with the aim of prevent it from happening again. It were arranged seminars where 
actors from several oil companies got together, exchanged experience and discussed what 
they had learned so far. This increased awareness among oil companies around the globe 
regarding potential consequences of oil spills and reasons for an incident like that could 
happen. To undermine this, interviewee I brings up the benefits with an overall system that 
sends out information regarding forums/seminars that are set to happen. Interviewee D adds 
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that forums provides learning best if the knowledge obtained are implemented well into the 
organization by having a good documentation practice. 
At the internal level in many companies the incident led to a sharpening of the rules for how 
to encounter dialog across company boundaries. As an example management of change 
procedures where changed in a way that requires more dialog between different actors before 
tasks can be conducted. Interviewee C says: “changes in a cement job in a well cannot be 
conducted without a thoroughly verifying of that changes have been made, this include dialog 
between the service provider, the rig owner and the oil company”. This is to assure that 
everyone knows what is going on as well as ensuring consensus regarding measures that are 
taken. More use of dialog can also be that the management is more involved in discussions 
with the operators by being more directly involved in the daily operations. Interviewee D 
says: “in company 1 the management is directly involved in operations by having one 
representative from the management available for the operators/line managers to contact if 
incidents happen or issues occur”. This ensures a close connection between the management 
and the daily operations and not just delicate it to local suppliers. Regularly dialog between 
experts across companies involved in operations, are also mentioned as important in order to 
develop for example HSE methods. Interviewee F highlights the importance of conducting 
informal conversations daily to continually learn from each other, especially with people 
which have tried different approaches in ways of doing things. In more formal dialog it is 
important as interviewee I mentions, with logs that describes who are going to communicate 
what in the organization.  
4.3.2 Dynamic management 
Another factor that often repeat itself among the interviewees is the need for a dynamic 
management that are committed to achieve results, instead of just bring up HSE questions into 
for example dinner speeches without really put any action behind the words. This can be in 
form of a total makeover of different formal systems in the company. Interviewee D brought 
up an example where changes were made in one part of a system without thoroughly thinking 
of other parts in the system. This lead to an accident where equipment where damaged and 
resulted in huge costs for the company. After this incident the management looked closely at 
system breaches that could cause incidents to happen as a result of planed changes conducted 
by operators in the company. This resulted in that the management took a close look at and 
reviewed the management of change procedure in order to develop procedures that clearly 
define which changes that can be conducted in the system without the need for formal 
improvement and which ones that needs formal improvements. This resulted in more 
clearness in the organization regarding which measures that can be taken without thinking of 
the system as a whole, and which measures that needs a more thoroughly risk assessment. 
This had positive effects in two ways. One is that smaller changes can be conducted more 
effectively without the need to confirm with others and check if the changes cause unwanted 
effects in other parts of the system. The other is that changes that can cause unwanted 
incidents in the system are not conducted without a thoroughly assessment of the possible 
consequences and bi effects of the change.  
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The management has also the power to decide how much effort it is going to be made in HSE 
work. Interviewee A says: “after an incident at a rig, the management decided to ensure that 
safety coaches where deployed at the rig and deliver weekly reports to the management 
regarding the conditions at the rig”. This is an example of an initiative that the management 
can do to show it takes HSE seriously. Also management can be more directly involved as 
mentioned by interviewee D earlier, in form of having one from the management as a phone 
guard, as well as being tough and specific as mentioned earlier by interviewee I by take 
critical decisions when needed. 
4.3.3 Right focus 
Right focus is another factor that repeatedly is mentioned by the interviewees as something 
that provides learning. After incidents like the Deepwater Horizon, the focus seems to be 
continually. Interviewee G says: “this is a result of not only the cost of the clean-up work but 
also that the incident will be in the justice system for several years and that the reputation of 
the company takes a long time to build up”. As a direct result of the Deepwater Horizon 
incident, several oil companies developed project teams consisting of internal personnel that 
had the task of study the Deepwater Horizon incident and to learn from it by study different 
independent investigations, and also participate in seminars that specifically had this incident 
at the agenda. A measure that underlines the increased focus internally among companies is as 
mentioned earlier by interviewee A the increased tendency to use safety coaches that are 
deployed at the rigs. They have the responsibility of conducting daily reports to onshore 
personnel regarding the HSE conditions on the rig, and also keep dialog with the offshore 
operators in order to obtain safe behavior. Right focus can be undermined by what was 
mentioned earlier by interviewee D, by directly involve the management in HSE factors at the 
working field by being available to for example line leaders.  
4.3.4 Good and transparent investigations 
Good and transparent investigations are also seen as important by the interview objects. When 
conducting such investigations it is underlined the importance of investigate all the way back 
to the design process to reveal root causes. As mentioned by interviewee D this was crucial to 
prevent a particular failure from happen again, since it had been made changes in one part of 
the design without assessing the consequence on the system as a whole, thus this was 
something that could happen because of a breach in the system not because of failure among 
employees. However this is something that not often is performed since it demands more 
effort of the team in form of resources. Interviewee H says: “investigations are successful if 
the investigation goes all the way back to the regulations and are continually measured up 
against this”. This ensures a correct and objective investigation which is immune against 
prejudices and personal motivations among different actors. Investigations like this often 
require a tough and experienced investigation leader which can take the investigation back to 
the roots of the investigation rules provided by the authorities. Interviewee F also highlights 
the importance of ensuring that all involved actors participate in the investigation.  
4.3.5 A challenging culture 
Culture was not brought up often as something that ensures learning in the different 
companies; however this is something that is underlying to achieve results. Interviewee H 
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mentioned that in company 3 it exist a challenging culture which never closes investigations 
without a thoroughly poking on the issues in order to satisfy everyone and continually 
challenge the current system. This undermines the tendency to brainstorm (which is 
mentioned repeatedly as a factor that has created learning) around issues and enable 
individuals to come up with solutions and also ideas to alternative scenarios to train on so that 
scenario trainings do not become to unilateral.  
4.4 Challenges/Barriers with the learning 
The fourth category is dedicated to reveal factors that were challenging with regards to 
achieve organizational learning as well as identification of barriers against learning. More 
filling explanations are to be found in appendix C.4 and C.6.  
Interviewee/challenges and 
barriers 
A B C D E F G H I Total 
Resistance to change *  *  * * * * * 7 
Formal tools * *  * * *    5 
Time  *  *   *  * 4 
Admission   * *    *  3 
Focus *    *    * 3 
Management  *    * *   3 
Interact    *  *   * 3 
Complexity    * *  *   3 
Culture *      *   2 
Data/statistic    *     * 2 
Anticipate    *      1 
Seriousness    *      1 
Objectivity *         1 
Respect        *  1 
Ownership       *   1 
Save  *        1 
 
4.4.1 Resistance toward change 
The challenge/barrier that seems to repeat most often is resistance toward change in 
organizations. This is often a result of that people wants to maintain things as they are, since 
habits have been settled and people feel safe in the way they execute tasks. As mentioned by 
interviewee A earlier, it is in the shipping industry a problem regarding ways in handling 
waste onboard ships, this is typically a result of that for example captains have adapted ways 
of doing things that are in conflict towards regulations since he have done the same thing 
several times and it has always gone well. Resistance towards change is typically a 
phenomenon among employees that have worked in the business for several years, since they 
through a long time have adapted habits, and as interviewee H points out developed arrogance 
with regards to knowledge. Inhibitors to change can also be a result of resistance to interact 
with each other. This often is a result of cultural collisions that occurs when internal 
departments or externally actors are to be sat together and are forced to cooperate in new and 
close ways. As an example interviewee A mentioned that in the oil industry it still are 
examples of actors that do not cooperate as an entity even though it is several years ago the 
companies merged. He says: “it is even examples that employees from the old company before 
the merge, meets regularly and discuss issues without participation of employees from the 
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company/companies they merged with”. This is a disadvantageous side by having an 
excessive cultural ownership since it inhibits new ways to interact and as interviewee G 
mentions making it hard for an external actor to come in and criticize existing methods. 
Another reason for resistance can be as mentioned by interviewee I a result of conflicting 
motives among actors, this goes especially between externally actors. It is in the oil industry 
many examples of that oil companies are not interested in integrate reports among sub-
contractors in their internally reporting system. This can be of fear of not satisfying HSE 
goals, or lack of interaction for what to report and how to report it. Interviewee I highlights 
also that it among the sub-contractors also can exist poor reporting because of conflicting 
motives.  
4.4.2 Lack of/poor formal tools 
Another challenge/barrier that several times has been mentioned is the lack of or poor formal 
tools. As an example interviewee A said: “after a near incident where equipment felt down 
and nearly killed three men there were a lack of clarity regarding how to deal with these 
employees, since they had no physical injuries”, thus no routines in handling people which 
may be in shock, also how to address the issue to the supplier it existed ambiguities about. 
Interviewee D mentions that formal tools might also be challenging for the operators since 
they often can be huge and complex with much content since content often are added without 
evaluate the procedure as a whole. This can lead to miss understandings among the operators 
since they might not have so much academic education and have trouble in interpreting 
procedures that requires good reading and analytical skills. Interviewee D implies that this 
also might lead to ignorance of the procedures. Formal tools might also work against its 
intension since when problems occur it is often a focus towards study if procedures exists, 
which interviewee D says: “might lead to neglect if things in detail are performed correct”. 
The contradiction to this is the problem regarding lack of formal tools. As an example 
interviewee E mentioned that adequate systems that ensures discussion around knowledge 
obtained from different seminars/courses don’t exists. This problem can be hidden for a long 
time, but comes to light when experienced personnel leaves the company and new employees 
needs to absorb knowledge to be able to work in the organization.  
4.4.3 Lack of time 
Challenges/barriers with regards to learning can also be in the form of lack of time to 
participate in learning activities. Interviewee D says: “it can be challenging to balance the 
time to participate in seminar/forums and the time to perform tasks”. Also as mentioned by 
interviewee B inhibitors to learning can be a result of lack of time to sit down and reflect in 
plenum over what have been learned after for example seminars and forums. It is regularly 
one meeting right afterward, the problem seems to be to arrange new meetings and discuss the 
same subjects to see if the company have learned. Even though it exists regulations that 
ensures documentation over what has been learned in the seminars/forums several of the 
interview objects feels that the content are rarely discussed in later occasions. Interviewee B 
also expresses concern regarding transfer of knowledge from past projects over to new 
projects. This is often a result of that evaluation of projects mainly are done by more 
inexperienced personnel which might not have been participated much in the projects, but 
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rather evaluates the project based on statements from involved personnel, since the more 
experienced personnel often do not have the time to be a part of the evaluation but are rather 
off to new projects. Interviewee I say: “it is common that when a project is at close to ending 
it is regular that people look forward too new projects, instead thinking of how to evaluate the 
project”. This is a common barrier that prevents learning from one project to another.  
4.4.4 Unwillingness to admit 
Admission is another key word that describes barriers with regards to learning. Interviewee D 
say: “a well-known scenario that creates incidents is when inexperienced personnel perform 
tasks without conferring with supervisors, or insures that they are monitored by supervisors”. 
It is many examples from different industries that incidents caused by apprentices have been 
explained as a result of inexperienced personnel performing the job without addressing the 
issue of why the supervisor where not involved and the lack of supervision. The lack of ability 
to admit deviations in procedures is something that prevents organizations from develop and 
learn. Another source to lack of admission is when internal/external actors are to achieve 
consensus regarding the actual conditions. Interviewee H mentions that this often are 
strengthened when the fact basis are faltering by not being tightened enough to the regulations 
provided by the authorities. If this is not achieved it might be given room for doubt and 
difficult to achieve consensus and admission.  
4.4.5 Wrong focus 
Wrong focus can also be a barrier towards learning. Interviewee A mentions that he many 
times have experienced what he refer to as wrong focus in the oil industry. It can for example 
be that a company initiates stair walking courses to its employees to underline the importance 
of always holding in the railing. Interviewee A say: “stair walking courses is something that 
Norwegians tend to see through, but can harm the organization since it can lead to less focus 
on more important issues, mainly by the management”. It exists several examples of that 
companies are good at preventing small incidents like falling accidents or similar issues, but 
at the same time proven to be unable to foresee and act to prevent huge disasters with multiple 
fatalities. This is something that is strengthened if the management is not taking signals from 
the employee’s seriously regarding measures like for example stair walking courses. Another 
problem is according to interviewee E that focus in investigations are often on pure material 
assets since this requires limited resources, this lead to that root causes rarely are investigated.  
4.4.6 Complexity and troubles in interaction 
The barrier regarding complexity and interaction are closely related. In the oil industry it is 
often many actors involved in operations therefore problems in interaction can become a 
barrier. This is especially true for small oil companies that are often very dependent on 
external companies to for example build wells. Interviewee D says: “this complexity in itself 
can become a barrier if it lacks clear leadership in how to interact, since it is many actors to 
communicate and achieve consensus between”. Interviewee G highlights that it is hard to 
reveal deviations in barriers when systems are very complex. This can often lead to 
misunderstandings, or poor cooperation because of different goals, since as interviewee E 
mentions actors can have different political views.  
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4.4.7 Lack of ability to anticipate 
Even though it is only mentioned by interviewee D, the issue of anticipation is here 
highlighted, since it is regarded by the researcher to be important. Interviewee D mentions 
that it in general has been a problem in the industry to anticipate and assess possible long term 
damages. He says: “it has been a poor assessment of long term injuries as a consequence of 
chemical exposure”. Regularly investigations are related to short time injuries; thus a poor 
anticipation of possible long term damages.  
4.4.8 Culture 
Culture is another issue rarely mentioned, but is implicit in many of the other 
barriers/challenges. The culture is as interviewee A says: “important in order to maintain a 
safety trend also when the tabloid part of an incident is over”. He says if this is missing it is 
hard to maintain a continually improvement. 
4.4.9 Poor data/statistic 
Also it is worth mention the issue of poor data/statistic. According to interviewee D statistics 
are often not covering the lack of ability to conduct tasks/projects, since it is common that 
people often are given new time limits, this might cause lack of indication on the 
performance, which in turn might give poor indications on major incidents to arrive.  
4.5 Systems to ensure learning and how to follow up reports/issues 
The fifth category aims at revealing systems that are meant to ensure learning in the different 
companies, and how to follow up what is learned. Note that interviewee A, B, C and D 
represent company 1, interviewee E and F represents company 2 and interviewee G, H and I 
represent company 3. More filling explanations are to be found in appendix C.8 and C.9. 
Interviewee/Systems A B C D E F G H I Total 
Documentation * * * * * * * *  8 
Gatherings *  * * * *  * * 7 
Forums *  * * * * *  * 7 
Benefits *   * * *    4 
CARE *  * *   *   3 
Management of change       * * * 3 
Review     *   * * 3 
Informal dialog  *      *  2 
Management *         1 
Culture        *  1 
Training  *        1 
Observation/brainstorming *         1 
Routines *         1 
Education       *   1 
Web sites       *   1 
Local expertise        *  1 
Save   *       1 
 
4.5.1 Documentation system 
Documentation is the most used system to ensure learning. The most regular form of 
documentation mentioned by the interviewees is the CARE system which is a HSE follow up 
system that ensures that every task has one responsible person which has to comment what 
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have been done, and describe possible failures with the tasks performed.  This gives a 
reminder of what actions that is left to be performed.  The system also provides possibilities 
for the operators to come up with qualitative judgment regarding how to improve processes. 
Documentation systems are also used to document what has been learned at different 
forums/seminars with the aim of ensuring that the knowledge are not forgotten but rather to be 
discussed among the participants afterwards and spread out to the rest of the organization. 
Interviewee C mentions that it in addition to forums it is important to continually share 
knowledge between companies; which in his company are done by so called safety bulleting´s 
where copies of all relevant incidents are sent between actors to check if external actors have 
experienced similar incidents. When learning new ways in performing tasks it is also 
important to document this, several of the interviewee objects mentions lessons learned 
reports that aim at ensuring that lessons learned are not forgotten.  
4.5.2 Gatherings 
Gathering is another tool to ensure learning. One regular form of gathering is in form of 
morning meetings where for example CARE reports are discussed. Interviewee A says: 
“morning meetings between onshore and offshore personnel or other non - present personnel 
with the help of video transferring are important in order to ensure that different employees 
are updated on the daily drift”. This kind of system undermines the need for transparency and 
shearing of knowledge in organizations. Another successful form of gathering mentioned by 
interviewee I are so - called awareness sessions which is based on voluntarily attending. In 
these meetings current issues are communicated out to the organization. The time where these 
sessions take place is essential in order to ensure that as many as possible shows up. 
Interviewee I say: “30 minutes before lunch is regarded as a good timing”. It were also 
mentioned by interviewee E more formal gatherings like quarterly meetings with external 
actors and quarterly inter functional meetings where employees within the same company 
from different countries within a specific field meet and exchanged experiences. Interviewee I 
mentions that in company 3 it is common with teleconference between actors globally every 
fourteenth day with one leader which describes the incident, also he mentions project 
meetings to ensure that all have an understanding about what has been done to date in a 
project.  
In the daily drift interviewee C mentions that all involved actors in an activity should meet 
and go through HSE factors before start to work on an activity, and also a general discussion 
is important which interviewee H says: “can be in so-called reference groups”.  
4.5.3 Forums 
Another popular system to ensure learning is the use of forums, where people from different 
companies meets to exchange experiences. Interviewee G says “forums where people with the 
same background meet and exchange experience is the most effective forms of forum since 
this enables possibilities to improve within a specific field”. Forums where people within 
different business department meet where regarded as forums where the subjects had a more 
superficial presentation, but still interviewee D mentions that forums across business units 
also are used by his company. Interviewee A says: “it is usually leaders from different 
departments that participate in forums. Afterwards they spread the knowledge within their 
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department”. Interviewee F adds that forums usually have a library in which all data and 
reports are saved.  
4.5.4 Benefits 
The interview objects also mentions that companies tend to promote learning by offering 
benefits when different key performance indicators (KPI´s) are reached. Interviewee A says: 
“the personal salary can be based upon personal KPI`s which includes different HSE 
factors”. He mentions this is mainly based on statistically data’s. Interviewee E mentions that 
the salary also can be based on numbers of management visits and audits offshore. The 
interviewees disagree in how well this type of measure works. Interviewee I do not mention 
benefits as a tool in company 3, his view is rather that it might work against its intentions 
since people might feel that bonuses are given unjustified and also that it is more important to 
ensure ownership to activities. Interviewee F adds that to evaluate individual performance on 
the background of the tasks they have performed are often more useful since statistics/data 
might hide facts and lead to unjustified bonuses.  
4.5.5 Management of change 
By all of the interviewee in company 3 it where mentioned that the management of change 
procedure is important, which is aimed at reveal deviations from plans, strategic direction and 
the design.  
4.5.6 Reviews  
Also it where repeatedly mentioned the yearly review of the overall management system to 
ensure that proper procedures exists.  
4.5.7 Culture 
An organization can have the best systems in the world to enhance learning; this provides no 
good results unless the organization has a culture that undermines the ability to learn. As 
mentioned earlier interviewee H said: “in company 3 it exist a challenging culture that always 
tries to improve the current situation by continually challenge the current system”. The issue 
of always trying to improve the current status can also be undermined by what interviewee B 
says about training on interpreting signals combined with what interviewee H says about the 
challenging culture in company 3 since it enables renovation by always train on new 
scenarios.  
Interviewee/Follow 
up 
A B C D E F G H I 
Matrix * * * *   * * * 
Gathering *       *  
Type    * *     
Self-assessment     * *    
Consensus *       *  
Continuality       *   
Closure *         
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4.5.8 Matrix system based on the ALARP - principle 
When it comes to how the companies follows up incidents/issues it existed few factors that 
repeatedly where mentioned, however one factor that were mentioned by almost all where the 
matrix system. This is a matrix that is based on the combination of probability and 
consequence, thus the ALARP-principle (Rausand, 2011). Incidents are separated in red, 
yellow and blue incidents. When a red incident occurs the working task is immediately 
stopped performed and measures are taken, this type of incidents also requires management 
involvement in the assessment. Yellow incidents might also be stopped in order to improve 
the situations, while the work continues with a blue incident all though as interviewee B said: 
“it is a focus toward maintaining a continually improvement even though the incident is 
blue”. It where a broad consensus that this principle where satisfactory, and it where little 
discussion around this principle, however interviewee D expressed concern over this one 
dimensional way of thinking. He believed that in some cases the probability factor had to be 
set aside and just focus on the potential consequences, since probabilities could in many cases 
bee hard to predict, and contribute to that nothing is done to improve dangerous conditions, 
since the probability part in many cases is sat low and therefore the condition is sat at the 
yellow or even blue part of the matrix.  
4.5.9 Self - assessment 
Even though the ALARP - principle where dominating in assessing what to be followed up it 
still where room for self - assessment which were mentioned by two of the interviewees. 
Interviewee E mentions that in company 2, HSE specialists stationed onshore receives reports 
from offshore personnel, they then make a self-assessment regarding the importance of the 
issues and if it is to investigate any further. Interviewee F adds that this is often determined by 
the experience of the HSE specialist. This close connection between on and offshore is 
something that have increased later years since a lot of tasks that before where performed 
offshore now are being performed onshore, therefore it is important with a close connection 
between on and offshore on how to follow up incidents, for example as mentioned through 
video conferences every morning, and special meetings if things are seen as important 
enough. 
4.5.10 Depend on the type of incident 
Another factor to be aware of when deciding whether an incident is to be followed up is what 
kind of incident that took place. Interviewee E says: “organizations/employees tend to be 
more on the alert regarding equipment that has been involved in earlier incidents”. This 
implies that incidents usually results in more focus toward specific issues the challenge are 
tough to maintain a continually focus. 
4.5.11 Gather and discuss 
Interviewee A and H underlines the importance of gather and discuss what to be followed up. 
This can be done by regular meetings or specific discussions with the aim of for example 
determine the probability of incidents to happen.  
Page 49 of 119 
 
4.6 How to become better able to learn? How to implement the measures? How to 
see the improvements? 
The sixth and last category is dedicated to reveal the interviewees view regarding how 
organizations can become better able to learn. It is also revealed how measures are 
implemented in the companies they are currently working for and how the companies register 
if improvements have been made with regards to learning. More filling explanations are to be 
found in appendix C.5, C.10 and C.7.  
 
Interviewee/How 
to be better?  
A B C D E F G H I Total 
Formal tools * *  * * * * * * 8 
Dialog * * *   * * * * 7 
Forums * * *   *  * * 6 
Management   *    * *  3 
Focus   * *   *   3 
Documentation  *      *  2 
Save     *   *  2 
Ownership   * *     * 3 
Re-design      *    1 
Investigation        *  1 
Culture        *  1 
Standards        *  1 
Baldness        *  1 
Anticipate   *       1 
Competence        *   1 
 
4.6.1 Better and more consistent formal tools  
The factor that repeats itself the most as an improvement potential is the need for better and 
more consistent formal tools. Several of the interviewees agree that it should be better and 
clearer routines for when to gather with internally and externally actors to repeat and discuss 
tasks to ensure a good development.  It however exist some formal gatherings, in addition to 
more informal gatherings, the needs according to interviewee A is to develop even more 
formal meeting places for when to meet and discuss different tasks, interviewee I adds that it 
should also be a formal system that ensures more regular meeting and discussions regarding 
what have been learned from for example participate in forums.  
Also in the daily drift it seems to be a lack of formal tools. As an example interviewee B 
expresses a wish to develop a formal system with regards to saving of informal mail. Mail is a 
very common way to exchange experiences, the problem seems to be to have an overview 
over important mail, interviewee B says: “it should be made a system where mails are 
categorized after importance, where important mails are saved in a folder, and less important 
mail might be treated as regular mail and deleted as the inbox gets larger”. Another urging 
system to get in place is according to interviewee F the need for a formal system that ensures 
a transfer of experiences between projects, since old projects tends to be forgotten before they 
even are finished, since people wants over to new projects and focus forward to new tasks. 
Interviewee G also mentions the importance of ensuring good and formal early warning 
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system with belonging obligatory measures since it enables detection of signals to failure as 
well as have clear procedures for what to do if signals are interpreted. The Deepwater Horizon 
incident illustrates the potential consequences of not having an adequate formal system to deal 
with early warnings. Interviewee G says: “it where signals that a blowout could happen in the 
months, weeks, days and even hours before the incident”. With a good early warning signal 
this would have been avoided. Also it is addressed by interviewee H a general need in the oil 
industry for develop very clear procedures that are capable to dismiss all uncertainties and 
possibilities to argue against it. This can be done by tighten the procedures more to the root 
regulations developed by the government in order to dismiss all prejudices and easier achieve 
consensus. Further interviewee D mentions a general wish within the oil industry to enable 
more judgment from the operators, so that procedures are not made only by engineers or 
others that might not be so much involved in the daily process. This is mainly to ensure that 
procedures are made easier to follow. Interviewee D says: “developing of checklists not 
unlike the one in the airline industry can be made as an attachment to procedures, to ensure 
that all important measures are made before conducting a task”. This he implies will ensure 
more compliance with procedures.  
4.6.2 Better able to keep dialog 
Another improving potential that repeats itself among the interviewees is the need to be better 
able to keep dialog with each other in order to ensure that everyone are updated on issues; this 
is mainly to ensure more awareness regarding for example the internal working environment. 
As an example mentioned by interviewee A to ensure that everyone on a cargo boat knows 
about what has been loaded on the boat and make them aware of the dangers with it by being 
open and honest about the problem.  
Another issue is to ensure thoroughly brainstorming/conversation among operators before 
performing a job, especially as mentioned by interviewee B in doubtable situations but should 
also be performed as a habit before all kinds of jobs. It is important that all personnel involved 
in the operation are able to come with input regarding what is going to be performed, in form 
of facts and thoughts. After incidents interviewee C says: “evaluation of incidents with 
external suppliers are in many cases done very fast”, this can for example be since actors 
across company lines may not know how to properly behave toward each other after incidents 
and are therefore to some extend limited when exchanging experiences with each other.  
Another issue that goes internally is the problem regarding dialog between technical 
personnel and the management; this is often a problem since technical personnel often uses 
very technical language when addressing problems to the management. The clue, according to 
interviewee F is to communicate to the management in a way that they understand the 
problem easily and see ways on how to improve the situation. The problem of making the 
message understandable is not just something that might occur between the management and 
technical personnel, but might also be between several actors. Interviewee I say: “the clue is 
to avoid being to specific when communicate, but rather be more general so that all actors 
can familiarize themselves with the problem and are able to come up with helpful 
contributions to solve the problem”. Thus the main reason for performing a good dialog with 
each other is to achieve more knowledge and clearer orders, which also enables according to 
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interviewee H more possibility to achieve consensus among several actors as well as it 
enables a good documentation basis.  
4.6.3 More use of forums 
Several of the interviewees called for more use of forums. As mentioned by interviewee A it 
is for example in the shipping industry proven that even if one incident occurs and one 
company learns from it, this does not ensure that the learning are spread around the industry 
and that other companies learns from it. This indicates that it should be more use of forums in 
general that enlightens the issue of possible consequences of not being aware of the working 
conditions, for example more participation into HSE forums. It is mentioned that it is 
important that forums are addressing issues that are topical; therefore it is important that 
signals are given from different companies to the forum speakers, regarding issues to address. 
Also it is mentioned that it is important to save knowledge obtained from forums, this is 
regularly done the improvement potential however lies according to interviewee F and I to 
gather more regular afterwards with the involved actors to reflect over if the companies have 
learned of the forums.  
Interviewee H expresses a wish to develop forums that goes across industries. Interviewee H 
says: “the nuclear industry has brought many lessons to the oil industry, especially in terms of 
thoroughness”. To take up again these bonds and arrange for common forums with actors 
from the nuclear and the oil industry are seen as potential very beneficial for the oil industry 
in order to be more thorough when developing different safety tools. He adds that it is 
probably no need to be as thoroughly as in the nuclear industry, but that the nuclear industry 
probably still can provide important inputs to the oil industry.  
4.6.4 Management participation 
It is now doubt that improvements can’t be achieved without participation from the 
management. Interviewee C says: “the management must give strong signals about how they 
want things to be as a part of an overall business vision”. This implies that changes have to 
come from the management as a part of an overall business strategy with high focus on HSE 
issues and a high degree of commitment to achieve different goals. As an example 
interviewee G says: “it is often a need to shake the organization in order to make people go 
together and overcome resistance towards change”. Thus a strong and clear management are 
a provider to draw things in the right direction and achieve improvements.   
4.6.5 Keep right focus  
Right focus as mentioned before is also a key to make organizations become better with 
regards to learning. Interviewee C says: “it is important to focus just as much to what is going 
right as it is to focus on what is going wrong and focus just as much if the right things are 
done compared to if the things are done right”. As an example interviewee D calls into 
question the unilateral use of the ALARP - principle, since probabilities can be hard to 
determine.  Thus it is important to also evaluate incorporated measures.  
4.6.6 Ensure ownership  
The question of ownership is also important, often more important than use of benefits in 
form of bonuses. In order to achieve the best results interviewee C underlines the importance 
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of not force measures upon an organization, but rather ensure that people feel an individual 
ownership to processes. Interviewee I adds that his experience was that plans where 
implemented best when the lines themselves had the full/most responsibility and felt a great 
deal of ownership to the plan. 
Interviewee/Implementing A B C D E F G H I Total 
Communication * * * * *  *  * 7 
Short sight * * *  * * *   6 
Parallel  *     *   2 
Series        * * 2 
Series and parallel *         1 
Documentation *       *  2 
Ownership       *  * 2 
Anticipate    * *     2 
Continuality  *        1 
Transparency    *      1 
Training     *     1 
Bowtie principle        *  1 
 
4.6.7 Good communication 
One of the purposes with the interview was to map how the companies are implementing 
measures. It was hard to see many patterns here but one factor mentioned repeatedly is the 
importance of good communication. Interviewee A says: “it is important to ensure mutual 
understanding between operators, HSE responsible (engineers) and the corporate side, since 
these three actors might have conflicting motives”. Another reason according to interviewee 
B, are to ensure that different departments have an overview of each other’s activities in order 
to enable a good coordination since many activities are done simultaneously, and are 
dependent on each other. When communicating with external actors it is a general view in the 
oil industry to be clear on expected performance and the time frame on different tasks, 
especially offshore. For example interviewee C mentions that when performing a job on a rig 
it is seen as important to have clear restrictions and expectations to the job, since the cost of 
renting a rig is several hundred thousand US dollars a day. Before the management decides to 
implement plans down the organization, interviewee D says: “it is crucial that the 
management develops a thoroughly vision which is communicated down the organization 
before project plans are developed and performance indicators are set, and that the overall 
company plan is closely tightened to the different project plans”. In addition it is seen as 
important to communicate with the aim of achieve consensus and overcome different barriers.  
4.6.8 Short time vs. long time view   
The activities that the interview objects is involved in are mainly developing of wells and side 
project attached this. It where mentioned that it is not so much focus on whether solutions is 
sustainable for the future since the wells have a limited/short timeframe/lifetime. Usually the 
time horizon for anticipating the future where set to one year.  
4.6.9 Series vs. parallel  
Whether things were done in parallel or series where something the interviewees had different 
opinions about. Some mentioned a mixture, while some meant that thing mainly where done 
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in parallel across different departments/companies, and that many tasks where complex, 
which demanded as mentioned earlier good communication.  
Another version where that thing mainly was done in series, this was more the overall 
activities. Interviewee H said: “it typically started with an assessment, then plans were made 
and decisions taken based on the assessment, then the focus were on ensure knowledge and 
spread this by develop systems that enhanced good communication, afterwards the measures 
were implemented, and at last the results were monitored to see if the plan/plans where 
properly performed”.  
Interviewee H added that it also were discussed afterwards whether the right things were 
done, but regularly among the interview objects it were only mentioned the discussion 
regarding if things were done right.   
Interviewee/See 
improvements 
A B C D E F G H I Total 
None  *    * *   3 
Number of 
incidents 
  *  *   *  3 
Tests        * * 2 
Open investigation    *      1 
Benchmark *         1 
4.6.10 Number of incidents  
The interview also aimed at revealing if the different companies had any tools/methods to 
register improvements regards to learning. This was something that was dismissed by most of 
the interviewees to in best case be very limited. Nevertheless it were mentioned a few 
measures. The most repeated measure is to monitor different parameters internally for 
example HSE parameters and then make trends too see if the type of incident are increasing or 
decreasing in number. Interviewee E added that such monitoring can be followed by 
investigations to see why things happen in order to reveal if the root causes to incidents still 
are the same or if they have changed, this can also be done by regularly meetings between the 
departments as mentioned by interviewee H.  
4.6.11 Net based tests  
The most regular measurement according to interviewee H and I are individually based in 
form of net based tests after participating at seminars/forums so that the individuals could 
have a clue of how much they had learned. These net based learning’s where often logged, 
and it where developed goals for what to be accomplished each quarter.  
4.6.12 Keep investigations open until the effects of the measures have been checked 
Interviewee D brought up; that keeping investigation open after measures have been taken 
until the effects is checked is a form of registration of how well it has been learned since it 
enables to check the effects of the measures.  
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5 Discussion 
This chapter is dedicated to discuss the empirical findings by linking it up to the theoretical 
material. The chapter is separated in three parts; where the first two parts are aimed at discuss 
respectively the inhibitors and promoters towards a learning organization, while the third part 
aims at come up with recommendations in order to ensure continuous learning for the 
companies.  
5.1 Inhibitors in becoming an learning organization 
In this subsection it is discussed the barriers towards learning that most often are mentioned 
by the interviewees. In addition it will be discussed some barriers that where not mentioned so 
often among the interviewees but that are seen as important in the theory. 
5.1.1 Lack of information flow 
From the empirical results the first inhibitor mentioned by several of the interviewees was the 
lack of information flow among actors. Interviewee A used the example of poor information 
transfer between personnel at rigs and captains on boats that loads waste from rigs. This 
results in lack of awareness among the crew about the dangers in their working environment. 
Regarding the main responsibility for this lack of information transfer interviewee A says: 
“the captain have the responsibility to ensure knowledge regarding the content on their ships, 
and the main risks with them”.  Why captains are not ensuring information adequately and 
follow the steps needed in order to handle different waste cannot be because they lack 
knowledge regarding possibilities for dangerous waste, since captains mainly have long 
experience. The problem lays rather in the fact that captains often have done the same 
procedure several times in many years and therefore they develop habits in ways of doing 
things. This can be referred to what Schein E. H. (1987) describes about basic underlying 
assumptions, which basically states that many organizations do not renew themselves because 
they take for grounded certain assumptions which leads to that they see no other solutions. 
Interviewee A indicates that it regularly have to happen an incident before captains changes 
their attitudes, since ways of doing things are so well incorporated in their way of working. 
This is further undermined by the theory of Baumard (1999), which describes that members of 
an organization tend to negotiate its own environment by following tried and tested 
approaches for the industry and it may be developed filters against incoming signals (Cyert & 
March, 2006). As a result of this, existing practices may be in conflict with authority rules and 
guidelines from the management of a company.   
Lack of information transfer where also mentioned by interviewee E to be a problem when 
working group cycles. Referring to Nonaka & Takeuchi, (1995) it seems to be that the breach 
occurs in the first step, thus the socialization process, where members are to share knowledge 
between each other when the cycles are rotating. This was according to interviewee E often an 
issue when small changes where conducted without verifying possible consequences. Perhaps 
this implies that the physical proximity between actors when working group cycles often is 
too relentless and is not being taken seriously enough. Failure in Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) 
socialization process can also be related to what interviewee G mentions about lack of 
competence sharing between actors in order to enable people to interpret signals of failure, 
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which would enable employees to see things differently and find new opportunities and 
options of doing things (Levitt & March, 1988). It has in fact been proven by investigations 
that accidents like the Deewater Horizon incident could have been avoided if signals had been 
interpreted adequately.  
5.1.2 Inadequate compliance  
The next inhibitor mentioned is difficulties in complying with regulations/procedures. 
Interviewee D mentioned that since many operators might have limited academically 
knowledge it might lead to that some operators are not able to follow procedures adequately. 
Referring to Rosness & Nesheim, (2013) this might be a result of structural actions by the 
management in the intuition process, where a high level of specialization reflects the 
procedures and might cause difficulties for operators to follow them. This is a typically a 
result of too much control by groups like engineers without participation from the operators or 
others in the forming of procedures, and setting the basis for further practices. This is often a 
problem since engineers and operators might have different understandings regarding similar 
issues and therefore crashes between these groups occur (Schein E. H., 1996). In addition to 
lack of understanding regarding procedures, lack of operator participation might also lead to 
that operators out of practical issues choose not to follow the procedures, since procedures 
might be inadequate adapted the practical drift. Referring to Nathanel & Marmaras, (2008) 
deviations might occur since operators in the daily work have to do activities that deviate 
from the procedures out of practical issues. This is a common problem in many industries 
(Reason, 1997) which provides a huge potential to learn by study the gap between procedures 
and what is really being done.  
Interviewee H mentioned that even procedures might not be in compliance with existing 
authority rules, since it has been a poor control to ensure that the procedures are tightened to 
current rules. This can possible be related to structural actions in the institutionalization 
process (Rosness & Nesheim, 2013) where it may lack control mechanisms which ensures a 
tightening to public regulations. This in turn might give critical employees in the company 
ammunition to argument against procedures and undermine the respect for them. Referred to 
Vaughan (1996) it can over time develop a culture in an organization that emphasizes on 
handle hazards instead of doing something about them; this is especially true when the 
framework is incomplete.  
Both the issue of complex procedures and procedures without roots in regulations might have 
the effect that employees choose to not follow them, but instead develops their own way of 
perform tasks. This in turn might lead to ways of doing things that might be inherited by new 
employees and it forms habits in ways of performing tasks that might be hard to change when 
they have been thoroughly incorporated into working groups. 
5.1.3 Lack of risk understanding 
Lack of risk understanding can also be an inhibitor towards a learning organization. Several of 
the interviewees implies that many employees have little experience with the hazards attached 
to the tasks they are working with in addition to little brainstorming around possible risks, 
especially when things are urging to be done. The issue of lack of risk understanding can be 
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related to what Senge (1990) describes about the importance of creating common mental 
models. It can be that risks are not considered to be dangerous as a result of that it contradicts 
with old and ingrown performances about how the world works (Baumard, 1999), and as a 
result of this new ideas are kept from provide learning. This can lead to employees feeling 
that there is little to gain from brainstorming and from suggest changes. The issue of urging 
tasks can be referred to the ETTO principle Hollnagel (2011), which describes if efficiency 
dominates; the action might be inadequate performed. In many time limited tasks this is a 
reality since actors can be pressured to perform tasks in a hurry to comply with different 
timeframes, which may go on the expense of the security since actors do not have the time to 
adequately think through possible dangers. However if it is too little time to perform the 
activity, it may be given a new time limit by the management. The challenge then mentioned 
by interviewee D is to register the inability to perform projects/tasks and not just give them 
new time frames without any questions and without a registration of the inability to perform 
projects.  This form of registration might be useful in order to develop tools to measure the 
learning ability of an organization (Antonsen, 2009), and also develop project plans that 
consider taking into account being thorough when performing tasks.  
Interviewee A ads that lack of risk understanding also can be a result of poor documentation 
which might give a false safety feeling. This is often a result of poor communication with 
suppliers of equipment in order to ensure that the documentation is adequate. Thus it lacks an 
active leadership of knowledge (Meier, 2010) in order to develop a trustfully relationship with 
suppliers to secure accurate documentation.  
5.1.4 Poor Management 
The reason for lack of risk understanding is according to many of the interviewees that it 
lacks leadership from the top management. This can be because of laziness to do something or 
it can be that managements in different companies put the blame on each other; this implies 
that the threshold to do something tends to be more difficult when several companies are 
involved in operations. Laziness by the management can be expressed in many ways; one way 
is that the management leaves it up to local expertise to handle incidents which may inhibit 
the involvement of the management into investigations. This implies that it lacks participation 
by all actors (Størseth & Tinmannsvik, 2011). The reason why conflicts arise between 
companies can be because of different business agendas or it can be because of cultural 
collisions between managements (Schein E. H., 1996). This issue tends to occur when an 
organization tries new ways to incorporate learning since current systems might be outdated. 
Thus it can be that new ways of assuring thoroughly risk understanding among employees can 
be difficult because managements do not dear to go into conflict with external actors. 
Conflicts like this tends to arise when there are difficulties in coordination which is something 
that regularly arises when it don’t exist an adequate strategy to ensure good dialog and 
training programs that are fitted the different cultures, thus lack of a inter organizational 
system that go across company boundaries (Meier, 2010).  
5.1.5 Resistance towards learning 
The reason why many organizations are hard to change in a desired direction is because it 
exist an embedded resistance towards learning in the organization. Interviewee A says: “it is 
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several examples of resistance towards changes inhibit learning since habits have been 
settled and people feel safe in the way they execute tasks.” Interviewee H adds that resistance 
towards change is something that especially goes for older and more experienced personnel 
because they tend to develop knowledge arrogance.  
Reluctance towards change can have many reasons, for example fear of losing ownership to 
their unique knowledge, fear of being punished (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) or that locally 
based learning have given good results repeatedly and is therefore still performed. It is 
however crucial for an organization to continually search for failure in order to come up with 
improvements, this cannot be done if employees do not support this proactively but instead 
rely too much on the current situation (Tinmannsvik, 2012). This must be undermined by 
employees that are proactive in asking questions about the current practice 
(Petroleumstilsynet, 2002). Resistance towards change can also as mentioned by interviewee 
A, be a result of reluctance between actors to cooperate with each other. Cooperation between 
actors across different sectors is necessary for an organizations ability to learn (Størseth & 
Tinmannsvik, 2011). It is in general a strong cultural pride that causes resistance to interact, 
which can be between internally as well as externally actors. This can be linked to basic 
underlying assumptions which inhibit an organization to renewal, since employees want to 
keep things as they are (Schein E. H., 1987). This is as interviewee G mentions the 
disadvantageous side by having a very strong cultural ownership, since the norms, values and 
perceptions of a reality (Bang, 1995) might cause difficulties in change and interact with new 
groups. This problem is often strengthened if the management doesn’t do anything about it, 
for example as interviewee G indicates, shake in the organization in order to make groups 
work together and secure a mutual understanding of each other (Schein E. H., 1996). This is 
an issue that it often has been focused little on since it has been a high degree of focus toward 
technical solutions (Kongsvik, 2012), this reflects also the interview results since cultural 
factors is rarely mentioned neither as an inhibitor or as an promoter towards learning. 
However this is important since developing of a learning culture aims at develop knowledge 
systems that underline an effective spreading and exploiting of knowledge (Rekdal, Fledsberg 
& Hansen, 2002). The lack of awareness about the importance of this issue can in fact itself 
be regarded as a barrier.  
Another resistance barrier can be illustrated by the lack of willingness by companies to 
integrate sub-contractor reports at their internally reporting system. This can lead to 
underreporting since it may lead to that many external employees do not feel that their 
reporting are being appreciated (Reason, 1997). Lack of reporting among sub-contractors 
might also be a result by lack of separate reporting systems (Le Coze, 2013) that cope with 
conflicting interests. In addition reports might be hard to make and consume much time, 
which might lead to that employees have a high barrier for reporting incidents.  
5.1.6 Inadequate/missing formal tools 
Lack of awareness for how to behave towards different tasks/incidents can be a result of lack 
of/poor formal tools. It can for example be as interviewee A mentioned lack of routines for 
how to deal with employees involved in a near incident, and also how to 
communicate/investigate the incident towards the supplier. This type of problem regularly 
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occurs when routines and practices which are integrated in the organizational knowledge are 
not formalized (Argyris & Schøn, 1996). However it is important to be aware of that 
formalized knowledge might be attached specific experiences, working contexts or cultures 
which can restrict the opportunities to store knowledge. This will be an increasingly problem 
if it lacks regularly discussions and follow - ups regarding if tools are adapted the current 
situation (Tinamannsvik, 2008).  
Interviewee I adds that it lacks a formal system to ensure a regularly discussion of knowledge 
obtained from forums/seminars to study if the organization are taking wisdom from the 
forums. It is therefore important to consciously design arenas in order to exchange experience 
(Levin & Klev, 2002). The importance of good formal tools often comes to light if 
experienced personnel are not present in a situation or if they are to leave the organization. An 
inhibitor toward knowing how to handle things can also be because it lacks formal systems 
that contributes to a free float of information among members and assures transparency (Jones 
& Cox, unspecified). It is also important to keep in mind what interviewee D mentioned 
regarding that formal tools might work against its intention, since procedures might lead to 
neglect if things in detail are performed correct if the focus purely is on performing things in 
compliance with procedures.  
5.1.7 The time constraint  
Time is a key barrier that inhibits members of an organization to develop their personal 
knowledge. This is illustrated by interviewee D who says: “it can be challenging to balance 
the time to participate in seminar/forums and the time to perform tasks”. And also as 
interviewee B mentions to reflect over what have been learned at forums/seminars, thus a 
problem in the tradeoff between achieving knowledge and performing working tasks 
(Hollnagel, 2011). This barrier is strengthened if there lacks predictability for when and how 
such meetings are going to take place. Nonaka (2002:105) says: “it is a critical matter for the 
organization to decide when and how to establish fields where individuals can meet and 
interact”. If this is not done it will thus be hard to plan in advance that these meetings are not 
colliding with working tasks, which decreases the probability for employees to participate in 
these gatherings.  
Also internally in organizations the time constraint might seek to that knowledge is not being 
shared properly. An example of this is the issue of not ensuring enough time to transfer 
experiences between projects, since experienced personnel often have a tough timeframe and 
that people tend to lock forward on new projects instead of evaluating the past project, this 
starts often even before projects are finished. In the theory this can be related to lack of 
motivation to learn (Størseth & Tinmannsvik, 2013), since it lacks an effort to confront the 
problem with an open and honest effort to learn. Also Disterer (2002) describes that in 
dynamic organizations it is often a lack of discussion regarding project results, since 
employees tends to end the project at different times and is off to other assignments. In this 
lays that project participants often are little aware of the importance of taking time to 
summarize projects after they are finished, thus little thoroughness in exchanging experiences 
from one project to another.  
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5.1.8 Reluctance to admit  
Barriers towards learning can also be because of reluctance to admit problems, for example as 
interviewee D mentions that employees tend comes up with alternative explanations to why 
things go wrong if they fear the consequences (Rekdal, Fledsberg & Hansen, 2002), 
especially if procedures have been broken. This can be related to lack of a reporting system 
that emphasizes learning instead of punishment (Petroleumstilsynet, 2002). Another inhibitor 
to achieve admission is as interviewee H mentioned when investigations are not going back to 
the roots in regulations, since it might give skeptical employees ammunition to resist new 
solutions. This can be because of too little use of dominance in the institutionalization phase 
(Crossan & Lane, 1999) because of too little effort in order to reduce the number of 
possibilities in developing of investigations.  
5.1.9 Wrong focus 
In order to ensure a learning organization it is important to ensure that an organization have 
the right focus. Wrong focus can according to interviewee A be that a company is trying to 
become world leading in preventing small incidents, which might undermine the effort related 
to studying root causes related to huge incidents. Easy measures like that can also as 
mentioned by interviewee E reflect the company in the way that investigations is mainly on 
pure material assets because this do not require so much resources. According to (Hopkins, 
2008) it exist examples of companies that have been in the world league in preventing small 
accidents because of a high focus on issues linked at individuals. As a result of this they have 
forgotten issues of importance for the system as a whole. This problem can be further 
undermined if the management is not taking into account views/signals from the employees 
regarding the measures (Størseth & Tinmannsvik, 2011).  
5.1.10 High degree of complexity and failure to interact  
In the oil industry it is in general a high degree of complexity since it is often a need to 
interact between several companies, this can according to interviewee D become a barrier in 
itself. A common failure that might occur in interaction between actors is that tools like IT – 
systems do not work as supposed, as well as documentation and follow up of suppliers 
(Hansen & Lekenes, 2011). Interviewee G points out that it might be hard to reveal deviations 
in barriers when systems are complex as well as the fact that different actors might have 
different goals. This will be increasingly difficult if it lacks clarity between actors for what 
they are trying to achieve. For example is the purpose of the learning to only adjust the action 
strategy or is the goal also to change the underlying values (nwlink.com, 2010). In addition it 
will be even harder for companies to interact if employees have not built relations to each 
other (Mueller, 2012) and developed alliances for how to interact and deal with different 
political views in order to achieve consensus between each other.  
5.1.11 Lack of anticipation  
Another barrier that where mentioned very rare in the interviews but although are mentioned 
here is the issue of anticipate future risks. Interviewee D said: “it has been a poor assessment 
of long time injuries”. This he especially linked to the possible consequences of chemical 
exposures. This acquires to look outside the box in order to anticipate future conditions and 
situations (Hollnagel, Woods & Leveson, 2011). If an organization lacks proactive members 
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in participating (Størseth & Tinmannsvik, 2011) in coming up with contributions this can lead 
to that organizations to late takes affaire when signs to unwanted consequences occurs. Lack 
of anticipation skills can be a result of lack of marked monitoring to see what the competitors 
are experiencing and doing. In addition it might be a lack of ability to try to expect new 
scenarios (Black Swans) that have not happened before (De – Risk Blog, 2009), which can be 
done in cooperation with external safety suppliers (Falck Nuteck, 2013).  
5.2 Promoters towards a learning organization  
This subsection is aimed at discussing the promoters that most often are mentioned by the 
interviewees. In addition it will be discussed some promoters that might not be mentioned so 
often among the interviewees but that are seen as important in the theory in order to create a 
learning organization.  
5.2.1 Dialog 
Dialog is regarded as crucial among the interviewees in order to enable a learning 
organization. It can be as interviewee G mentions, dialog between external actors in form of 
seminars where employees from different companies meets and study incidents that have 
happened among each other. This increases the awareness of potential incidents among actors 
which can result in a higher degree of learning in the current industry as a whole, thus adapt 
the behavior as a result of new knowledge (Garvin, 2000). An example of a tool developed as 
a result of participating in seminars can be as interviewee C mentions procedures that ensure 
that changes cannot be conducted without thoroughly verifying that everyone is updated on 
what is going on. To undermine this, it is as interviewee I indicates important with an overall 
system that sends out information to actors regarding when such gatherings are meant to find 
place, in order to coordinate between actors for when to meet which ensures cooperation and 
exchange of experience between as many actors as possible (Størseth & Tinmannsvik, 2011).  
Dialog can also be related to the daily drift internally at companies as well as between a 
company and its supplier. The clue here is to be clear on the expectations in order to achieve 
correct performance from involved actors. Interviewee D mentioned that he see it as 
positively that the management are directly involved in operations and not just delegate this to 
local expertise, this will undermine to prevent what is referred to in the theory as developing 
of locally based learning which can be hard to transmit, and also make it easier for technical 
personnel and the management to keep dialog in a language that they both understand by 
being aware of each other’s technical/corporate knowledge. This can for example be done by 
that a member of the top management organizes weekly tours with different department 
leaders where they in community inspect the working place. After the tour they can sit down 
and discuss in order to achieve consensus about what they saw and develop guidelines for 
how to behave in different situations (Hussein, 2013). It is also important that it is encouraged 
discussion among the employees at the daily basis in order to come up with alternative 
solutions and have a thorough discussion of HSE factors before conducting a job. In more 
formal communication, interviewee I highlight the importance of clarity regarding who are 
going to communicate what in the organization. If the management is to communicate it is 
important with effective and transparent communication patterns between the executive and 
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the employees where the management encourages learning and ensures motivation (Jones & 
Cox, unspecified).  
5.2.1.1 Gatherings 
To undermine the importance of keeping dialog with each other it is important with regular 
gatherings. This can be as interviewee A mentions by morning meetings, where different 
actors gather, this include use of video conferences to ensure participation of non-present 
personnel for example with offshore personnel, which will ensure a tighter connection 
between onshore and offshore personnel as well as between a company and its external 
suppliers (Perrow, 1999). This contributes to a higher degree of understanding among 
different groups like operators, engineers and the management in order to avoid barriers 
resulted by crash between different working cultures (Schein E. H., 1996) and also a 
transparency of each other’s performance. 
Another form of gathering is what interviewee I refer to as awareness sessions which are 
based on voluntary participation, where internally personnel meet, for example once a week 
and presents what they regards as important issues, thus construct an arena where issues that 
employees believes is important are addressed (Nonaka, 2002). In order to achieve this it is 
important that companies delegate time and resources to such measures (Roseness & 
Nesheim, 2013). The management should also try to set the awareness sessions to when it is 
best regarded by the interviewees. Thus it may not be a fixed time every week but rather a 
flexible time for when it is best suited by the interviewees. By the experience of interviewee I 
it was regularly best fitted 30 minutes before lunch. It should be a rotation in who performs 
what in the awareness sessions to ensure that every employee gets to participate (Størseth & 
Tinmannsvik, 2011) and come up with their views. Interviewee E brings up more regular and 
formal meetings as important in order to develop the company. It can be quarterly meetings 
with external actors to undermine the alliance building, which is important in order to develop 
consensus and discuss different political views (Meier, 2010). It can also be in form of 
gatherings internally in big international companies where employees within a specific field 
meet and exchange experiences. An idea for how to act in these yearly gatherings can be to 
use Kolb’s experience model (Kolb, 1984) as a tool to ensure reflecting of the experiences, 
get consensus around the understandings and use this to initiate new actions. To ensure 
transparency around progress in projects, project meetings where seen as important by 
interviewee I. In addition to discuss the progress it should be discussed what have been 
learned so far and also what could be transferred of experiences to new projects.  
5.2.1.2 Forums 
In addition to seminars that regularly relates to specific incidents, forums is another form of 
arena. Forums usually aim at gather employees from different companies within a specific 
subject field in order to develop expertise knowledge. This is in the theory referred to as 
communities of practice, which is a network that is based on informal relations between 
employees, which might collectively contribute to learning within a field of subject (Brown & 
Duguid, 1991). In these societies knowledge are shared through common discussions and 
activities, which over time will develop tools to solve tasks (Wenger & McDermott, 2002), 
therefore it is important to consciously design arenas to exchange experiences (Levin & Klev, 
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2002). Interviewee G felt that the most effective form of forum is so called subject-forums 
where people from the same background meet and exchange experience. This might be 
because it is easier for people within the same subject to develop sheared mental models 
(Senge 1990) and develop ideas for new solutions, since they talk the same language when 
referring to thoughts, will, deliberation feelings, or habits (Argyris & Schøn, 1996).  
It is as interviewee A implies important that the knowledge obtained from these forums are 
spread internally at the company. This can be by ensuring regular saving of the knowledge in 
addition to discuss the knowledge obtained regularly, for example link it to the previous 
mentioned awareness sessions in order to study the results from the forums. 
 Interviewee H mentioned that it could be useful to develop forums where personnel from 
different industries meet an exchange experiences. He reminded of that the atomic industry 
had provided much knowledge to the oil industry, and it probably still could have something 
to contribute with. New inputs from the atomic industry could ensure that the oil industry do 
not get stuck in old patterns (Edmondson & Moingeon, 1999), and develop new learning 
tools. 
Interviewee A underlined the importance of giving signal to the forums regarding which 
issues that is urging to be addressed, this is important to ensure that the issues that are 
addressed are adapted the current challenges. After participated in forums it is important that 
the knowledge are saved and discussed. It seemed to be clear procedures for how to save 
knowledge and also discuss the content right afterwards. However it where claimed that it 
where a lack of formal gatherings afterwards to see if the knowledge obtained had provided 
results in the companies, which might lead to increased motivation (Størseth & Tinmannsvik, 
2011) if seeing positively results.  
5.2.2 Dynamic management 
The need for a dynamic management is regarded by the interviewees to be a huge contributor 
towards a learning organization. As interviewee D mentioned it where crucial that the 
management in a former company he worked for reviewed procedures in order to provide 
clarity regarding what changes that can be conducted in an organization without the need for 
formal improvement and which one that needs formal improvement, which clearer separates 
unjustifiable errors from errors that are caused by systematically deviations (Kongsvik, 2012). 
This underlines the importance of participation by the management in addressing issues when 
needed (Størseth & Tinmannsvik, 2011). The example also underlines the importance of that 
the management have a view that not only focus on tracing errors back to individuals but also 
ask if the system is adequate (Hansen & Lekenes, 2011).  
The management can in several ways show that it takes HSE questions seriously. It can for 
example bee as interviewee A mention deploy safety coaches at the rigs. The safety coaches 
can contribute to undermine the discipline of group learning in system thinking (Senge, 
1990), by helping in develop individuals as well as collectives in order to contribute to 
collaboration across functions. Another way can be that one representative from the top 
management is attachable as a phone guard in which the employees can call if an incident 
occur, this ensures directly involvement by the management which makes it easier for the 
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management to develop what Senge (1990) refer to as mental models that is adapted the 
reality. It is important to keep in mind that good leadership means not just to implement 
changes in a good and effective way with regards to different schedules; it also means to 
ensure an understanding regarding what is being done and to develop a ownership feeling 
among the employees, so that for example line managers do not feel that their department are 
going to lose repute (Hussein, 2013). As interviewee D highlights it is important that a 
management develops a thoroughly vision which is communicated out in the organization. 
This enables the organization to develop common visions (Senge, 1990) which is important in 
order to develop understanding toward changes and ensure loyalty.  
5.2.3 Keep right focus 
To keep right safety focus which is the next promoter are closely related to the management 
issue since the management have to ensure that proper measures are taken. After big disasters 
like the Deepwater Horizon incident interviewee G mentioned that the oil industry across the 
globe focused on this incident in the long term also after the tabloid part of the incident was 
over (Hovden, 2011). This was done by develop project teams which had the task of studying 
the Deepwater Horizon incident in order to learn from it. This form of communities of 
practice (Brown & Dugid, 1991) are specially aimed at studying a special incident in order to 
learn from it and interpret signals to ensure that something like this does not happen again. 
This form of learning focuses on recordings and drawing of conclusions based on the 
background of experience and then formalize these in routines, procedures, conventions, 
technologies and strategies (Schults, 2002).  
In order to decide the right focus, it is important to take signals from the employees in order to 
avoid too much focus on a certain problem (Hopkins, 2008) but rather have a variety of issues 
to address and see the interaction between. As interviewee A mentioned he had several times 
experienced that companies have started what he calls useless courses like for example stair 
walking courses, without conferring with the employees first. In order for an organization to 
become learning it is important that the management gets the employees to participate 
(Størseth & Tinmannsvik, 2011) by enable them to come up with their own judgment 
regarding the measures that are taken and that the management take these judgments 
seriously. Interviewee D also calls for an evaluation of the risk matrix tool. He believes that 
this tool often can be inaccurate since probabilities can be hard to determine, and therefore in 
some cases it should be an excluded focus on the consequence part without regarding the 
probability side. This implies an increased degree of self - assessment in many cases. This 
kind of questioning of incorporated tools undermines an organization ability to develop and 
not just rely on tools developed in the past (Daft & Weick, 1984).  
5.2.4 Culture that emphasize a continual improvement 
Even though it is important with good and concrete measures, which was mainly mentioned 
by the interviewees, it is also important to have the right mind set in place in order to build an 
intelligent organization by ensuring that knowledge and thoughts held by individuals enters 
into the organizations thoughts and actions (Argyris & Schøn, 1996). In order to obtain this 
interviewee H believes that it is important with a challenging culture which never closes 
investigations without a thoroughly poking on the issues in order to satisfy everyone and 
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challenge the system, thus a high tolerance for new ideas and fantasies for possible scenarios 
(Petroleumstilsynet, 2002). This encourage the employees to think outside the box (Roseness 
& Nesheim, 2013) which contributes to that employees continually are dedicated to try to 
come up with ways to improve the current situation and as interviewee B mentioned to always 
think of new scenarios. This also undermines the employees to not only consider if tasks are 
performed correct but also if the right tasks are performed (Klev & Levin, 2009). It can also 
be related to undermining the learning by experience model (Kolb, 1984), since it underlines 
the importance of active experimentation.  
5.2.5 Benefits/Bonuses 
The interviewees disagree in what benefits that is most effective. Benefits could be in form of 
bonuses given when different goals within a department are reached or it could be more 
individual based goals. This could be done by tying safe behavior and career development 
together (Short, 2007), which could lead to more proactive members with regards to asking 
questions about the current practice (Petroleumstilsynet, 2002). Interviewee I believed that 
ensuring ownership to tasks is more important than bonuses. He mentioned that his 
experience is that best results are obtained when line leaders are given much responsibility 
and ownership feeling to the tasks. This implies that an organization should use its power 
proactively in order to achieve change (Borum, 2005).  
5.2.6 Better/changed formal tools 
In the daily drift it where mentioned by interviewee B a wish to develop better routines for 
how to save knowledge obtained from informal mails which is often send between employees. 
He mentioned that he wanted a system where important mail could be saved directly in a 
folder so that the important mails could be easier to bring up again when needed. This would 
make it easier to take up again important knowledge when needed, and undermines the 
importance of an effective information system (Pidgeon, 1998). Better formal systems can 
also be related to a good and formal early warning system, that have clear connections 
between incidents/signals observed and the measures that have to be taken related to this, thus 
a form of signal tree. This will be a helping tool in the determination of what patterns too look 
for that might provide unwanted results (Le Coze, 2013). Interviewee D calls for more formal 
tools that make it easier for operators to perform tasks, since procedures can be long and 
complex. He mentions that procedures are more likely to be followed if the operators and the 
engineers have cooperated in making of the procedure. This is in the theory described as 
challenging since different cultures might have different understandings regarding similar 
issues (Schein E. H., 1996).  
5.2.6.1 Good documentation system  
To ensure that knowledge obtained from different seminars/forums are integrated in the 
company it is as interviewee C points out important with a good documentation system that 
saves the knowledge in order for the participants to gather later and discuss what have been 
learned and what is still the challenges. This can be related to (Schuls, 2002) third purpose of 
learning, thus to emphasize learning as an evolution of knowledge over time and disturb this 
to the organizations sub - units. As mentioned it where highlighted among the interviewees 
more need to gather and discuss what have been learned from participating in forums. This 
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could be done by develop a formal system for when and where to gather and discuss if the 
knowledge obtained have provided the results it should.  
Documentation is also important at the daily drift since it ensures an overview over which 
tasks that has been performed and which ones that is still to be performed. It where mentioned 
by some of the interviewees that some of the registration systems emphasized qualitative 
judgment in order to obtain improvement. This is important in order to ensure participation by 
the operators so that they can contribute to an optimization of the procedures (Størseth & 
Tinmannsvik, 2011), and not just rely on tools mainly developed by engineers. This 
undermines the effort to avoid crash between the engineering and the operation culture 
(Schein E. H., 1996). Also it seemed to be a need for a formal system that ensures a transfer 
of knowledge between projects, thus important to register after every project meeting 
experiences that can be brought to next project.  
5.2.6.2 Transparent and good investigations 
In order to reveal the root causes to incidents it is important with good and transparent 
investigations. In this lays as mentioned by interviewee D a need to investigate all the way 
back to the design process, in order to reveal root causes. This underlines the need for a 
thoroughly system thinking (Hansen & Lekenes, 2011), so that errors are not only being 
traced back to individuals but also see the system as a whole in order to reveal if it is the 
system that causes incidents. Also it is important to be aware of what interviewee H says: 
investigations are successful if the investigation goes all the way back to the regulations and 
are continually measured up against this”.  To achieve this it is important with a strong and 
active leadership (Meier, 2010), which is active and though enough to take the assumptions in 
procedures and investigations back to the ground regulations provided by the authorities  
5.2.7 See the improvements 
Tools to see how well an organization has learned were something the interviewees mostly 
had no knowledge about. This is something that it obviously exist a huge improvement 
potential on. It is mentioned that it is a lack of discussion regarding knowledge obtained from 
different forms/seminars. This may be an improvement potential; by create formal meeting 
places (Levin & Klev, 2002) for when to meet and discuss what have been learned some 
months afterwards in addition to discuss the net based tests mentioned by interviewee H and I. 
However it is important that the organization have a clear strategy for how to measure 
learning, this can be done by asking themselves about the questions that Antonsen (2009) 
addresses in the theory.  
 
5.3 Recommendations 
In this subsection it will be given recommendations regarding how companies can learn by 
external/internal experience. The recommendations are basically aimed as a tool for the oil 
industry, but may be applicable also in other industries.  
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5.3.1 Dialog 
 Include as many internal/external actors as possible at morning meetings, for example 
captains and bring up issues that to date are urging, as well as getting feedback from 
operators at the sharp end regarding procedures 
 Collaborate with other companies in which seminars to participate in and have 
regularly discussions if knowledge obtained are giving results for the companies 
 Establish awareness sessions where employees are rotating in presenting their issues 
 Take up the contact with the nuclear industry with the aim of construct common 
forums for the oil and nuclear industry 
 Make things general and understandable for each other, and be clear on the 
expectations 
 Be proactive in giving signals to forum speakers regarding issues to be addressed 
 
5.3.2 Formal tools for learning 
 Develop procedures that clearly defines who needs to approve what, and let the 
procedures be open for qualitative judgment from operators at the sharp end 
 Develop a formal system that separates important mails from more less important 
mails. Thus a saving system for important informal mails 
 Develop signal trees that illustrates clear connections between incident/signals and the 
following measures 
 Develop check lists as a supplement to procedures, which the operators have to follow 
every time they are going to perform a task, as well as checklists for what to go 
through when working groups cycles 
 Evaluate if the probability side of the risk matrix are preventing issues to be addressed  
 Ensure that investigations has its roots in authority regulations 
 Develop a registration system that maps the inability to perform projects within 
deadlines in order to develop more realistic projects in the future that takes into 
account time to brainstorm and reach consensus 
 Develop separate reporting systems that takes into account conflicting interests and 
keep the reports easy to make 
 Perform risk assessments on long time injuries  
 
5.3.3 Dynamic management 
 Ensure that line leaders/operators feel ownership to new solutions 
 Shake the organization if needed to make different actors work together 
 Do not punish employees that are reporting about their own mistakes 
 Have one from the management as a phone guard, which employees on a field can call 
if an incident are to occur  
 Be proactive in develop training programs that are fitted different actors and consider 
signals from employees at management meetings 
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 Have a close relationship with suppliers of security training with the aim of 
developing training programs that continually develops and train on new scenarios 
 Take signals from the employees regarding safety measures seriously 
 Have fixed people from the management to regularly meet with different departments 
leaders and discuss the challenges, preferably with direct observation 
 
5.3.4 Time 
 Plan in advance to ensure that working tasks are not colliding with seminars/forums 
 Plan in advance to ensure that project meetings are sat at times where most people are 
able to participate  
 
5.3.5 Keep right focus 
 Encourage employees to come up with their views regarding safety measures and take 
these signals seriously  
 
5.3.6 Benefit/Bonuses 
 Continue with bonuses related to achieve HSE goals but also ensure that 
employees/line leaders are given much responsibility and ensure ownership feeling to 
new solutions 
 
5.3.7 Culture 
 Develop a culture that constantly questioning implemented solution until everyone are 
satisfied, thus a challenging culture 
 
5.3.8 See the improvements 
 Regularly discussions regarding if knowledge obtained from participating in 
forums/seminars have provided results 
 Individual meetings with employees to map if they feel improvements 
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6 Conclusion 
Based on the empirical results from the semi-qualitative interviews it can be concluded that it 
exists some repetitive factors which is seen as important in order to develop a learning 
organization.  
Dialog was such a factor. Dialog can be difficult to perform adequately because of the 
complex composition of different actors that cooperates across company sections. This goes 
especially for small oil companies that are dependent on several external actors to perform its 
tasks. It is a field that has a huge improvement potential by finding new ways and arenas to 
cooperate, not only across company boundaries, but also to some extend between industrial 
boundaries. This is important in order to share experiences, discuss improvements made and 
being updated about what is the current issues in order to develop modern systems/tools to 
cope with this. Also internally in companies it is important with dialog that enables everyone 
to be updated and correct each other by giving feedback. It is important with regularly 
meetings and to communicate in a way that everyone understand, in order to assure that 
everyone is working towards the same goal.  
Another factor that was seen as important is the issue of develop proper formal tools in order 
for operators to perform their tasks in a best possible way and also to ensure an optimal 
interaction between internal/external actors. It also here exist improvement potentials, by for 
example make it easier to perform tasks, saving of important information, take into account 
long time impacts, increased clarity regarding connections and associated measures, develop 
solid tools with clear roots in the regulations, continually evaluate incorporated tools as well 
as formalize informal routines and also ensure a continuous development by develop systems 
that ensures feedback regarding procedures, projects as well as individual performance.  
A factor that is seen as important in the theory, but not mentioned often in the interviews is 
the issue regarding developing of a culture that undermines continuous improvement by 
continually challenge the current system. The reason why this is not mentioned more often is 
unclear, however culture is an important element in order to undermine many of the other 
issues and enable a freely anticipation of possible future treats and risks.  
How to measure the degree of learning achieved internally at companies, was also rarely 
mentioned. This is something that the companies should offer more thought, in order to study 
if the developments are going in the right direction.  
To undermine the previous mentioned issues it is important with a proactive management, 
since they have the key to ensure enthusiasm for different goals internally in companies. This 
requires a though management that do not back down from problems, but instead is involved 
and resolute and not just delegate things to other groups. In addition it is important to be open 
for criticism so that the management also can correct its own actions, and also enable 
employees to report of their own mistakes without fearing the consequences.  
In the discussion it where found that the empirical results could be related too much of what 
has been written in the theory, which consists of a wide range of references from leading 
writers on the field. Although some of the theory could not be related directly to the empirical 
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results, all of the theory where used to make an interview guide that aimed at revealing a 
broad range of issues.  
At the end it is important to point out that the different views among the interviewees can be a 
result of different background and degree of experience. It is registered that the more 
experienced interviewees had more thorough answers and went more in the dept since they 
had participated in several investigations of incidents, while the more inexperienced 
interviewees had a tendency to be more superficial and based their answers more on 
systemically knowledge without so much knowledge regarding how things tend to develop in 
practice.  
The recommendations developed can be used as a supplement in helping the companies 
involved in the thesis develop new ways in order to ensure continuous learning in the future. 
The recommendations are general applicable for the oil industry, but could possibly also be 
applicable in other industries.  
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Appendix A: the interview guide 
Appendix A consists of the interview guide used in the thesis, to reveal the empirical results. 
The guide is written in Norwegian since the interviewees speak Norwegian as their primary 
language.     
 
Intervju med: 
  
 
Organisasjon:  
 
 
Dato og tid:  
  
 
Sted: 
 
 
        Referent: 
 
Innledning 
Denne intervjuguiden tar sikte på å avdekke læringsevnen til et utvalg case – bedrifter, basert 
på hendelser/nesten hendelser. Resultatene av intervjuene skal benyttes til å skrive en 
empirisk del i en masteroppgave som omhandler læring. Ved å sette allerede skrevet teori opp 
mot denne empirien skal det utvikles retningslinjer for hvordan selskaper kan være lærende. 
Det kan være generelle retningslinjer for case bedriftene dersom mønster finnes, eller 
spesifikke retningslinjer for den enkelte bedrift.  
Bedrift og intervjuobjekt forblir anonyme.  
 
Innledende spørsmål 
 
 Hvilken bakgrunn har du? 
 Hvor lenge har du arbeidet i selskapet? 
 Hvilken stilling har du i dag, hva er dine viktigste oppgaver og hva kjennetegner dine 
viktigste oppgaver? 
 
 
Spørsmål angående læringens praksis 
 
Nevn et eksempel på en hendelse/nesten hendelse som dere lærte av 
 Beskriv hendelsen 
 Hvordan ble det lært? 
 Hva var utfordringen med læringen? 
 Hva skapte læring? 
 
Nevn et eksempel på en hendelse med utilstrekkelig læring 
 Beskriv hendelsen 
 Hvorfor ble det ikke lært? 
 Hva skal til for å bli bedre til å lære? 
 
Hvilke barrierer opplever du mot læring? (egenrådighet, automasjon, tenke selv…) 
 Hvorfor oppstår de? 
 Hvordan løses de? 
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Er dere gode til å lære av hendelser/nesten hendelser? 
 Hvorfor er dere gode/ikke gode? 
 Er det utført målinger av læringsgraden til bedriften, hvordan utføres i så fall det og 
skal det repeteres? 
 
Nevn et eksempel på et uønsket forhold 
 Beskriv forholdet 
 Hvordan lærte dere av det? 
 Hva var utfordringen med læringen? 
 Hva skapte læring? 
 
I forhold til dine viktigste oppgaver, hvilke feil kan oppstå? 
 Hvordan er fokuset i forhold til å gjøre tingene riktig vs. å evaluere om de riktige 
tingene gjøres? 
 Hvordan koordineres oppgaver mellom ulike aktører? 
 Hva er prosedyren når feil oppstår? 
 Hvordan evalueres oppgavene i bedriften? 
 Hva gjøres når tegn til feil oppstår? 
 
Hvilke rapporteringssystemer for hendelser/nesen hendelser eksisterer i bedriften? 
 Hva er praksisen ved rapportering og oppfølging av dem? 
 Hvordan avgjøres hva som skal følges opp? 
 
Når bedriften har fastslått et ønsket HMS mål, hvordan implementeres dette inn i 
organisasjonen? 
 Gjøres tiltak parallelt? 
 Hvor langt fram i tid tenker dere? 
 Hvordan er fokuset i forhold til å inkludere feil vs. korrigere feil? 
 Hvordan er fokuset i forhold til å gjøre tingene riktig vs. å evaluere om de riktige 
tingene gjøres? 
 Hvordan engasjerer dere ansatte i arbeidet?  
 Hvordan samarbeider dere med eventuelle eksterne aktører? (allianser) 
 
 
Har du et eksempel på motstand mot endringer i bedriften? 
 Hvorfor oppsto det? 
 Hvordan ble det løst? 
 
Hvilke arenaer/rutiner har dere for utveksling av erfaringer? 
 Hvordan gjøres dette? 
 Hvorfor gjøres det? 
 Føler du det er effektivt? 
 Hvordan sikres det at kunnskapen ikke glemmes? 
 Hva benyttes kunnskapen til?  
 
Hvordan deles informasjon mellom aktører i bransjen? 
 Hvor i virksomheten deles info? 
 Hvordan tar bedriften lærdom av det? 
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 Hvorfor gjøres det? 
 
Hvilke rutiner er det for å vurdere formelle systemer/prosedyrer opp mot virkelig drift? 
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Appendix B: the interview results 
After performing nine semi-quantitative interviews with employees from three different oil 
companies the following results are provided. Note that interviewee A, B, C and D are from 
company 1, interviewee E and F from company 2 and interviewee G, H and I from company 3 
Appendix B is a summarizing of the answers from the interviewee. Each chapter starts with a 
short introduction to the interviewee.  
B.1 Interviewee A  
B.1.1 Introduction to the interview object 
Interviewee A are graduated within offshore techniques, and he’s working experience are 
primary based on working offshore. He is new in the current company and has only been 
working here for seven weeks as a drilling super intended. He’s primary working tasks are in 
the planning phase where he provides a cooperative company with advice on how to perform 
drilling activities.  
Drilling is a task it exist very clear rules for how to perform and there is little room for 
deviations.  
B.1.2 Findings from interview A  
 
Categories Interviewee A 
Deviations that causes incidents  Falsely documentation 
(might give false risk 
understanding) 
 Unclear information 
about what going on 
 Lack of compliance with 
procedures, since habits 
are created 
 Poor culture related to 
safety 
How was it learned  The employees became 
more knowable about 
what they were doing and 
the dangers with it 
 Participated more in 
forums to learn from one 
another 
 More thinking of ways to 
improve 
 Dangerous equipment 
were removed from the 
marked 
 More focus on doing 
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things right after an 
incident have occurred 
 Accomplished an secure 
operation 
 More reviews to correct 
an equipment before 
failure occur 
What created the learning  Investigation 
 Learning tends to occur 
after an incident have 
happened 
 More HSE personnel in 
teams 
 Safety coaches on the 
working place 
 Always think twice 
before operation are 
conducted 
 Spread the awareness 
about the importance of 
always think twice 
 Used discipline to force 
changes but in addition 
explain why 
The challenges with the learning  How to deal with the 
direct involved 
employees in the incident 
 How to deal with the 
supplier in form of being 
objective 
 To maintain an safety 
trend (ensure that issues 
do not get forgotten)  
 Members want to 
maintain old ways of 
doing things 
How to be better able to learn  More use of forums to 
spread knowledge 
externally 
 More 
awareness/information 
about the working 
environment among all 
internal actors 
 Be open and honest about 
the problems 
 Gather and repeat tasks  
in order to maintain a 
good development  
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Barriers against learning  Automation in ways of 
doing things since things 
goes well several times 
 A desire of doing things 
easy 
 Wrong HSE focus 
How to see improvement  Make trends on all key 
performance indicators 
related to HSE and 
benchmark against 
likeable world class 
Systems to ensure learning  CARE which is a HSE 
follow up system that 
ensures that every task 
has one responsible 
person which have to go 
in in the system and 
comment what he have 
done, and describe 
possible failure with it.  
 A matrix system to 
separate different 
incident after how 
serious they are 
(possibility/consequence) 
 The management have to 
go inn and lock so called 
red actions this ensures 
that the whole company 
are updated on what is 
happening 
 Daily evaluate the 
processes 
 The personal salary are 
based upon personal 
KPI`s which include 
different HSE factors 
 Different forums that 
calls inn leaders from 
different departments and 
companies to ensure a 
discussion about 
important issues. The 
results are spread by the 
leaders within its 
department 
 Go through CARE 
reports on morning 
meetings 
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 Save the lessons learned 
in documentations 
 Go through existing 
procedures before 
performing an activity 
 After performed an 
activity it is performed an 
“as done procedure” to 
see possible changes/ 
improvements that can be 
achieved in the existing 
procedure. These 
observations are logged 
and discussed among on 
and offshore. The new 
and improved procedure 
gives the basis next time 
the activity are to be 
performed 
How to follow up reports  Daily meetings between 
onshore and offshore 
personnel 
 Weekly closure and 
follow up of reported 
incidents  
 Assure consensus among 
actors, involve leadership 
if it is a red incident 
How to implement measures  A mixture of series and 
parallel 
 Think both on the long 
sight and in the short 
sight 
 After correcting a failure 
it is important to make a 
lesson learned to 
document what learned 
 Go through lesson 
learned later 
 Important with 
communication between 
operators, HSE 
responsible personnel 
and economists 
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B.2 Interviewee B 
B.2.1 Introduction to the interview object 
Interviewee B has his graduation from math studies at NTNU. His experience from the 
working life is as a risk manager of drilling activities. This is a task that lies in the crossroad 
between HSE and drilling activities, the task includes modeling of physical causal factors in 
the wells.  
He have been working one year in the current company, as a HSE advisor with regards to 
internal drilling projects, which involves participate in the planning processes of wells. This 
involves initiate with projects if it exist indicators that indicates tasks it have to be focused on.     
B.2.2 Findings from interview B 
Categories Interviewee B 
Deviations that causes incidents  Lack of risk understanding 
throughout the organization even 
though procedures exists 
 Lack of compliance with procedures 
 Misjudge situations 
 Lack of clarity regarding who 
perform which tasks among different 
companies 
 Management tends to bring up HSE 
questions at different occasions 
without any meaning behind the 
words 
How was it learned  Performs more risk assessment 
 More risk understanding among all 
involved in activities 
 Informal conversations among 
employees 
 More us of decision trees to see the 
hierarchical connection 
 Some tasks where stopped performed 
What created the learning  More focus on certain issues  
 Dialog internally at the office to 
modernize working tasks 
 Ensure dialog internally with use of 
mails 
 Petroleum authority’s sends out mail 
to all actors on the marked if it is 
something they want focus on or 
equipment that have to be exchanged 
The challenges with the learning  Give the organization properly 
resources to learn adequately 
 New people may have new ideas that 
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make sure that the learning are 
forgotten 
 Often decisions are based on they 
whom “shout” highest  
How to be better able to learn  Make sure that actions are properly 
documented in order to make sure 
that the learning are not forgotten 
 Have a good discussion in doubtable 
situations 
 Participate more in forums with 
employees in external companies to 
learn from on another 
 Better ways in storage of mails and 
categorization of them 
Barriers against learning  Lack of time to sit down and reflect 
over the learning 
 Often the lessons learned reports are 
made by people that lack knowledge 
about the situation, since they with 
knowledge do not have time 
 It is a tendency that when a task have 
been performed well once it is hard to 
do it differently the next time 
 Strict rules may prevent that 
procedures are made easy and 
understandable  
How to see improvements   No system 
Systems to assure learning  Lessons learned reports 
 Training of people to interpret 
precursors to errors 
 Informal mail are sent between 
employees to exchange experiences 
and also attachments with working 
processes performed are sent 
How to follow up reports  Transfer most serious incidents from 
an external actor to the company 
system 
(all incidents that lead to damage on people 
as well as serious near misses are registered 
and cases that relates to quality on equipment 
that the company have contract to)  
How to implement measures  Tasks are often performed on the 
crossroad between departments and 
things are done simultaneously, by 
communicate between departments 
 It is a relatively short time horizon 
the tasks are performed on 
 Continuous planning are performed to 
see beyond when things are done 
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B.3 Interviewee C  
B.3.1 Introduction to the interview object 
Interviewee C is graduated as a petroleum engineer from at the University of Stavanger. He 
has been working in the current company for five months as a drilling manager. The working 
task is to ensure that the company has the resources needed to perform their activities, this 
includes making resource plans, develop strategic plans and to facilitate for the others in the 
drilling department.   
B.3.2 Findings from interview C 
Categories Interviewee C 
Deviation that causes incidents  Incorrect execution of working tasks 
 Conflict between different actors 
 Wrong choose of design in the 
planning phase 
How was it learned  Developed proper routines 
 The management become more 
involved in daily operations 
 Developed proper practices  
 Develop procedures where it lacked 
 Spreading awareness regarding what 
is the focus  
 Discussion regarding that things are 
not in the way it should 
 Changed working methods 
 Common rules where made 
What created the learning  Admission of deviation 
 Go through what happened with 
involved actors in order to achieve 
consensus about what is the problem 
 Be flexible in changing  
 Excursions to benchmark with 
experts on the field 
 Sat focus where it should be a focus  
The challenges with the learning  Admission that there are deviations in 
the procedures, this goes for both the 
performers of the task as well as the 
responsible 
 Be honest instead of going in defense 
position 
 Be able to think of unexpected 
situations 
How to be better able to learn  Be better able to exchange 
experiences when going through 
incidents, with external suppliers 
 Participate in forums to share with 
others what is the challenges 
 The management must give strong 
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signals about how they want thing to 
be in order to achieve a good culture 
 Focus just as much about what going 
right as what going wrong and focus 
just as much if the right things are 
done compared to if the things are 
done right 
 Focus more on the future and monitor 
the development in the marked 
 Ensure that people feel ownership to 
a solution, so that changes do not 
become forced upon an organization  
Barriers against learning  Lack of honesty 
 Following traditional solutions 
 Doing things in the same way it 
always have been performed 
(resistance to change/afraid of new 
measures) 
How to see improvement  Measure different HSE parameters 
(LTI, other absence injuries 
parameters and study the 
development)  
Systems to assure learning  Safety bulleting’s that ensure that 
copies of all relevant incidents are 
sent between actors to check if the 
external actors have had similar 
incidents 
 Investigation of incidents 
 CARE: registration system to follow 
up actions (a reminder of outstanding 
actions) 
 Double reporting (external actors 
reports are brought in in the 
company’s system) 
 Go through HSE factors before 
starting one a activity  
 Ensure meetings to exchange 
experience regarding internal 
operations  
 Weekly meetings where the risk 
register are reviewed to see if things 
are looked and see if goals are 
reached 
 Meetings with suppliers once a 
quarter to go through the services that 
have being performed  
 Action log to save experiences  
 Subject forums (for example drilling 
management forums) to exchange 
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experience, this include 
communication of case historic 
within the company 
How to follow up reports  Matrix system to define the 
seriousness in order to define the 
measures 
How to implement measures  Working through contractors 
 Clearly specify measures  
 Limited time horizon 
 
B.4 Interviewee D  
B.4.1 Introduction to the interview object. 
Interviewee D has been working with HSE for 36 years, among the task has been as a safety 
leader for an oil field and also at the department of oil where he was involved in developing 
of new regulations for the oil industry. He has no formal education but has rather worked his 
way up in the system as an operator. He has however been taking safety subjects at the 
University of Stavanger. He has been working in the current company for five months as a 
HSE manager which consists of participate in leadership meetings as well as develop plans 
for the system, which means that the working tasks are characterized by leadership as well as 
making sure that small pieces in the system works as it should, he adds that an extensive focus 
on details can contribute too little focus on the overall strategy. He has also been called in to 
contribute to develop guidelines in the atomic industry.  
B.4.2 Findings from interviewee D 
Categories  Interviewee D 
Deviations that causes incidents  Automatic process did not work as it 
should, since changes in design where 
made in one part of the system 
without thinking of another part 
 The results from investigations 
becomes pure operational measures, 
that is in form of recommendations in 
the risk analysis (be careful of, etc.) 
 Lack of knowledge among actors 
about changes 
 Lack of supervision on inexperienced 
personnel (apprentices)  
 Ways of doing things becomes 
automatic 
 Lack of leadership 
 Complex procedures might be hard to 
follow 
How was it learned  Clearer rules and refinement between 
incidents 
 Drastically steps taken after incident 
occur 
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What created the learning  Investigated all the way back to the 
design process  
 Created a new management of change 
procedure that had clearer rules and 
where clearer of what type of changes 
and repairs that can be conducted 
 Initiate campaigns  
 Went through procedures   
 Marks high potential incidents 
without consequences by involving 
top management in the investigation 
(not just rely on local expertise)  
 Developed an indicator to see the 
ability to perform the tasks 
 Gatherings to benchmark with one 
another to obtain best practice 
learning and use it to develop 
standards  
 Management directly involved 
The challenges with the learning  Often a single incident is not enough 
to ensure big structural changes in the 
system as a whole 
 Changes becomes to extensive 
problems often require a total re-
design 
 Incidents are often seen as a result of 
an inexperienced operator 
 Operators tends to have too much 
focus on issues that covers their own 
safety, and they forget the big 
potential accident focus  
 It is often too much focus on better 
the procedures, which may make the 
procedures big and complex 
 People are often focusing too much 
on easy measure parameters   
 Find a balance between using time on 
being updated by exchange 
experience and doing the working 
tasks 
 It is often a need to do activities in 
interaction between different actors  
How to be better able to learn  Focus more on possible consequences 
(possibilities can be hard to foresee), 
possible consequences should trig an 
investigation, independent of an the 
probability of it 
 Less  threshold to change practices 
and procedures   
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 More focus on factors that might give 
long term damages, not just on acute 
issues  
 Assess if it is the procedure is good 
not just if the procedure is followed 
(procedures can be to extensive, and 
inadequate adaption to what is 
critical) 
 Develop checklist to obey the 
procedures more easily 
 Develop individual based goals in 
addition to team based goal (so that 
all contributes and see the meaning of 
it) 
 Better planning of when to perform 
tasks so it is easier to participate in 
forums 
Barriers against learning  Often consequences have to be severe 
before changes are maid  
 Too much focus on the possibility of 
an incident, (can be hard to judge the 
possibility) 
 Long term issues are rarely 
investigated (chemical exposure) 
 Poor follow-up of mappings,(new 
mappings are started instead), leads to 
incomplete action plans 
 Often operators might not be able to 
absorb writhed information (lack of 
education) 
 The data tool (CARE) are difficult to 
change, it requires change globally 
(the system handles only incidents, 
not technical deviation, quality 
deviation, etc. in order to follow up 
audits as well as incidents, register 
not unwanted conditions)  
 The statistic do not covers lack of 
ability to conduct tasks(people often 
gets a new time limit, to predict major 
accidents it is also important with 
performance indicators)  
 Lack of clearly leadership in 
coordination of different external 
actors  
 Different companies might be in 
different developing stages, this can 
contribute to that suggested measures 
by one company are outdated fast in 
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another company 
How to see improvement  Keep the investigations open after 
measures are taken  until effects of 
measures are checked (do not lock 
cases after measures are taken)  
Systems to ensure learning  CARE: electronic system where 
incidents are recorded 
 Monthly internal gatherings with 
presentation of issues that are to be 
discussed in plenary 
 Yearly employee conversation   
 Bonuses that are based on the 
performance 
 People with same background meets 
in yearly forums to discuss and 
address issues (every business unit 
have their own yearly gatherings) 
 Safety forums where different actors 
participate across business units  
 Participation in presentations of 
current problem issues 
How to follow up reports  Based on the incident (is it a well-
known incident) 
 ALARP-principle  
How to implement measures  The top management develops 
visions, which are communicated 
further down in the organization. It is 
then developed project goals and 
performance indicators based on this  
 Focus on seeing alternative ways of 
performing things  
 Contracts with external suppliers, that 
provides services, make sure that 
tasks are transparent so that 
coordination between actors are 
possible  
 
B.5 Interviewee E  
B.5.1 Introduction to the interview object 
Interviewee E is graduated as a construction engineer at NTNU in Trondheim. Afterwards he 
started to work at the water resource laboratory at Sintef, and further as a consultant within 
the oil industry. He has been working in the current company for seven months as a HSE 
specialist, which consists of mainly two tasks, one is to ensure that the company follows the 
HSE rules that exist, and the other is to follow up the operator they share ownership with. The 
tasks are characterized by a high degree of consideration of the further approach since 
incidents that can change the agenda tend to occur.  
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B.5.2 Findings from interviewee E 
 
Categories Interviewee E 
Deviations that causes incidents  Poor design  
 Lack of information transfer to next 
working group  
How was it learned  Increased training of external actors 
 Investigation of root causes (technical, 
organizational)  
What created the learning  Contact/inform the supplier of services 
about the incident 
 Thoroughly investigation of root causes 
The challenges with the learning  Often focus in investigations are on pure 
material assets ( root causes are rarely 
investigated since often complex 
composition) 
 When reorganizing the organization it 
can be difficult to see if the right things 
are done 
 When systems are complex it can be 
difficult to address the investigation 
correct in the jungle of actors and 
procedures   
How to be better able to learn  Allocate time and work with issues that 
have happen, and study the learning 
process afterwards 
 Bring in external people to look at 
issues to get new views 
 Discuss/brainstorm more if the right 
things are being done 
 Better able to interpret signs to failure 
(instead of judge mistake separately it is 
important to see the whole picture to see 
if bigger things is behind) 
 Better to anticipate unthinkable issues 
 Better routines in saving of knowledge 
achieved from different gatherings  
Barriers against learning  Pride among individuals (ownership to 
design)  
 Different political views among actors 
 People tends to forget the last project 
since they want to focus on a new 
project  
 Resistance in going over to new and 
unknown systems  
 Lack of formal systems to save 
knowledge from gatherings which will 
lead to longer time for new employees 
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to learn their tasks  
How to see improvement  Monitor development of number of 
incidents followed by investigation of 
why things happen (to see if/why the 
same issue repeats)  
Systems to ensure learning  Lessons learned sessions  
 Deploying own personnel in external 
companies  
 Close connection with partners, where 
risk analyses are been done in plenum 
 Synergy system: event/quality deviation 
system, where incidents and the 
potential consequence of incidents are 
being registered  
 When high potential events occur it is 
sent out a signal to all HSE personnel in 
the company    
 Weekly safety sessions, where it is a 
rollover in who presents what’s in the 
sessions  
 Bonuses related to number of 
management visits and audits offshore  
 Quarterly meetings with external 
operator 
 Quarterly internal functional gatherings 
where employees from different 
countries within a specific field meets 
and exchange experiences  
 Different forums where different actors 
from different companies in the same 
situation (in form of size) meets and 
exchange experience, this experience 
are mediated within the company  
 Yearly review of management systems 
 Start campaigns (where one particular 
issue are focused on)  
How to follow up reports   HSE specialists onshore receives reports 
from offshore personnel and make a 
self-assessment on if the reports are of 
interest to investigate any further  
 Often more alert on equipment that have 
been involved in earlier incidents  
How to implement measures  Training, which are evaluated later 
 Audits against the operator to see if 
things are done right/right things are 
done  
 Relatively short time horizon (one year) 
 Dialog with operator to reveal 
differences and achieve consensus  
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B.6 Interviewee F 
B.6.1 Introduction of the interview object F 
Interviewee F is graduated within the field of reservoir and production, and has been working 
within that field for several years. She has been working in the current company for little over 
two years, as an advisor within the field of reservoir. This working task includes being 
updated on strategies and plans within the oil field that the company is a co-owner in, thus an 
optimization of the oil field.  
B.6.2 Findings from interview F 
Categories Interviewee F  
Deviations that causes incidents  Assures of things that cant be hold  
 Uncertainty about what should be 
done 
How was it learned  Revealed what have to be done 
different 
What created the learning  Went together in an investigation 
(different actors) 
 Review of the overall system at the 
management level  
 Talk with each other at a regular basis 
 Transfer experiences from one project 
to another (no formal system) 
 Try to develop alternative ways in 
doing things  
 Involve people which have tried 
different approaches in ways of doing 
things  
The challenges with the learning  To long time from identification of 
the problem to it is taken seriously by 
the management  
 Regular it is only focused on if 
procedures exists not if things in 
detail are done correct  
How to be better able to learn  Technical personnel must be better to 
communicate problems upwards in 
the organization  
 The organizational structure should 
be re-designed to easier be able to 
spread knowledge within the 
company 
 Problems should go around in the 
organization to achieve consensus 
around what is the problem and how 
to address it  
 Construct a formal system for 
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experience exchange from one project 
to another project 
 Better to discuss with each other what 
have been learned from seminars 
Barriers against learning  Difficult to enable communication 
upwards in the system and across the 
departments  
 Difficult to transfer knowledge to the 
top level in the company  
 Things are often done in wrong order, 
since conflict occur between long 
time and short time views 
 Huge resistance to change within 
different technical milieu  
How to see improvement  None 
Systems to ensure learning  Safety meetings  
 Communicate wishes/priorities to the 
operator (done through resource 
committees) 
 Working/informal meetings where 
different issues are presented 
 Synergy system if incidents/quality 
deviations occur  
 System to evaluate all the employees 
on the background of duties that were 
supposed to have been done in the 
past year (grades based on the duties, 
are given by evaluation in the year 
and total evaluations after the year is 
finished) 
 Forum where actors from different 
companies meets to exchange 
experience within a subject (the 
forum have a belonging web site with 
a library in which all reports and data 
are saved) the information is used to 
make it easier for new personnel 
within the firm and also spread the 
knowledge out to other actors in 
Norway 
 Seminars where different issues are 
addressed 
How to follow up reports  Personal experience, gives the basis 
for what is addressed to the operator 
How to implement measures  Risk matrices on functions are 
gathered in a total package  
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B.7 Interviewee G 
B.7.1 Introduction of the interview object 
Interviewee G is graduated as an engineer within the field of electronic, and have had 
economical subjects added to his education. He has over 30 years of experience from working 
in the oil industry. He started within quality insurance of oil fields and has had many leading 
roles within that field. He is currently hired within this company and started one week ago as 
a senior advisor within quality assurance, which consists of developing of management 
systems with regards to different projects the company is involved in. The work is 
characterized by establishment of procedures and evaluating of existing procedures, which is 
mainly done by studying earlier and similar projects.   
B.7.2 Findings from interview G 
Categories Interviewee G 
Deviations that causes incidents  Bad management (shortcoming in 
interaction between several actors) 
 Pressure from corporate interests on 
operators on the field to be effective 
 To many inexperienced personnel/ 
lack of monitoring of inexperienced 
personnel  
 To little knowledge in interpreting 
signals that can lead to an incident 
 Lack of monitoring of working 
processes 
 Lack of risk awareness combined 
with economic interests  
 Do thing as cheap and effective as 
possible 
 Lack of verifying of changes (in order 
to see consequences of even small 
changes) 
 Interaction problems between 
different actors (lack of respect for 
each other)  
How was it learned  Better internal/external interaction  
What created the learning  Change of focus within the 
management 
 Better awareness within the industry 
 Study of crucial incidents (actors are 
curious of what happened)  
 Get things up at the agenda (morning 
meetings, other meetings)  
 Brainstorming around different 
scenarios to exercise on  
 Active in searching of others that 
might have done similar activities 
The challenges with the learning  Competence management (ensure 
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that people involved in operations 
have the correct knowledge)  
 Complex systems makes it hard to 
reveal deviations in barriers 
 Convince personnel about new ways 
of doing things (change attitudes)  
 When mix cultures it can be hard to 
achieve consensus (afraid of new 
things) can be internal departments or 
external companies  
How to be better able to learn  More training in interpreting of 
signals  
 Develop of good early warnings 
systems  
 Respect for experience and 
competence (right competence to 
right place)  
 The top management must have focus 
on HSE questions  
 Often it is a need to shake in the 
organization in order to make people 
go together  
 Ensure ownership to processes   
 Train more on unusual incidents and 
brainstorm around them  
 Ensure that all involved personnel 
can come up with inputs  
 More transfer of experience between 
projects 
Barriers against learning  Lack of time (often very focused in 
doing the task so it is forgotten to 
evaluate the tasks) 
 Management have too much focus on 
effectiveness 
 Difficult to exchange experiences 
(since little time to do this, often just 
one meeting) 
 Difficult to come in as an external 
and criticize existing methods 
(internal actors goes into defense 
positions) 
How to see improvement  None 
Systems to assure learning  Management of change procedures  
 CARE system (open for qualitative 
judgment) 
 Different forums to exchange 
experience (people with the same 
background shear experience is the 
most effective) 
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 Documentation of what learned in 
forums 
 Education of personnel  
 Web sites specially directed to actual 
incidents/issues 
 Regular audits (quality factors)  
How to follow up reports  Matrix system (ALARP) 
 Continually third part risk evaluation 
(to see development in mainly the 
probability development)  
How to implement measures  Capture the immediate needs and 
develop plans based on this (short 
sight)  
 Take a round with different actors to 
achieve an common plan 
 Things are mainly done in parallel 
because of complex interactions (a 
need to communicate well)  
 Do things known before 
implementing change  
 Go through every other year the 
management system  
 Ensure individual ownership to 
ensure support around things 
 Licenses to ensure partnership, the 
operator are the main force, but the 
other actors are following what is 
being done 
 Continually adherence with 
belonging consequences to ensure 
that actors are adapting new measures 
 
B.8 Interviewee H 
B.8.1 Introduction of the interview object 
Interviewees H is graduated as an electronics engineer but have a multiple background as a 
diver, solider, pilot and have worked a lot with maintenance in the army. He has been in the 
oil business for 23 years, where he has worked in both private companies and also in the 
agency of oil where he has been involved in developing of investigations paragraphs, mainly 
by studying of the Swedish nuclear industry. He has been working in the current company for 
little more than one year, as a HSE and quality manager. His most important tasks are to build 
teams, knowledge, systems and resource set projects. The tasks are characterized by 
leadership and enable systems and people to do tasks instead of being directly involved in 
them himself.  
B.8.2 Findings from interview H 
Categories Interviewee H  
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Deviations that causes incidents  Lack of compliance (breach in rules 
and procedures)  
 Lack of planning  
 Bad communication 
 Control of the work permit system 
(tasks go into another shift without 
follow up that the interaction are 
adequate) 
 Inadequate documentation of tasks 
How was it learned  Companies change procedures 
 The industry as a whole took the 
experience from an incident with 
them and new standards where 
developed  
 Guidelines for further direction where 
sat  
What created the learning  The incident became an industrial 
issue 
 Developing of incident trees that on 
the minute maps what happens 
(important to get people to admit the 
factual course of event)    
 Good communication between 
different actors to ensure consensus 
about the task  
 Objective input (objective when 
addressing an issue)  
 Clear documentation that can dismiss 
prejudices (deviation treatment if 
things are done otherwise)  
 Challenging culture that ensures 
continually challenge towards what 
have been established 
The challenges with the learning  Many people seems to believe that 
they are experts in investigation  
 Hard to get people to go back to the 
roots of the investigation regulations   
 The focus on learning goes away 
when the tabloid part of the incident 
are in the past  
 Get a consensus regarding the actual 
conditions (admission) often difficult 
when  the fact basis are faltering  
 Can be difficult to tell about 
inadequate work (requires a certain 
use of force), often more 
inexperienced personnel have 
problems with this  
How to be better able to learn  Develop forums where different 
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industries can meet and exchange 
experiences (mainly nuclear and oil 
industry) 
 Ensure more knowledge to enable a 
good documentation basis in order to 
reveal and get consensus around 
course of events  
 Ensure that investigations are linked 
to the regulations and gives answers 
to the main points in it  
 Develop very clear procedures  
 Develop good investigation 
competence  
 More commitment from the 
management 
 Create a culture where learning 
conditions are seen as something 
understandable, and as a common 
denominator in the company (must 
have strong people to achieve this)  
 Commitment from the management 
 More commitment to agreements  
 Training on and more clearly 
standards for how to document issues  
 Change of attitudes (campaigns)   
 Operator have to tell how it is  
 More brainstorming with external 
safety supplier  
 Knowledge an baldness in taking 
discussions back to the frame work, 
when meeting resistance   
 Investment in documentation  
 More informal practice in saving of 
informal mail  
Barriers against learning  Conflicting issues/different motives 
(different motives, for example 
economic, political issues) 
 Lack of clarity in the industry that 
learning is a part of a continuous 
improvement  
 Arrogance with regards to knowledge 
(people think they know, especially 
the older generation) 
 Often the respect for line leaders are 
to big  
 Corruption (the industry have 
difficulties in documenting this)  
 Different motives can affect 
subjective reviews which affects the 
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follow-up 
 Groups/individual do not like new 
influence (individual motivations) 
 Seek for an easy way out (afraid that 
new ways are difficult to handle) 
 Afraid to challenge an established 
system  
 Too much respect for  individuals, 
groups, so that deviations are not 
pointed on 
How to see improvement  Tests after people have been on a 
course to see how well they have 
learned  
 Study development of reports 
(meetings every week were the 
department are measured after 
different standards) 
Systems to ensure learning  Management of change procedure: 
(deviation from plans, strategic 
direction, design) 
 Terms of reference: the investigation 
task are described for the 
investigation leader and team what 
they are supposed to do and deliver  
 HSE responsible checks what he have 
ordered is what he gets, and sends 
back the document if this is not 
adequate (can be external or internal 
actors) 
 Discussions (reference groups, 
investigation part)  
 Improvement processes to ensure 
frame work for investigation 
procedures (involves several actors in 
discussions, check and balance) 
 Nonconformance (deviation) 
 Incident system: document that a 
single task where performed wrongly  
 Miss system: condition reveals 
possible risks  
 Near miss: near incidents 
 Safety coaches on the rigs that 
constantly monitors the conditions 
(daily conversations, meetings every 
week to judge existing procedures)  
 Challenging culture (company 
challenges itself all the time, are 
challenged by external partner)   
 Uses the involving principle (safety 
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representative, developing programs 
over time, half an over sessions every 
Thursday where knowledge are 
cheered) 
 Participate in networks to exchange 
experiences  
 In Norway it is one strong 
coordinating supervisor authority 
(controls the other twelve)  
 Audit plans/documentation  
 Informal discussions  
 Yearly reviews to judge the existing 
overall control system 
 Constantly judgment of existing 
procedures  
 Local expertise  
How to follow up reports  Risk matrix (ALARP) 
 Discussion within different 
perspective (determine the 
probability) 
 Special meetings if issues are 
important enough  
How to implement measures  Important to evaluate both if the right 
things and done and if things are done 
right  
 Documented what to do (compliance 
with rules, no need to go further up in 
the system, unless very serious 
incident)  
 Dimensioned plans to achieve 
different goals (risk assessment of 
different actions, dimension of 
measures) 
 Things are done in series 
(assessment-make plans/decide-
develop knowledge and systems-
implementation-monitoring), well 
established method 
 Following the bowtie principle (are 
aware of what is on the probability 
side and what is on the consequence 
side)  
B.9 Interviewee I 
B.9.1 Introduction of the interview object 
Interviewee I is graduated as a construction engineer at NTNU (NTH), and started his 
working career at SINTEF safety and reliability, afterwards he worked offshore as a HSE 
leader for four years, then he started at the sales and marketing department within the oil 
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industry. He has been in the current company for one year, as a HSE advisor, which includes 
controlling of all HSE activities within the company’s exploration drilling. This involves 
ensuring that all demands from the authorities are fulfilled. The task are characterized by 
compliance with Norwegian rules as well as corporate guidelines, in this lies systematically 
planning of activities and documentation of what have been done.  
B.9.2 Findings from interview I 
Categories Interviewee I 
Deviations that causes incidents  Lack of awareness about issues 
 Results from investigations are not 
communicated and no actions are 
made  
 Lazy management over dangerous 
working areas  
 Fails to follow rules/procedures  
How was it learned  Awareness all over the organization 
 Subcontractor took over a dangerous 
working task (drastically measure)   
What created the learning  The line itself investigated (the lines 
problem therefore themselves have to 
front the investigation, this include 
training of own personnel)  
 Logs that described who are going to 
communicate issues out in the 
organization 
 Tough management (addressed issues 
when needed)  
 Internal evaluation of tasks to ensure 
properly execution  
 Ensure information from suppliers 
about items in order to use this 
proactively  
 Overall system that sends out 
information regarding when forums 
are set to happen  
The challenges with the learning  Learning comes at the top of all other 
issues (other priorities)  
 Communication often becomes very 
specific, since it is often used 
technical peculiarities 
 Tendency when finished one project 
people run to a new project 
 Huge data materiel when measuring 
learning 
 Difficult to highlight concrete 
experiences  
How to be better able to learn  Avoid being to specific when 
communicate issues so that all 
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understands (doing things more 
general) 
 Make thing relevant and transferable 
to other departments/companies  
 Ensure that all actions have one 
owner and a time limit attached it  
 Make it mandatory to summarize 
projects/activities  
 Involve actors before changes occur 
(can be just a little debrief of what is 
about to happen) 
 Ensure local ownership  
 Meet and reflect over experience 
from different forums  
 Share more information between each 
other when performing an activity 
 Fully audit of the overall 
management system to enable more 
judgment from the operators 
regarding existing procedures (make 
them as easy as possible in addition 
to follow Norwegian 
law/requirements)  
Barriers against learning  Lack of planning of experience 
transmission activities  
 Focus change rapidly (all see forward 
to new activities which unable a 
summarizing of old activities)  
 Many are not interested in reporting 
incidents among sub-contractors 
(conflicting motives)  
 Often lack of exchange of experience 
(forums becomes down prioritized 
because of lack of time) 
How to see improvement  Keep logs over net based learning 
(goal each quarter for what are to be 
accomplished)  
Systems to ensure learning  Teleconference between actors all 
over the world every fourteenth day 
with one leader which described the 
incident (quality check of the 
investigation as well as the line get to 
submit its issue) 
 Use of common project plan (drilling, 
logistics, purchase) to ensure that all 
work in the same direction (mutual 
dependence of each other)  
 Project meetings to ensure 
transparency regarding what have 
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been done 
 GAMAB: system where all incidents 
are registered (includes reports by 
external supplier)  
 Systems must be easy to update  
 Train on worst case scenarios 
(cooperate with external actors), 
brainstorm what could happen 
 Awareness sessions to communicate 
important issues out in the 
organization (30 minutes before lunch 
once a week, all were invited and 
came if they could) have to be aware 
of the time when performing this as 
well as it do not take too long time  
 Meetings with partners in the license  
 Different forums within the industry 
to exchange experience (people 
within the same field for example 
HSE meets and exchange 
experiences) 
 Update processes, plans when 
achieve new knowledge  
 Gathering with people from different 
fields/suppliers (HSE, drilling) to 
ensure that everyone knows what is 
happening in a process and are 
updated  
 A continually update between 
companies when performing an 
activity  
 Yearly audit of the overall 
management system  
 Management of change procedures  
How to follow up reports  Corporate guidelines (risk matrix)  
 Important to distinguish what the line 
itself are going to do and what HSE 
support functions are going to do  
How to implement measures  Use old projects as a basis for new 
ones (exchange experience from old 
projects) 
 Use a overall plan for the company as 
a support for the project plan  
 Do the things that can be done first to 
be sure of completion of projects  
 Yearly management meetings to 
make plans for further activities and 
communicate this down the 
organization 
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 Things tend to be done in series 
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Appendix C: the interview results separated into categories  
Appendix C is a gathering of the results provided from appendix B into categories.  
C.1 Deviations that causes incidents  
The first category is related to deviations that cause incidents to happen.  
Interviewee   Answers 
A  Falsely documentation (might give false risk understanding) 
 Unclear information about what is  going on in the sharp end 
 Lack of compliance with procedures, since habits are created 
 Poor safety culture  
B  Lack of risk understanding throughout the organization even though 
procedures exists 
 Lack of compliance with procedures 
 Misjudge situations 
 Lack of clarity regarding who perform which tasks among different 
companies 
 Management tends to bring up HSE questions at different occasions 
without any meaning behind the words 
C  Incorrect execution of working tasks 
 Conflict between different actors 
 Wrong choose of design in the planning phase 
D  Automatic processes do not work as it should, since changes in design 
where made in one part of the system without thinking of another part 
 The results from investigations becomes pure operational measures, 
that is in the form of recommendations in the risk analysis (be careful 
of, etc.) 
 Lack of knowledge among actors regarding changes that are 
incorporated 
 Lack of supervision of inexperienced personnel (apprentices) 
 Ways of doing things becomes automatic 
 Lack of leadership 
 Complex procedures might be hard to follow 
E  Poor design 
 Lack of information transfer to next working group 
F  Assures of things that can’t be hold 
 Uncertainty regarding what should be done 
G  Bad management (shortcoming in interaction between several actors) 
 Pressure from corporate interests on operators in the field to be 
effective  
 To many inexperienced personnel/lack of monitoring of inexperienced 
personnel 
 To little knowledge in interpreting signals that might lead to an 
incident 
 Lack of monitoring of working processes  
 Lack of risk awareness combined with economic interests 
 Seek in doing things as cheap and effective as possible 
 Lack of verifying of changes (in order to see consequences of even 
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small changes) 
 Interaction problems between different actors (lack of respect for each 
other) 
H  Lack of compliance (breach in rules and procedures) 
 Lack of planning 
 Bad communication 
 Control of the work permit system (tasks go into another shift without 
follow up that the interaction are adequate) 
 Inadequate documentation of tasks 
I  Lack of awareness about issues 
 Results from investigations are not communicated and no actions are 
made  
 Lazy management over dangerous working areas 
 Fails in following rules/procedures 
 
C.2 Outcome of the learning  
The second category describes different outcomes of the learning.  
Interviewee  Answers 
A  The employees became more knowable about what they were doing 
and the dangers with it 
 Participated more in forums to learn from another 
 More thinking of ways to improve 
 Dangerous equipment where removed from the marked 
 More focus on doing things right after an incident have occurred 
 Accomplished an secure operation 
 More reviews to correct an equipment before failure occur 
B  Performs more risk assessment 
 More risk understanding among all involved in activities 
 Informal conversations among employees 
 More use of decision trees to see the hierarchical connection 
 Some tasks where stopped performed 
C  Developed proper routines 
 The management became more involved in daily operations 
 Developed proper practices  
 Developed procedures where it lacked 
 Spreading awareness regarding what is the focus  
 Discussion regarding that things are not in the way it should 
 Changed working methods 
 Common rules where made 
D  Clearer rules and refinement between incidents 
 Drastically steps taken after incident occur  
E  Increased training of external actors 
 Investigate more on root causes (technical, organizational) 
F  Revealed what have to be done different 
G  Better internal/external interaction 
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H  Companies change procedures 
 The industry as a whole took the experience from an incident with 
them and new standards where developed  
 Guidelines for further direction where sat 
I  Awareness all over the organization 
 Subcontractor took over a dangerous working task (drastically 
measure)   
 
C.3 What created the learning 
The third category are related to how organizations achieved the results they did and 
improved the situation of the organization.  
Interviewee  Answers 
A  Investigation 
 Learning tends to occur after an incident have happened 
 More HSE personnel in teams 
 Safety coaches on the working place 
 Spread the awareness about the importance of always think twice 
(forums) 
 Used discipline to force changes but in addition explain why 
B  More focus on certain issues  
 Dialog internally at the office to modernize working tasks 
 Ensure dialog internally with use of mails 
 Petroleum authority’s sends out mail to all actors on the marked if it is 
something they want focus on or equipment that have to be exchanged 
C  Admission of deviation 
 Go through what happened with involved actors in order to achieve 
consensus about what is the problem 
 Be flexible in changing  
 Excursions to benchmark with experts on the field 
 Sat focus where it should be a focus 
D  Investigated all the way back to the design process  
 Created a new management of change procedure that had clearer rules 
and where clearer of what type of changes and repairs that can be 
conducted 
 Initiate campaigns  
 Went through procedures   
 Marks high potential incidents without consequences by involving top 
management in the investigation (not just rely on local expertise)  
 Developed an indicator to see the ability to perform the tasks 
 Gatherings to benchmark with one another to obtain best practice 
learning and use it to develop standards  
 Management directly involved 
E  Contact/inform the supplier of services about the incident 
 Thoroughly investigation of root causes 
F  Went together in an investigation (different actors) 
 Review of the overall system at the management level  
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 Talk with each other at a regular basis 
 Transfer experiences from one project to another (no formal system) 
 Try to develop alternative ways in doing things  
 Involve people which have tried different approaches in ways of doing 
things 
G  Change of focus within the management 
 Better awareness within the industry 
 Study of crucial incidents (actors are curious of what happened)  
 Get things up at the agenda (morning meetings, other meetings, 
forums)  
 Brainstorming around different scenarios to exercise on  
 Active in searching of others that might have done similar activities 
H  The incident became an industrial issue (forums) 
 Admission of the factual course of event (incident trees that on the 
minute maps what happen)   
 Good communication between different actors to ensure consensus 
about the task  
 Objective input (objective when addressing an issue)  
 Clear documentation that can dismiss prejudices (deviation treatment if 
things are done otherwise) 
 Challenging culture that ensures continually challenge towards what 
have been established 
I  The line itself investigated (the lines problem therefore themselves 
have to front the investigation, this include training of own personnel)  
 Logs that described who are going to communicate issues out in the 
organization 
 Tough management (addressed issues when needed)  
 Internal evaluation of tasks to ensure properly execution  
 Ensure information from suppliers about items in order to use this 
proactively  
 Overall system that sends out information regarding when forums are 
set to happen  
 
C.4 Challenges with the learning  
In the fourth category it is aimed at reveal factors that were challenging with regards to 
achieve organizational learning.  
Interviewee  Answers 
A  How to deal with the direct involved employees in the incident 
 How to deal with the supplier in form of being objective 
 To maintain an safety trend (ensure that issues do not get forgotten)  
 Members want to maintain old ways of doing things 
B  Give the organization properly resources to learn adequately 
 Personnel might be exchanged so that the learning are forgotten  
 Often decisions are based on they whom “shout” highest 
C  Achieve admission that there are deviations in the procedures, this 
goes for both the performers of the task as well as the responsible 
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 Get people to be honest instead of going in defense position 
 Be able to think of unexpected situations 
D  Often a single incident is not enough to ensure big structural changes 
in the system as a whole 
 Changes becomes to extensive problems often require a total re-design 
 Incidents are often seen as a result of an inexperienced operator 
 Operators tends to have too much focus on issues that covers their own 
safety, and they forget the big potential accident focus  
 It is often too much focus on improving the procedures by adding more 
to it, which may make the procedure big and complex 
 People are often focusing too much on easy measure parameters   
 Find a balance between using time on being updated by exchange 
experience and doing the working tasks 
 It is often a need to do activities in interaction between different actors 
E  Often focus in investigations are on pure material assets ( root causes 
are rarely investigated since often complex composition) 
 When reorganizing the organization it can be difficult to see if the right 
things are done 
 When systems are complex it can be difficult to address the 
investigation correct in the jungle of actors and procedures   
F  To long time from identification of the problem to it is taken seriously 
by the management  
 Regular it is only focused on if procedures exists not if things in detail 
are done correct 
G  Competence management (ensure that people involved in operations 
have the correct knowledge)  
 Complex systems makes it hard to reveal deviations in barriers 
 Convince personnel about new ways of doing things (change attitudes)  
 When mix cultures it can be hard to achieve consensus (afraid of new 
things) can be internal departments or external companies 
H  Many people seems to believe that they are experts in investigation  
 Hard to get people to go back to the roots of the investigation 
regulations   
 The focus on learning goes away when the tabloid part of the incident 
are in the past  
 Get a consensus regarding the actual conditions (admission) often 
difficult when  the fact basis are faltering  
 Can be difficult to tell about inadequate work (requires a certain use of 
force), often more inexperienced personnel have problems with this 
I  Learning comes at the top of all other issues (other priorities)  
 Communication often becomes very specific, since it is often used 
technical peculiarities 
 Tendency when finished one project people run to a new project 
 Huge data materiel when measuring learning 
 Difficult to highlight concrete experiences 
 
 
Page 109 of 119 
 
C.5 How to be better able to learn? 
In the fifth category it is aimed at reveal factors that contribute to a learning organization. 
Interviewee  Answers  
A  More use of forums to spread knowledge externally 
 More awareness/information about the working environment among all 
internal actors 
 Be open and honest about the problems 
 Gather and repeat tasks/discuss  in order to maintain a good 
development (formal routines for this) 
B  Make sure that actions are properly documented in order to make sure 
that the learning are not forgotten 
 Have a good discussion in doubtable situations 
 Participate more in forums with employees in external companies to 
learn from on another 
 Better ways in storage of mails and categorization of them 
C  Be better able to exchange experiences when going through incidents, 
with external suppliers 
 Participate in forums to share with others what is the challenges 
 The management must give strong signals about how they want thing 
to be in order to achieve a good culture 
 Focus just as much about what going right as what going wrong and 
focus just as much if the right things are done compared to if the things 
are done right 
 Focus more on the future and monitor the development in the marked 
 Ensure that people feel ownership to a solution, so that changes do not 
become forced upon an organization 
 Get people to be honest instead of going in defense position 
 Be able to think of unexpected situations 
D  Focus more on possible consequences (possibilities can be hard to 
foresee), possible consequences should trig an investigation, 
independent of an the probability of it 
 Less  threshold to change practices and procedures   
 More focus on factors that might give long term damages, not just on 
acute issues  
 Assess if it is the procedure is good not just if the procedure is 
followed (procedures can be to extensive, and inadequate adaption to 
what is critical) 
 Develop checklist to obey the procedures more easily 
 Develop individual based goals in addition to team based goal (so that 
all contributes and see the meaning of it) 
 Better planning of when to perform tasks so it is easier to plan for 
participating in forums/exchange of experiences 
E  Allocate time and work with issues that have happen, and study the 
learning process afterwards 
 Bring in external people to look at issues to get new views 
 Discuss/brainstorm more if the right things are being done, also in 
gatherings with external companies 
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 Better able to interpret signs to failure (instead of judge mistake 
separately it is important to see the whole picture to see if bigger things 
is behind) 
 Better to anticipate unthinkable issues 
 Better routines in saving of knowledge achieved from different 
gatherings 
F  Technical personnel must be better to communicate problems upwards 
in the organization  
 The organizational structure should be re-designed to easier be able to 
spread knowledge within the company 
 Problems should go around in the organization to achieve consensus 
around what is the problem and how to address it  
 Construct a formal system for experience exchange from one project to 
another project 
 Better to discuss with each other what have been learned from 
seminars/forums 
G  More training in interpreting of signals  
 Develop of good early warnings systems  
 Respect for experience and competence (right competence to right 
place)  
 The top management must have focus on HSE questions  
 Often it is a need to shake in the organization in order to make people 
go together  
 Ensure ownership to processes   
 Train more on unusual incidents and brainstorm around them  
 Ensure that all involved personnel can come up with inputs 
 More transfer of experience between projects 
H  Develop forums where different industries can meet and exchange 
experiences (mainly nuclear and oil industry) 
 Ensure more knowledge to enable a good documentation basis in order 
to reveal and get consensus around course of events  
 Ensure that investigations are linked to the regulations and gives 
answers to the main points in it  
 Develop very clear procedures  
 Develop good investigation competence  
 More commitment from the management 
 Create a culture where learning conditions are seen as something 
understandable, and as a common denominator in the company (must 
have strong people to achieve this)  
 Commitment from the management 
 More commitment to agreements  
 Training on and more clearly standards for how to document issues  
 Change of attitudes (campaigns)   
 Operator have to tell how it is  
 More brainstorming with external safety supplier  
 Knowledge an baldness in taking discussions back to the frame work, 
when meeting resistance   
 Investment in documentation  
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 More informal practice in saving of informal mail 
I  Avoid being to specific when communicate issues so that all 
understands (doing things more general) 
 Make thing relevant and transferable to other departments/companies  
 Ensure that all actions have one owner and a time limit attached it  
 Make it mandatory to summarize projects/activities  
 Involve actors before changes occur (can be just a little debrief of what 
is about to happen) 
 Ensure local ownership  
 Meet and reflect over experience from different forums  
 Share more information between each other when performing an 
activity 
 Fully audit of the overall management system to enable more judgment 
from the operators regarding existing procedures (make them as easy 
as possible in addition to follow Norwegian law/requirements) 
 
C.6 Barriers against learning 
The sixth category is dedicated to reveal the interviewees view of possible barriers towards 
learning.  
Interviewee  Answers  
A  Automation in ways of doing things since things goes well several 
times 
 A desire of doing things easy 
 Wrong HSE focus 
B  Lack of time to sit down and reflect over the learning 
 Often the lessons learned reports are made by people that lack 
knowledge about the situation, since they with knowledge do not have 
time 
 It is a tendency that when a task have been performed well once it is 
hard to do it differently the next time 
 Strict rules may prevent that procedures are made easy and 
understandable 
C  Lack of honesty 
 Following traditional solutions 
 Doing things in the same way it always have been performed 
(resistance to change/afraid of new measures) 
D  Often consequences have to be severe before changes are maid  
 Too much focus on the possibility of an incident, (can be hard to judge 
the possibility) 
 Long term issues are rarely investigated (chemical exposure) 
 Poor follow-up of mappings,(new mappings are started instead), leads 
to incomplete action plans 
 Often operators might not be able to absorb writhed information (lack 
of education) 
 The data tool (CARE) are difficult to change, it requires change 
globally (the system handles only incidents, not technical deviation, 
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quality deviation, etc. in order to follow up audits as well as incidents, 
register not unwanted conditions)  
 The statistic do not covers lack of ability to conduct tasks(people often 
gets a new time limit, to predict major accidents it is also important 
with performance indicators)  
 Lack of clearly leadership in coordination between different external 
actors  
 Different companies might be in different developing stages, this can 
contribute to that suggested measures by one company are outdated 
fast in another company 
E  Pride among individuals (ownership to design)  
 Different political views among actors 
 People tends to forget the last project since they want to focus on a 
new project  
 Resistance in going over to new and unknown systems  
 Lack of formal systems to save knowledge from gatherings which will 
lead to longer time for new employees to learn their tasks 
F  Difficult to enable communication upwards in the system and across 
the departments  
 Difficult to transfer knowledge to the top level in the company  
 Things are often done in wrong order, since conflict occur between 
long time and short time views 
 Huge resistance to change within different technical milieu 
G  Lack of time (often very focused in doing the task so it is forgotten to 
evaluate the tasks) 
 Management have too much focus on effectiveness 
 Difficult to exchange experiences (since little time to do this, often just 
one meeting) 
 Difficult to come in as an external and criticize existing methods 
(internal actors goes into defense positions) 
H  Conflicting issues/different motives (different motives, for example 
economic, political issues) 
 Lack of clarity in the industry that learning is a part of a continuous 
improvement  
 Arrogance with regards to knowledge (people think they know, 
especially the older generation) 
 Often the respect for line leaders are to big  
 Corruption (the industry have difficulties in documenting this)  
 Different motives can affect subjective reviews which affects the 
follow-up 
 Groups/individual do not like new influence (individual motivations) 
 Seek for an easy way out (afraid that new ways are difficult to handle) 
 Afraid to challenge an established system  
 Too much respect for  individuals, groups, so that deviations are not 
pointed on 
I  Lack of planning of experience transmission activities  
 Focus change rapidly (all see forward to new activities which unable a 
summarizing of old activities)  
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 Many are not interested in reporting incidents among sub-contractors 
(conflicting motives)  
 Often lack of exchange of experience (forums becomes down 
prioritized because of lack of time) 
 
C.7 How to see improvement  
In this category it is revealed how learning is being measured, if it exist such methods. 
Interviewee  Answers  
A  Make trends on all key performance indicators related to HSE and 
benchmark against likeable world class 
B  None 
C  Measure different HSE parameters (LTI, other absence injuries 
parameters and study the development) 
D  Keep the investigations open after measures are taken  until effects of 
measures are checked (do not lock cases after measures are taken) 
E  Monitor development of number of incidents followed by investigation 
of why things happen (to see if/why the same issue repeats) 
F  None 
G  None 
H  Tests after people have been on a course to see how well they have 
learned  
 Study development of reports regarding incidents (meetings every 
week were the department are measured after different standards) 
I  Keep logs over net based learning (goal each quarter for what are to be 
accomplished) 
 
C.8 Systems to ensure learning  
Here the systems to ensure learning in the three companies are mapped. Note that interviewee 
A, B, C and D belong to company 1, E and F to company 2 and G, H and I to company 3.  
Interviewee  Answers  
A  CARE which is a HSE follow up system that ensures that every task 
has one responsible person which have to go in in the system and 
comment what he have done, and describe possible failure with it.  
 The management have to go inn and lock so called red actions this 
ensures that the whole company are updated on what is happening 
 Daily evaluate the processes 
 The personal salary are based upon personal KPI`s which include 
different HSE factors 
 Different forums that calls inn leaders from different departments and 
companies to ensure a discussion about important issues. The results 
are spread by the leaders within its department 
 Go through CARE reports on morning meetings 
 Save the lessons learned in documentations 
 Go through existing procedures before performing an activity 
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 After performed an activity it is performed an “as done procedure” to 
see possible changes/ improvements that can be achieved in the 
existing procedure. These observations are logged and discussed 
among on and offshore. The new and improved procedure gives the 
basis next time the activity are to be performed 
B  Lessons learned reports 
 Training of people to interpret precursors to errors 
 Informal mail are sent between employees to exchange experiences 
and also attachments with working processes performed are sent 
C  Safety bulleting’s that ensure that copies of all relevant incidents are 
sent between actors to check if the external actors have had similar 
incidents 
 Investigation of incidents 
 CARE: registration system to follow up actions (a reminder of 
outstanding actions) 
 Double reporting (external actors reports are brought in in the 
company’s system) 
 Go through HSE factors before starting one a activity  
 Ensure meetings to exchange experience regarding internal operations  
 Weekly meetings where the risk register are reviewed to see if things 
are looked and see if goals are reached 
 Meetings with suppliers once a quarter to go through the services that 
have being performed  
 Action log to save experiences  
 Subject forums (for example drilling management forums) to exchange 
experience, this include communication of case historic within the 
company 
D  CARE: electronic system where incidents are recorded 
 Monthly internal gatherings with presentation of issues that are to be 
discussed in plenary 
 Yearly employee conversation   
 Bonuses that are based on the performance 
 People with same background meets in yearly forums to discuss and 
address issues (every business unit have their own yearly gatherings) 
 Safety forums where different actors participate across business units  
 Participation in presentations of current problem issues 
E  Lessons learned sessions  
 Deploying own personnel in external companies  
 Close connection with partners, where risk analyses are been done in 
plenum 
 Synergy system: event/quality deviation system, where incidents and 
the potential consequence of incidents are being registered  
 When high potential events occur it is sent out a signal to all HSE 
personnel in the company    
 Weekly safety sessions, where it is a rollover in who presents what’s in 
the sessions  
 Bonuses related to number of management visits and audits offshore  
 Quarterly meetings with external operator 
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 Quarterly internal functional gatherings where employees from 
different countries within a specific field meets and exchange 
experiences  
 Different forums where different actors from different companies in 
the same situation (in form of size) meets and exchange experience, 
this experience are mediated within the company  
 Yearly review of management systems 
 Start campaigns (where one particular issue are focused on) 
 
F  Safety meetings  
 Communicate wishes/priorities to the operator (done through resource 
committees) 
 Working/informal meetings where different issues are presented 
 Synergy system if incidents/quality deviations occur  
 System to evaluate all the employees on the background of duties that 
were supposed to have been done in the past year (grades based on the 
duties, are given by evaluation in the year and total evaluations after 
the year is finished) 
 Forum where actors from different companies meets to exchange 
experience within a subject (the forum have a belonging web site with 
a library in which all reports and data are saved) the information is 
used to make it easier for new personnel within the firm and also 
spread the knowledge out to other actors in Norway 
 Seminars where different issues are addressed 
G  Management of change procedures  
 CARE system (open for qualitative judgment) 
 Different forums to exchange experience (people with the same 
background shear experience is the most effective) 
 Documentation of what learned in forums 
 Education of personnel  
 Web sites specially directed to actual incidents/issues 
 Regular audits (quality factors) 
H  Management of change procedure: (deviation from plans, strategic 
direction, design) 
 Terms of reference: the investigation task are described for the 
investigation leader and team what they are supposed to do and deliver  
 HSE responsible checks what he have ordered is what he gets, and 
sends back the document if this is not adequate (can be external or 
internal actors) 
 Discussions (reference groups, investigation part)  
 Improvement processes to ensure frame work for investigation 
procedures (involves several actors in discussions, check and balance) 
 Nonconformance (deviation) 
 Incident system: document that a single task where performed wrongly  
 Miss system: condition reveals possible risks  
 Near miss: near incidents 
 Safety coaches on the rigs that constantly monitors the conditions 
(daily conversations, meetings every week to judge existing 
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procedures)  
 Challenging culture (company challenges itself all the time, are 
challenged by external partner)   
 Uses the involving principle (safety representative, developing 
programs over time, half an over sessions every Thursday where 
knowledge are cheered) 
 Participate in networks to exchange experiences  
 In Norway it is one strong coordinating supervisor authority (controls 
the other twelve)  
 Audit plans/documentation  
 Informal discussions  
 Yearly reviews to judge the existing overall control system 
 Constantly judgment of existing procedures  
 Local expertise 
I  Teleconference between actors all over the world every fourteenth day 
with one leader which described the incident (quality check of the 
investigation as well as the line get to submit its issue) 
 Use of common project plan (drilling, logistics, purchase) to ensure 
that all work in the same direction (mutual dependence of each other)  
 Project meetings to ensure transparency regarding what have been 
done 
 GAMAB: system where all incidents are registered (includes reports 
by external supplier)  
 Systems must be easy to update  
 Train on worst case scenarios (cooperate with external actors), 
brainstorm what could happen 
 Awareness sessions to communicate important issues out in the 
organization (30 minutes before lunch once a week, all were invited 
and came if they could) have to be aware of the time when performing 
this as well as it do not take too long time  
 Meetings with partners in the license  
 Different forums within the industry to exchange experience (people 
within the same field for example HSE meets and exchange 
experiences) 
 Update processes, plans when achieve new knowledge  
 Gathering with people from different fields/suppliers (HSE, drilling) to 
ensure that everyone knows what is happening in a process and are 
updated  
 A continually update between companies when performing an activity  
 Yearly audit of the overall management system  
 Management of change procedures 
 
C.9 How to follow up reports 
Here it is revealed how the companies follow up reports.   
Interviewee  Answers  
A  Daily meetings between onshore and offshore personnel 
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 Weekly closure and follow up of reported incidents  
 Assure consensus among actors, involve leadership if it is a red 
incident 
 A matrix system to separate different incident after how serious they 
are (possibility/consequence) 
B  Transfer most serious incidents from an external actor to the company 
system (all incidents that lead to damage on people as well as serious 
near misses are registered and cases that relates to quality on 
equipment that the company have contract to) 
C  Matrix system to define the seriousness in order to define the measures 
D  Based on the incident (is it a well-known incident) 
 ALARP-principle 
E  HSE specialists onshore receives reports from offshore personnel and 
make a self-assessment on if the reports are of interest to investigate 
any further  
 Often more alert on equipment that have been involved in earlier 
incidents 
F  Personal experience, gives the basis for what is addressed to the 
operator 
G  Matrix system (ALARP) 
 Continually third part risk evaluation (to see development in mainly 
the probability development) 
H  Risk matrix (ALARP) 
 Discussion within different perspective (determine the probability) 
 Special meetings if issues are important enough 
I  Corporate guidelines (risk matrix)  
 Important to distinguish what the line itself are going to do and what 
HSE support functions are going to do 
 
C.10 How to implement measures  
How measures are implemented is here mapped.  
Interviewee  Answers  
A  A mixture of series and parallel 
 Think mostly short sight 
 After correcting a failure it is important to make a lesson learned to 
document what learned 
 Go through lesson learned later 
 Important with communication between operators, HSE responsible 
personnel and economists 
B  Tasks are often performed on the crossroad between departments and 
things are done simultaneously, by communicate between departments 
 It is a relatively short time horizon the tasks are performed on 
 Continuous planning are performed to see beyond when things are 
done 
C  Working through contractors 
 Clearly specify measures by good communication 
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 Limited time horizon 
D  The top management develops visions, which are communicated 
further down in the organization. It is then developed project goals and 
performance indicators based on this  
 Focus on seeing alternative ways of performing things  
 Contracts with external suppliers, that provides services, make sure 
that tasks are transparent so that coordination between actors are 
possible 
E  Training, which are evaluated later 
 Audits against the operator to see if things are done right/right things 
are done  
 Relatively short time horizon (one year) 
 Dialog with operator to reveal differences and achieve consensus 
F  Risk matrices on functions are gathered in a total package 
 Plans for the living time of the well 
G  Capture the immediate needs and develop plans based on this (short 
sight)  
 Take a round with different actors to achieve an common plan 
 Things are mainly done in parallel because of complex interactions (a 
need to communicate well)  
 Do things known before implementing change  
 Go through every other year the management system  
 Ensure individual ownership to ensure support around things 
 Licenses to ensure partnership, the operator are the main force, but the 
other actors are following what is being done 
 Continually adherence with belonging consequences to ensure that 
actors are adapting new measures 
H  Important to evaluate both if the right things and done and if things are 
done right  
 Documented what to do (compliance with rules, no need to go further 
up in the system, unless very serious incident)  
 Dimensioned plans to achieve different goals (risk assessment of 
different actions, dimension of measures) 
 Things are done in series (assessment-make plans/decide-develop 
knowledge and systems-implementation-monitoring), well established 
method 
 Following the bowtie principle (are aware of what is on the probability 
side and what is on the consequence side) 
I  Use old projects as a basis for new ones (exchange experience from 
old projects) 
 Use a overall plan for the company as a support for the project plan  
 Do the things that can be done first to be sure of completion of projects  
 Yearly management meetings to make plans for further activities and 
communicate this down the organization 
 Things tend to be done in series 
 Ensure ownership to tasks 
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